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Abstract 
This study aims to examine the determinants and consequences of the Quality of Forward-
looking Information Disclosure (QFLID) among non-financial Indian listed companies. 
Following objectives are accomplished in this study: Firstly, to investigate the association 
between Corporate Governance mechanisms (CG) and QFLID. Secondly, to investigate the 
impact of QFLID on Firm Value (FV) and lastly, to investigate the impact of QFLID on the 
Accuracy of Analysts’ Earnings Forecast (ACUAF). The study uses a sample of 2120 
observations of non-financial companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) from 
2006 to 2015. To measure QFLID, this study adopted a multidimensional framework designed 
by Beretta & Bozzolan (2008). Both the quantity and the richness dimensions are considered 
in this framework.   
Regarding the first objective, the results indicate that board size, frequency of board meetings, 
board independence, female presence on the board, frequency of audit committee meetings, 
independence of the audit committee and female presence on the audit committee have positive 
associations with the QFLID. These results are in line with the perspectives of the agency, 
signalling and resource-dependence theories. However, the study found that CEO duality, 
blockholder ownership, institutional ownership, promoters’ ownership, audit committee size 
and audit committee financial expertise have no relationship with the QFLID.  
To achieve the second objective, the empirical results found that QFLID is positively and 
significantly associated with FV, which is consistent with the agency and signalling theory 
perspectives. Thus, firms with high QFLID increase FV more than those with a low QFLID. 
Concerning the third objective, the analyses indicate that QFLID is positively associated with 
ACUAF, meaning that firms with high QFLID increase ACUAF as compared to those with 
low QFLID. This result supports the signalling theory, suggesting that managers increase FLID 
as it reduces information asymmetry and improves ACUAF. 
The current study also conducted a series of tests to check the robustness of the main results. 
The findings of these additional and robustness tests provide evidence that the essential 
findings of this study are robust and unchanged.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
This chapter covers the introduction of the current study. It is split into six sections. Section 
1.1 provides a brief overview and background of the research. Section 1.2 explains the study 
motivations. Section 1.3 sheds light on the research aim and objectives. Section 1.4 outlines 
the research methodology. Section 1.5 addresses the contribution of the study and Section 1.6 
reports the structure of the thesis.  
1.1 Research Overview 
Corporate disclosure is a significant research area that has attracted many accountancy 
researchers since the beginning of the 1960s (Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012). It plays a vital 
role in mitigating the issue of information asymmetry among all parties and reducing agency 
costs. Annual reports of a company are comprised of two disclosure types: Mandatory and 
Voluntary. Mandatory disclosure is compulsory for companies as multiple regulations and laws 
force companies to disclose a minimum amount of information that has to be revealed to users. 
Voluntary disclosure is further information that is reported by the company in their annual 
report, which exceeds the compulsory information. Although voluntary disclosure is 
information that is not legally required, it helps companies to promote a better image and also 
helps them to increase stakeholders’ confidence (Alnabsha, Abdou, Ntim, & Elamer, 2017; 
Meek, Roberts, & Gray, 1995a).   
Voluntary disclosure consists of two types: backward-looking information and forward-
looking information disclosure (FLID) (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007). FLID is an essential 
element of voluntary disclosure (Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Menicucci, 2013a). FLID 
contains information regarding a company’s future forecast (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007). It 
helps investors to evaluate a company’s future performance and increases their capability to 
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make rational investment decisions (Kieso, Weygandt, & Warfield, 2010). FLID also deals 
with non-financial information, such as uncertainties and risks. FLID has been defined in the 
literature by a number of authors. For instance, Hussainey (2004, p. 38) defines FLID as 
“information on predictions related to current and future plans to assist users of financial 
statement and other shareholders about firm’s future performance”. FLID is defined as 
“information or any forecast that assists to make assessments about the future; it comprises 
estimates of opportunities, management’s strategy and risks and predictions data” (Celik, Ecer, 
& Karabacak, 2006, p. 200). Similarly, FLID is defined as “information on future estimates 
that help users to evaluate company’s future performance” (Menicucci, 2013c, p. 1668). 
Likewise, FLID is defined as “corporate forecasts based on the future of the firm and provide 
valuable financial information to its owners who are concerned about its future performance ” 
(Alkhatib, 2014, p. 858). 
Recently, several official pronouncements have asserted the importance of FLID for financial 
information users. For instance, the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) in 
2002, and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW) in 2003 
recommended that firms’ annual financial reports should provide more FLID in order to meet 
users’ needs, which leads to creating long-term value. However, mere disclosure (low quality 
information) may have a negative impact on the market decisions (Botosan, 2004). If low 
quality information is reported by the manager, it will not enhance the judgments of financial 
decision makers and other stakeholders (Dhaliwal, Radhakrishnan, Tsang, & Yang, 2012). 
Thus, managers should provide high quality FLID to help users make their investment 
decisions.  
Prior studies have suggested several determinants of disclosure in general. It is also argued that 
CG is a key determinant of FLID (Alkhatib, 2014; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Kuzey, 2018; 
Mousa & Elamir, 2018; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Although no empirical study has examined 
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the impact of CG on QFLID, Aksu & Kosedag (2006) suggest that companies with high CG 
standards may have a better chance of providing high quality informative disclosure. CG assists 
in reducing information asymmetry by using adequate monitoring measures, such as adding 
more independent directors (Ebrahim & Fattah, 2015; El-Masry, Elbahar, & AbdelFattah, 
2016). In India, the Mandatory Corporate Governance Code was put in place in the year 2000 
by the Security Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and obliged all companies listed on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) and other stock exchanges to disclose certain levels of 
information in their financial reports (Sharma & Singh, 2009).  
Earlier studies, which examined the association between CG mechanisms and FLID, provide 
mixed results. For instance, Navarro & Urquiza (2015) found a positive impact of independent 
directors on FLID, although other researchers found no association between the two variables 
(Aljifri, Alzarouni, Ng, & Tahir, 2014; Ebrahim & Fattah, 2015; Kuzey, 2018; O’Sullivan, 
Percy, & Stewart, 2008; Uyar & Kilic, 2012). Wang & Hussainey (2013) found a negative 
association between CEO duality and FLID, while Navarro & Urquiza (2015) showed that 
CEO duality has no association with FLID. Wang & Hussainey (2013) and Navarro & Urquiza 
(2015) reveal that board size is positively related to FLID, whereas Kuzey (2018) and  Liu 
(2015) reported no association between BSIZE and FLID. Al-Najjar & Abed (2014) found 
block holder ownership is negatively linked with FLID, while Alqatamin et al. (2017) found 
no significant association between block holder ownership and FLID. 
These contradictory results might be because of measurement of FLID. The majority of earlier 
studies which examined the relationship between CG and FLID used quantity as a proxy to 
measure the quality of disclosure (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Alsaeed, 2006; Cooke, 1989; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hossain, Ahmed, & Godfrey, 2005; Hossain & Reaz, 2007; Inchausti, 
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1997; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Wallace, Naser, & Mora, 1994). Botosan (2004) and Urquiza et 
al. (2009) argued that the quantity of information disclosed does not necessary imply its quality.  
A closer look at the inconsistent results reveals that they can be reconciled if one can evaluate 
the quality of FLID. Therefore, the current study has a strong incentive to examine the 
relationship between CG and QFLID. Given the contradiction of prior studies’ findings, and 
the importance of the association between CG and FLID for market participants and academics, 
more research is needed. To the best of the researcher’s knowledge, no previous research 
examined the impact of CG on the QFLID in developing countries, particularly in India. 
Consequently, this study adopted a multidimensional framework to measure the QFLID for 
examining the impact of CG on QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
It is also interesting to note that the main aim of FLID is to provide users and stakeholders with 
beneficial information about a company’s future performance, and also to improve a firm’s 
decision making capability regarding its investments (Healy & Palepu, 2001; Kieso et al., 2010; 
Menicucci, 2013c; Singhvi & Desai, 1971). Aljifri & Hussainey (2007) indicate that FLID is 
usful in different contexts, such as the firm value (FV) and the accuracy of analyst forecasts 
(ACUAF). Firstly, few studies have examined the association between the FLID and FV and 
they reported mixed results (Bravo, 2015; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 
2013). However, no study has examined the quality of FLID in relation to FV. Thus, this 
study’s purpose is to bridge this potential knowledge gap and examine the link between QFLID 
and FV among Indian companies. Secondly, Lang & Lundholm (1996) highlight that financial 
analysts are an essential part of the capital market. They mentioned that analyst forecast 
contains information on earnings forecast, buying and selling guidance and other useful 
information for managers, brokers and investors. A limited number of studies have examined 
the link between FLID and ACUAF (Bozzolan, Trombetta, & Beretta, 2009). However, no 
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study considered the quality of FLID in relation to ACUAF. Therefore, in order to fill this gap, 
the present research examined the impact of QFLID on ACUAF among Indian listed 
companies. 
1.2 Research Motivations 
This research is motivated by several considerations. Firstly, FLID is beneficial for companies 
as it helps them to reduce information asymmetry (Alkhatib, 2014). When there is less 
information asymmetry between the company and its stakeholders, it enables the company to 
become more transparent and improve its decision making process. Beretta & Bozzolan (2004) 
highlight that the presence of FLID in annual reports of companies improves their overall 
credibility. On the other hand, a few studies suggest that FLID is not beneficial for companies 
due to various reasons (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007). For instance, the downside of FLID 
mentioned is that it provides competitors of a company with useful information related to the 
future that can affect the position of the company. Moreover, some of the information related 
to the future is not easy to predict and it can lead companies to lawsuits. By looking at the pros 
and cons of FLID, it creates a motivation to research further in this area.  
 Secondly, some prior studies adopted quantity as a proxy to measure the quality of FLID (Al-
Najjar & Abed, 2014; Bozzolan et al., 2009; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Hussainey, 
Schleicher, & Walker, 2003; Mathuva, 2012b; Qu et al., 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). 
Botosan (2004) argued that although quantity and quality are inseparable and difficult to 
measure, information quantity disclosed does not necessarily imply quality. Additionally, since 
it is difficult to measure disclosure quality due to issues of objectivity, the measurement of 
FLID quantity needs to be paralleled by quality measurement in order to clearly understand the 
QFLID. Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) supported this view and highlighted that it is not adequate 
to use the extent of disclosure (i.e. quantity of disclosure) to represent its quality. Therefore, 
 6 
 
this study uses a multidimensional approach to measure the quality, as it covers both 
dimensions, quantity and richness, to provide a better understanding.  
Thirdly, although prior studies have attempted to examine the effect of FLID on its 
consequences (FV and ACUAF), they have not taken the quality of FLID into consideration 
(Bozzolan et al., 2009; Bravo, 2015; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Kent & Ung, 2003; Wang 
& Hussainey, 2013). Thus, this study considers the quality of FLID and investigates its impact 
on both FV and ACUAF. In order to fill the potential gap in this area, it is interesting to 
investigate the association between QFLID and both FV and ACUAF. 
Finally, most of the previous studies, whether related to CG and FLID or to FLID and both FV 
and ACUAF, are conducted in developed countries (Agyei-Mensah, 2017; Al-Najjar & Abed, 
2014; Bozzolan et al., 2009; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Mathuva, 2012b; O’Sullivan et al., 
2008; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Thus, not much is known about these relationships in 
developing countries. Furthermore, evidences found by previous literature in the developed 
nations may not be helpful in understanding the association in developing nations, due to 
differences in environment and standards between these nations (Anglin, Edelstein, Gao, & 
Tsang, 2013). Siddiqui (2010) points out that most of the developing countries have poor 
infrastructure and enforcement is not up to standard. Based on this, the present research is 
motivated to investigate determinants and consequences of QFLID in India. 
This study focuses on India context for following reasons. Firstly, India is a rapidly growing 
economy and attracted many foreign investments to increase its growth rate substantially 
(Arora & Athreye, 2002; Prasad, Rogoff, Wei, & Kose, 2005). As India is a developing 
country, CG has been a central issue as, earlier, the enforcement of corporate laws in India 
remained under scrutiny. The World Bank (2004) report, which is based on codes and standards 
observance, reported that India observes the majority of the principles and can perform better 
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in areas such as enforcement of laws, insider trading and dealing with certain violations of the 
Companies Act.  
Secondly, India has a different ownership structure, which entails promoters and non-
promoters ownership. According to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), a 
promoter is defined as an individual or group of individuals who control the firm or act as an 
instrument in the formulation of a plan or programme pursuant to which the securities are 
offered to the public and those named in the prospectus as promoters (Ganguli & Agrawal, 
2009; Kumar & Singh, 2013). Promoter ownership is considered to be several types of 
investors, including individuals, family members and corporate bodies (Selarka, 2005). To 
protect the interest of the investing community, laws and regulations in India require that 
promoters should have more than 20% of the post issue share capital (Ganguli & Agrawal, 
2009). Kumar & Singh (2013) highlight that promoters in Indian firms raised the problem of 
owner-manager control. Charumathi & Ramesh (2015a) argue that companies with a higher 
promoters’ holding have less incentive for higher disclosure. Thirdly, previous studies have 
also argued that several factors, for instance culture, religion and other societal norms, may 
affect corporate disclosure (Gautam & Singh, 2010; Hastings, 2000). As India has different 
religions and cultures, QFLID might influenced by these characteristics.  
Fourthly, due to globalisation, CG is becoming an important area of consideration in India as 
their interaction with investors from developed countries is increasing rapidly. The Companies 
Act 1956 is an important legislation put in place for Indian companies, which enforces them to 
operate accordingly. The mandatory CG code was put in place by the Securities and Exchange 
Board of India (SEBI) in 2000 through Clause 49, followed by all the stock exchanges listed 
companies. The SEBI uses Clause 49 to monitor CG activities of listed companies. The listing 
agreement of the stock exchange in India is integrated with this clause. According to this clause, 
all the companies should disclose CG information as a separate section in their annual reports. 
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There is another requirement that companies should have a brief compliance report on CG. The 
report consists of nine sections, based upon the board of directors, risk management, 
compensation of directors, the audit committee, board meetings, shareholders’ information, 
communication means, management analysis and their discussion. The clause also requires 
companies to obtain certification from the audit committee regarding meeting CG conditions, 
as stated therein. The companies must attach this certificate to their annual report before 
sending it to the stock exchange.   
Finally, the stock market of India is comprised of 23 stock exchanges. However, there are two 
main stock exchanges, which govern the market, namely the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) 
and the National Stock Exchange (NSE). The BSE was established in 1878 and it is the oldest 
stock exchange in Asia. The BSE represents about 90% of over-all Indian market capitalisation. 
All the listed companies in India are required to comply with the regulations of the SEBI. 
For reporting purposes, there are two professional bodies in India, namely the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI) and Institute of Cost and Work Accountants of India 
(ICWAI). As per the ICAI, Indian companies’ reporting standards are in line with International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and International Standards on Auditing (ISA). 
Based on the above evidence, as India is a developing nation, which is growing rapidly, it is 
interesting to investigate the determinants and consequences of QFLID of Indian companies.  
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
This research aims to examine the determinants and consequences of QFLID in non-financial 
Indian listed firms. This study seeks to achieve the following objectives: 
 To examine the association between CG mechanisms and QFLID among non-financial 
Indian listed firms. 
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 To examine the relationship between QFLID and FV among non-financial Indian listed 
firms. 
 To investigate the association between QFLID and ACUAF among non-financial 
Indian listed firms. 
1.4 Research Methodology 
This section discusses the research methodology used in the present study. The details and 
justifications of the methodology are discussed in Chapter Four of the study. The association 
between CG mechanisms and QFLID is examined in Chapter Five. To measure the QFLID, 
this study adopted a multidimensional framework designed by Beattie et al (2004), which is 
further developed by Beretta & Bozzolan (2008). Both the quantity dimension and the richness 
dimension are considered in this framework. The second objective is to examine the 
relationship between QFLID and FV in Indian listed firms. Tobin’s Q ratio (TQ ratio) is used 
as the main proxy to measure FV, while market capitalisation (MC) is used as an alternative 
measurement of FV to check the robustness of the main analysis. The third objective is to 
examine the association between QFLID and ACUAF in Indian listed firms. In this study, 
ACUAF is used as the main analysis, whereas dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecast 
(DISAF) is employed as the robustness check.  This study uses annual reports for CG and 
QFLID data (Salama, Dixon, & Habbash, 2012), while the data regarding FV and ACUAF are 
collected through the OSIRIS database which contains reliable information on listed firms. 
In general, this research uses preliminary analysis, multivariate analysis and additional analysis 
in data analyses. In the preliminary analysis, this research discusses the descriptive statistics 
and checks for a multicollinearity problem through a correlation matrix and Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF). The study uses descriptive statistics to summarise and describe the basic features 
of the data in regards to the tests of central tendency. Both a correlation matrix and the VIF 
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methods are employed to test the correlation among sample explanatory variables, as well as 
to clarify the extent of linear association among two explanatory variables (Gujarati & Porter, 
2011). In addition to the preliminary analysis, this research uses multivariate methods to test 
the research hypotheses. The Chow test and Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier (LM) are 
conducted for regression models in order to decide whether the panel or pooled model is more 
appropriate. Moreover, the Hausman test is conducted in order to decide between the random 
and fixed effects models (Greene, 2008).  
This research performed additional (alternative) analyses to check the sensitivity and the 
robustness of the primary outcomes. Firstly, to confirm whether the main analysis differs or 
not, the sample is split into two sub-samples (high and low QFLID). Secondly, alternative 
measurements of dependent variables are used in order to examine the robustness of 
preliminary outcomes. The study conducts two-stage least square regression (2SLS) and 
instrumental variables (IV) to address the issue of endogeneity and to confirm whether this 
issue affects the primary results or not.   
1.5 Research Contributions 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge in several ways. Firstly, the present study 
adds a contribution to the literature in terms of determinants of FLID. It is noted that previous 
researchers have addressed the relationship between CG and the level of FLID. Most of them 
used the level or quantity of FLID as a proxy for its quality (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Al-
Najjar & Abed, 2014; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Mathuva, 2012b; Qu et al., 2015; Wang 
& Hussainey, 2013). It is noted that there is no previous study, which focuses on the association 
between CG and quality of FLID in developing countries, specifically in India. Thus, this study 
attempts to investigate the impact of CG on QFLID in Indian non-financial listed companies.  
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Secondly, limited research has attempted to examine the association between FLID and FV 
(Bravo, 2015; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Kent & Ung, 2003; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). 
However, these studies focused mainly on the quantity or the level of FLID. As per the 
researcher’s knowledge, this is the only study, which examines the impact of the QFLID on 
FV in developing countries, particularly in India. This study attempts to bridge this gap by 
examining the impact of the QFLID on FV in Indian non-financial listed companies.  
Thirdly, a few studies have investigated the relationship between FLID and ACUAF 
(Bozzolan et al., 2009). However, no study has taken QFLID into consideration in relation to 
ACUAF. Therefore, this is the first study to examine the impact of QFLID on ACUAF in a 
developing country (India). 
Finally, the majority of prior studies which have examined the above relationships (the 
relationship between CG and FLID; the relationship between FLID and FV; and the 
relationship between FLID and ACUAF) are conducted in developed countries. However, not 
much is known about these relationships in developing countries. Thus, this study has bridged 
this gap by examining the determinants and consequences of QFLID among Indian listed 
companies.   
1.6 Structure of the Study 
This section explains the structure of the present research, which is comprised of seven 
chapters. The study consists of the following chapters: Chapter One covers the overview and 
background of the research, study motivations, study aim and objectives, methodology, 
research contribution and ends with the structure of the study.  
Chapter Two sheds light on the literature of FLID. It covers working definitions of FLID, its 
motivations and the quality of FLID. It also reviews the empirical studies conducted to examine 
FLID. The first section discusses prior studies, which examined CG with FLID. The second 
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section discusses the existing literature regarding the consequences of FLID in relation to FV 
and ACUAF. 
Chapter Three reviews the theoretical framework and hypotheses development. The first 
section discusses various theories to explain the link between CG and voluntary disclosure and 
an understanding of how voluntary disclosure links with both FV and ACUAF. 
Chapter Four discusses the research methodology adopted for this study. It starts with the 
research methodology, the sample of the study and data collection. It provides the explanation 
and justification of methods used for measuring QFLID as a dependent variable in the first 
model, as an independent variable in both the second and third models, and FV and ACUAF 
as dependent variables in the second and third models respectively. Moreover, this chapter 
provides three models used in the present research, together with the analysis processes.   
Chapter Five discusses the results regarding the association between CG and QFLID. Several 
analyses, including descriptive statistics, multicollinearity problems (using pairwise correlation 
and VIF) and the multivariate analysis are used to present the results. Furthermore, this chapter 
explains additional analyses to check the sensitivity and robustness of the outcomes. In 
addition, the robustness or sensitivity of the outcomes was confirmed by analysing the presence 
of the endogeneity problem.  
Chapter Six covers the results of the association between QFLID and both FV and ACUAF. 
This chapter reports the findings using descriptive statistics, followed by the multicollinearity 
analysis (pairwise correlation and VIF) and multivariate analysis. Further analyses and 
sensitivity analyses are also presented in this chapter to confirm the robustness of the main 
results. The present study investigates whether high and low quality FLID have different 
impacts on dependent variables (TQ ratio and ACUAF). Moreover, alternative measurements 
of dependent variables (MC and DISAF) are used to examine the robustness of the preliminary 
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outcomes. In addition, the sensitivity of the outcomes was checked against the presence of the 
issue of endogeneity. 
Chapter Seven provides the conclusion of the present research. This includes the summary of 
the key findings, discusses the implications of the findings, the limitations of this research and 
provides recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review (FLID) 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter focus on overview and the previous studies related to FLID. It is organize as 
follows: Section 2.2 covers the concept and definition of FLID. Section 2.3 nature of FLID. 
Section 2.4 provides motivations of FLID. Section 2.5 explains the usefulness of FLID. Section 
2.6 clarifies the quality of FLID. Section 2.7 covers the determinants of FLID. Section 2.8 
review the empirical literature of FLID that consists of three parts as: section 2.8.1 discusses 
the empirical studies regarding CG and FLID, while section 2.8.2 discusses empirical studies 
regarding FLID and FV and section 2.8.3 discusses empirical studies regarding FLID and 
ACUAF. Section 2.9 research gap and finally section 2.10 presents the summary of current 
chapter.  
2.2. Concept and Definition of FLID 
Company’s annual reports are comprised of two types of disclosure: Mandatory and Voluntary. 
Mandatory disclosure is compulsory for companies as multiple regulations and laws force 
companies to disclose a minimum amount of information that has to be revealed to users. 
Voluntary disclosure is further information that is reported by the company in their annual 
report, which exceeds the compulsory information. Additionally, voluntary disclosure is 
classifiable into two categories: ‘backward-looking information’ and FLID (Hussainey, 2004). 
While the past financial performance of a firm is reported using backward-looking information 
whereas in FLID the information is related to the current company’s plans and their forecasts 
for the future (e.g., their earnings, anticipated revenues and expected cash flow). Information 
related to the future helps investors and other stakeholders to make an assessment regarding 
the future financial performance of the company. FLID also deals with non-financial 
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information (e.g. uncertainties and risks that can have an impact on the projected outcomes). 
As FLID is subjective so preparation of such information need professional judgement. 
Previous studies identified FLID in the annual report narratives by using certain keywords like 
“estimate,” “outlook,” “next,” “likely,” “anticipate,” “expect,” “believes”, “intends”, “plans” 
“forecast” or other similar vocabulary (Hussainey et al., 2003; Muslu, Radhakrishnan, 
Subramanyam, & Lim, 2011).  
FLID has been defined in the literature by a number of authors. For instance, Hussainey (2004, 
p. 38) defines FLID as “information on predictions related to current and future plans to assist 
users of financial statement and other shareholders about firm’s future performance”. In the 
same vein, FLID is defined as “information or any forecast that assists to make assessments 
about the future; it comprises estimates of opportunities, management’s strategy and risks and 
predictions data” (Celik et al., 2006, p. 200). Similarly, FLID is defined as “information on 
future estimates that help users to evaluate company’s future performance” (Menicucci, 2013c, 
p. 1668). Likewise, FLID is defined as “corporate forecasts based on the future of the firm and 
provide valuable financial information to its owners who are concerned about its future 
performance ” (Alkhatib, 2014, p. 858).   
Based on the discussion above, this study defines FLID as information on future estimates that  
provide users and stakeholders with beneficial information about a company’s future 
performance and also improves a firm’s decision making capability regarding its investments. 
Therefore, this research considers FLID to be a key tool that assists stakeholders and users of 
a company’s financial reports to evaluate FV and ACUAF. 
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2.3. Nature of FLID 
Previous research look at the presentation of FLID in the corporate annual report. According 
to Aljifri & Hussainey (2007) and Bujaki & Zéghal (1999), FLID can be classified into various 
types of inforamtion like financial and non-financial, qualitative and quantitative, good and 
bad news, one year and multiple years’ forecasts information.  
A number of research described the nuture of FLID in the annual report. For instant, Bujaki & 
Zéghal (1999) studied the nature of FLID published in Management Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) and analyed chairmen’s statements for fourty six Canadian firms. Their results 
indicate that 19.2% of the information in MD&A and in chairmen’s statement is related to 
FLID. Furthermore, the findings reveal that most of the FLID is qualitative and firm-specific. 
In addition, the results indicate that good news is of higher porportion that is 97.5% of the  
information as compare to bad  news that represent only 2.5%. Moreover, Clarkson et al. (1994) 
aruge that managers are highly likely to disclose favourable FLID mostly in annual reports. In 
addition, Clatworthy & Jones (2003) found that firms tend to disclose mostly good news 
regarding its performance and take credit for it whereas bad news related to its preformance is 
attributed to external sources. Furthermore, Wang & Hussainey (2013) reveal that FLID in UK 
firms reporting is neither verifiable or auditable as it is most comprised of good news.   
2.4. Motivations of FLID  
Several studies attempted to explain the motivation of companies regarding FLID. For instance, 
a number of studies have asserted that FLID is use to reduce information asymmetry between 
managers and investors , and to increase financial analysts’ confidence (Bujaki & Zéghal, 1999; 
Lundholm & Van Winkle, 2006; Morton & Neill, 2001). Therefore, managers disclose more 
FLID to increase stakeholders confidence about the firms future performance (Healy & Palepu, 
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2001). Likewise, Lundholm & Winkle (2006) argue that firms tend to disclose a greater extent 
of FLID to make it more valuable and to reduce the degree of information asymmetry between 
insider (managers) and outsiders (shareholders). It also help firms to take advantage of a lower 
cost of capital.  
Graham et al. (2005)  reveals that managers in the US make a voluntary disclosure for three 
reasons: i) to enhance a reputation for transparent reporting; ii) to address the insufficiencies 
of mandatory disclosure; and iii) to minimize the information risk assigned to the company’s 
stock. Hence, managers are more likely to disclose more FLID to the stakeholders to increase 
their confidence about the company’s future performance (Singhvi and Desai 1971; Healy and 
Palepu 2001). Clarkson et al.  (1994) indicated that the disclosure of such information is viewed 
as one measurement of financial reporting quality, suggesting that financial reports including 
FLID are more likely to be percieved as qualitative. 
Other studies considered that the disclosure of accounting information is essential for parties 
who utilise this information in order to make rational investment decisions (Kieso et al., 2010; 
Menicucci, 2013c). For example, the study by Menicucci (2013c) reported that FLID would 
enhance the ability of shareholders to assess future cash flows, estimate future earnings and 
make better decisions regarding their investments. In particular, current and potential investors 
rely on financial information to take decisions in order to buy, sell or maintain their 
investments.  
In addition, Verrecchia (1983)  and Verrecchia & Weber (2006) reveal that even if disclosure 
is costly because of product market consequences, managers may tend to extend the level of 
voluntary disclosure in order to avoid undervaluation of their shares by the capital market. 
Furthermore, expanding the level of disclosure can improve intermediation for a firm’s stock 
in the capital market (Core, 2001). Healy & Palepu (2001) and Walker & Tsalta (2001) 
concluded that companies disclose more information because they suppose expected benefits 
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will exceed costs. Furthermore, Kieso et al. (2010) mention that FLID contain both financial 
and non-financial information and it is useful for investors in their decision making process as 
they pay greater attention to information related to firms future forecasts. Schleicher & Walker 
(1999) and Hussainey et al. (2003) suggest that increased FLID in annual reports improves the 
capital market’s ability to estimate future earnings surprises.  
2.5. Usefulness of FLID 
Prior studies investigated the benefits of FLID in different context. It covers issues like 
corporate future performance forecast, characteristics of analyst forecast and behaviour of 
stock price (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007).  
A number of research investigated the role of FLID in forecasting corporate future 
performance. Clarkson et al. (1994; 1999) indicate that the inclusion of FLID in the annual 
reports is much informative regarding firms future performance. Moreover, they found that 
change in the extent of FLID in MD&A is positively related to the firms future performance. 
That means the inclusion of FLID in MD&A provide value relevant information. Li (2010) 
investigated that whether the inclusion of FLIDs in MD&A is informative about future 
performance or not. The result reveal that FLID in MD&A is very informative with regards to 
firms future performance. Menicucci (2013c) highlight that FLID improves shareholders 
ability to assess future cash flows more efficiently, to make better future earnings estimates 
and make effective investment decisions.  
Prior studies also focused on examining the impact of FLID on financial analyst forecast. 
Barron et al. (1999) found that  a higher level of FLID regarding operations and capital 
expenditure is related to analysts’ forecasts accuracy. Likewise, Walker & Tsalta (2001) 
reported positive relationship between FLID and analyst forecast published in narrative 
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reporting. Furthermore, Vanstraelen et al. (2003) indicate that FLID increases accuracy of 
analyst forecasts but back-ward information disclosure has no impact on it. Moreover, 
Bozzolan et al. (2009) mention that  FLID shed light on the anticipated influence on company 
performance and it improves accuracy of analyst forecast. 
Other studies investigated the association between FLID and stock market in annual reports. 
For instance, Muslu et al. (2011) tested whether FLID in MD&A aid investors to predict future 
earnings. Their results indicate that the greater extent of FLID in MD&A assist investors to 
predict future earnings more efficiently. Furthermore, Schleicher & Walker (1999) and 
Hussainey et al. (2003) found that a huge amount of FLID in narrative reporting improve 
capability of stock market to predict future earnings variations. Additionally, Wang and 
Hussainey (2013) provide evidence that FLID of companies who are well-governed improve 
the stock market ability to predict its future earnings. Moreover, Athanasakou & Hussainey 
(2014) examined the role of FLID in annual reports of companies. Their findings highlight that 
investors are dependant on future oriented information to predict company’s future earnings. 
2.6. The quality of FLID 
The main purpose of disclosure is to provide high quality information concerning economic 
entities and useful for economic decision making (Van Beest, Braam, & Boelens, 2009). 
Providing high quality information is important because it will positively influence capital 
providers and other stakeholders in making investment, credit, and similar resource allocation 
decisions enhancing overall market efficiency (Van Beest et al., 2009).  
Disclosure is a key tool of corporate accountability for investors that useful to consider when 
making decisions. In releasing information, a company has to consider the quality of disclosure. 
The quality is a complex and context-specific concept in nature. There are variety of ways to 
define quality of voluntary accounting disclosures. King (1996) defined quality as a degree of 
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self-interested bias in disclosure. Whereas, Hopkins (1996) termed quality as the ease that 
enables investors to read and evaluate the disclosed information. Wallace & Naser (1995) 
stated that disclosure should first align and be suitable for purpose.  Second, information must 
be informative for users. Third, the firm should convey not only good news but also bad 
conditions.  Fourth, the financial reports should have timelines or periodic reports. Fifth, the 
information is able to be read easily and understandably by users. Sixth, the information should 
be related to company risks, and analysis of performance.  Finally, the company should release 
the information completely and comprehensively.  
Furthermore, Bagnoli & Watts (2005) argued that the quality of disclosure is affected by the 
managers’ intentions, which affects whether they will expose performance transparently or not. 
Before presenting with the firm’s information transparently, the managers might consider what 
the contents of the information that was reported will be: these contents may depend on the 
quality of the information they choose to reveal, whether they are presenting bad or good news, 
and whether it will trigger a firm’s value to decrease or increase. 
Botosan (2004) debates that high quality disclosure is useful to the information's users in 
making financial decisions. It is argued that the quality of information disclosed is high if it is 
positively associated with analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008), 
which suggest that disclosure quality is value relevant information to market participants 
(Baek, Kang, & Park, 2004; Healy, Hutton, & Palepu, 1999). Empirical previous studies have 
examined impact of FLID on FV, ACUAF, asymmetric information and firm’s reputation 
(Bozzolan et al., 2009; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Since 
agency and singling theories suggest that the QFLID could be used to reduce information 
asymmetries (Miller & Bahnson, 2002; Watts & Zimmerman, 1986), it can be expected that 
the QFLID is useful for various stakeholders and hence include a positive phenomenon for 
stock markets (Garrido-Miralles & Sanabria-García, 2014). 
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Based on above discussion, the QFLID, which is the focus of this study, can be define as value 
relevant information to market participants, and it helps users for economic decision making 
through reduce information asymmetries. Hence, improving both FV and ACUAF.  
2.7. Determinants of FLID 
Previous studies have used firms’ characteristics and CG mechanisms as determinants of FLID 
(Agyei-Mensah, 2017; Agyei-Mensah & Agyei-Mensah, 2017; Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Al-
Najjar & Abed, 2014; Kuzey, 2018; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). 
Several studies have used firms’ characteristics as determinants of FLID (Aljifri & Hussainey, 
2007; Alkhatib, 2014; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Celik et al., 2006; Kuzey, 2018; Mousa & 
Elamir, 2018). Firm size has been used in literature as an important determinant of FLID. Since 
firm size is used a proxy for political visibility, prior studies found evidence that size to have a 
strong impact on disclosure (Beattie et al., 2004; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Kuzey, 2018). 
Kuzey (2018) and Wang & Hussainey (2013) suggest that FLID proposed to reduce 
information asymmetry and mitigate agency costs. Company profitability is another variable 
represented as determinants of FLID. Past research suggested that company profitability 
controls the potential effects on the FLID (Alkhatib, 2014; Kuzey, 2018; Uyar & Kilic, 2012). 
Signalling theory assumes that, if companies are performing well, they are liable to signal their 
activities to investors (Watson, 2002). Another determinant of FLID is leverage, previous 
research indicated leverage as an essential factor that may have an impact on disclosure 
practices (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Ho & Wong, 2001a; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011; Oyelere, 
Laswad, & Fisher, 2003). Agency theory assumes that firms who have higher leverage tend to 
incur higher monitoring costs (Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Watson, 
Shrives, & Marston, 2002). Liquidity is an indicator of the company’s ability to cover its 
current obligations. Signalling theory assumes that managers of high liquidity companies tend 
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to disclose more information, as it signals their ability in managing liquidity as compared to 
managers who are managing lower liquidity (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). Firms with a higher 
growth rate may have higher information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, so 
they would have more incentives to disclose voluntary information in order to reduce this 
information gap (Gul & Leung, 2004). Industry type is also indicated by previous studies as a 
determinant variable of FLID (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Alkhatib & Marji, 2012; Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2008; Celik et al., 2006; Kuzey, 2018).  
Furthermore, CG is one of the key determinants of corporate disclosure. It is also a crucial issue 
that is being addressed extensively by regulators and capital market participants around the 
world (El-Masry, Elbahar, & AbdelFattah, 2016). European Central Bank (ECB) (2004) 
defined CG as a set of processes and procedures to which a company is managed and directed. 
Gillian (2006) explained that the need of CG mechanisms is due to the separation between 
capital managers and capital providers. According to Fama & Jensen (1983), CG play a key 
role in monitoring and curbing managerial opportunism to make sure that shareholder’s right 
are not being violated. Moreover, CG assists in reducing asymmetric information by using 
adequate monitoring measures such as adding more independent directors. According to Aksu 
& Kosedag (2006), companies that use high CG standards have a better chance of providing 
more informative disclosure. 
Most definitions of CG provided by prior literature are concerned with shareholder protection 
through improving disclosure quality. According to Gillan & Starks (1998, p.4), CG is “the 
system of laws, regulations and factors that controls operations at a company”. On the other 
side, Donelly & Mulcahly (2008) explained CG as a set of corporate mechanism designed to 
monitor managerial decisions and to make sure that corporation is operating according to the 
interests of its stakeholders. El-Masry et al. (2016) argue that a more appropriate definition of 
CG comprises additional components such as disclosure of board composition, including the 
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number of independent directors on the board; composition of various committees of the board; 
and separation of chair of the board and CEO. The main benefit of having an effective CG 
system is that it helps to build a strong financial system whether it’s company-based or market-
based, that have a huge impact on economic growth. According to Solomon (2007), CG enable 
companies to control external and internal environments to ensure that all its operations are 
executions according to stakeholder’s interests. By the same token, John & Senbet (1998) 
highlight that CG enable stakeholders to exert control over a company by exercising their rights 
as established by regulators. Due to the effective of CG lead to more transparency, all the 
stakeholders like managers, creditors, suppliers, shareholders will be able to protect their 
interests in the company.  
The role of company disclosure quality is really important as it enable companies to reduce 
information asymmetry between internal and external stakeholders. Ho et al. (2008) highlight 
that if the disclosure information is accurate and reliable, then it enable investors to make 
effective investments decisions. If CG companies are applied in companies then managers have 
less chance to manage their interest by holding information as the quality of monitoring will 
be improved. CG and voluntary disclosure are studied as accountability mechanisms (Hidalgo, 
García-Meca, & Martínez, 2011). It is highlighted by Karamanou & Vafaes (2005) that 
effective CG reduces the problem of information asymmetry and improve the transparency of 
the firm’s operations. It is one of the most discussed and an important area of interest for both 
academics and businesses. Following Cerbioni & Parbonetti (2007) and Brown et al. (2011), 
due to a monitoring role of CG, it is expected that CG mechanisms and quality of firm’s 
disclosure is positively associated. Based on above discussion, this study expects a positive 
association between CG and quality of FLID.  
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2.8. Empirical Literature of FLID 
This part review various aspects of the literature related to this study’s hypotheses. Firstly, the 
association between CG mechansimes and FLID. Secondly, the relationship between FLID and 
FV. Thirdly, the association between FLID and ACUAF. 
2.8.1. Empirical Studies of CG and FLID 
Corporate disclosure is a significant research area that has attracted many researchers in 
accounting since the beginning of 1960s (Hussainey & Al‐Najjar, 2012). Extensive studies 
based on developed and developing countries of corporate disclosure has been examined in the 
literature. Most of them investigated the determinants of the level of disclosure and impact of 
firm characteristics on observed disclosure practices, which may explain the variations in 
disclosure level (e.g. Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Aljifri et al., 2014; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; 
Cooke, 1989; Dyduch & Krasodomska, 2017; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Kolsi & Kolsi, 
2017; Wang & Claiborne, 2008). Recently, number of empirical studies has investigated the 
relationship between voluntary corporate disclosure and CG (Alnabsha et al., 2017; Eng & 
Mak, 2003; Madhani, 2014; Madhani, 2016; Maskati & Hamdan, 2017; Samaha, Khlif, & 
Hussainey, 2015; Yilmaz, Kurt-Gumus, & Aslanertik, 2017). It also there are a number of 
studies investigated the relationship between CG and FLID (Agyei-Mensah, 2017; Agyei-
Mensah & Agyei-Mensah, 2017; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Kuzey, 2018; Wang & Hussainey, 
2013). However, no study has examined the link between CG and QFLID. Thus, in order to 
develop study hypotheses this section will discuss both voluntary disclosure in general and 
FLID in particular.  
Firstly, previous studies used number of variables like the board of directors, audit committees, 
ownership structure and firm characteristics to study the impact of CG on corporate disclosure. 
Numerous studies display examples of the board of directors characteristics (Alnabsha et al., 
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2017; Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016a; Chen & Jaggi, 2001; Eng & Mak, 2003; Haniffa & Cooke, 
2002), Audit committee (Aljifri et al., 2014; e.g. Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 2006; S. S. Ho & 
Shun Wong, 2001; Samaha et al., 2015) to study the mechanism of CG. Ownership structure 
have been examined as an explanatory variable in the literature of disclosure (e.g. Alhazaimeh, 
Palaniappan, & Almsafir, 2014; Alnabsha et al., 2017; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Huafang & 
Jianguo, 2007).  
Several studies attempted to investigate the relationship between CG and voluntary disclosure. 
For instance, Chen & Jaggi (2001) examined the association between the independence of 
board directors (proxy of CG) and comprehensiveness of financial disclosure by using a sample 
size of 87 companies operating in Hong Kong. The study found a positive relationship between 
the ratio of independence of board directors and the extent of financial disclosure. Moreover, 
it is indicated that this relationship is stronger in non-family controlled companies as compare 
to family controlled companies. Similarly, Ho & Wong (2001a) studied the association 
between CG and level of voluntary disclosure among listed Hong Kong firms. Their study 
include CG variables like the ratio of independence of board directors, audit committee 
existence, CEO duality, and the proportion of family members on the board. Their results found 
a significant positive relationship between the existence of an audit committee and the level of 
voluntary disclosure. They reported a negative relation between ratio of family members’ on 
board and the level of voluntary disclosure. The outcome of a positive relationship between the 
existence of an audit committee and level of voluntary disclosure is in line with the study 
conducted by Barako et al. (2006) who study the factors that may affect voluntary disclosure 
in Kenyan listed companies.  
Haniffa & Cooke (2002) investigated the association between CG that’s include factors like 
(board composition, cross-directorships, role duality, and the inclusion of family members, 
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financial director and non-executive chairperson on the board) and the level of voluntary 
disclosure. They used a sample of 87 non-financial companies listed on the Kuala Lampur 
Stock Exchange for the period 1995. The study reported a significant positive association 
between two variables of CG (non-executive chairman and family members sitting on the 
board) and voluntary disclosure level. Using similar sample for the year 2000, Ghazali & 
Weetman (2006) attempted to examine the impact of board characteristics and ownership 
structure on the level of voluntary disclosure. They found that the percentage of family 
members on the board has a negative impact on the extent of voluntary disclosure and found 
insignificant association between board composition and the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Moreover, Gul & Leung (2004) used a sample of 385 non-financial listed companies based in 
Hong Kong for the year 1996 to examine the relationship between board leadership structure 
represented by CEO role duality, the ratio of independent directors on the board and the level 
of voluntary disclosure. Their outcomes show a negative association of voluntary disclosure 
with CEO duality and the ratio of independent directors on the board.  
Chau & Gray (2002) attempted to investigate the impact of ownership structure on corporate 
voluntary disclosure among 60 Hong Kong and 62 Singapore companies for the year 1997. 
They found that the extent of voluntary disclosure is positively and significantly associated 
with a wider ownership structure. In the same vein, using a sample of 158 listed companies in 
Singapore, Eng & Mak (2003) investigated empirically the impact of CG on the extent of 
voluntary disclosure. The ownership structure divided into government ownership, block 
holder ownership and managerial ownership. Their outcomes indicate that the government 
ownership and lower managerial ownership have a positive relationship with voluntary 
disclosure, whereas there is no relationship between block holder and the extent of disclosure.  
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Ghazali & Weetman (2006) studied the impact of ownership concentration, number of 
shareholders, director and government ownership on the level of voluntary disclosure. Their 
outcomes show that there is significant relationship between director ownership and the level 
of voluntary disclosure, while government ownership have no significant impact on voluntary 
disclosure. Barako et al. (2006) investigate the effect of the level of ownership structure on 
voluntary disclosure among Kenyan listed companies from 1992 to 2001. They found that the 
level of institutional and foreign ownership have a positive influence on the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Furthermore, Tsamenyi et al. (2007) attempted to investigate the influence of the 
CG on the level of voluntary disclosure in Ghanaian companies. They found that firm size, 
ownership structure and dispersion of shareholding have a significant positive relationship with 
voluntary disclosure, while leverage has insignificant association.   
In the same vein, Huafang & Jianguo (2007) investigated the influence of ownership structure 
on the level of voluntary disclosure by using a sample size of 559 listed firms in China for the 
year 2002. They found that block holder ownership and foreign listing/shares ownership is 
related significantly to the level of voluntary disclosure. Whereas, state ownership, managerial 
ownership and legal-person ownership have insignificant association with voluntary 
disclosure. Likewise, in Taiwan, Guan et al. (2007) studied the relationship between ownership 
structure and the level of disclosure. Their outcomes indicate that institutional ownership and 
director ownership have a positive association with the extent of voluntary disclosure.  
Cheng & Courtenay (2006) examined the association between the role of the board of directors, 
board size and CEO duality on the level of voluntary disclosure using 104 firms for the year 
2009. Their findings show a significant positive association between the level of voluntary 
disclosure and ratio of independent non-executive directors. Similarly, Patelli & Prencipe 
(2007) used a sample of 175 non-financial companies listed on the Milan Stock Exchange for 
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the year 2002 to examine the relationship between independent directors and level of voluntary 
disclosure. Their outcomes revealed a positive and significant association between independent 
directors and the level of voluntary disclosure. Moreover, Lim et al. (2007) used 181 companies 
sample and attempted to investigate the association between board composition and the level 
of voluntary disclosure. The study found a positive relationship between board composition 
and the level of voluntary disclosure. 
Akhtaruddin et al. (2009) studied association between CG and voluntary disclosure by using a 
sample of 94 Malaysian listed companies. Several board characteristics were tested in this 
study that includes board size, ratio of independence board of directors and the ratio of audit 
committee members to total members on the board. The study concluded that board size and 
ratio of independence board of directors have a positive and significant association with the 
level of voluntary disclosure, whereas there is insignificant relationship between the proportion 
of audit committee members to total members on the board and the level of voluntary 
disclosure. Garcia-Meca & Sanchez-Ballesta (2010) conducted a meta-analysis by using 
review of 27 empirical studies from around the world to examine the impact of the ratio of 
independent directors and ownership concentration on voluntary disclosure. They found that 
board independence has a positive influence on the level of voluntary disclosure, while there 
is negative association between ownership concentration and corporate voluntary disclosure. 
Ho & Taylor (2013) examine the relationship between CG and voluntary disclosure by utilizing 
a sample of 100 Malaysian firms over three socio-economic periods: 1996, 2001 and 2006. The 
result highlight a positive and significant relationship between firms’ CG structure and 
voluntary disclosure. In the same vein, Allegrini & Greco (2013) studied the relationship 
between CG variables and voluntary disclosure, using 177 listed Italian firms for year 2007. 
Their outcomes show a positive association between board size, diligence (proxies by board 
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and audit committee total meetings) and the frequency of audit committee meetings in regards 
with voluntary disclosure. There is negative association between CEO duality and corporate 
voluntary disclosure. Similarly, Jouini (2013) using non-financial listed Tunisian companies 
from 2004 till 2009, showed empirically that level of disclosure is explained by various factors 
like CEO duality, ownership concentration and control quality proxies by the number of 
auditors and presence of the Big 4 audit firms.  
Aljifri et al. (2014) investigate the relationship among CG and corporate financial disclosure 
among 153 listed and non-listed UAE companies. The result found that both board composition 
and audit committee have no impact on voluntary disclosure. Alhazaimeh et al. (2014) provide 
empirical evidence of CG influence on coporate voluntary disclosure in Jordanian companies. 
The study examined five board characteristics that include board size, board composition, 
board activity, non-executive directors and audit committee. The findings show there is 
significant relationship between voluntary disclosure and board compensation only. Similarly, 
Sartawi et al. (2014) investigated the association between board composition and voluntary 
disclosure by using annual reports of listed 103 Jordanian companies for year 2012. The study 
reveal that higher ownership concentration reduce voluntary disclosure but foreign and old 
directors enable to improve its level.   
A recent meta-analysis provided by Samaha et al. (2015) to examine the possible relationship 
between characteristics of committee (board and audit) and voluntary disclosure. Using 64 
empirical studies between 1997 and 2013, the study measured total disclosure score by using 
capital, social and environmental disclosure. The outcome reveal that there is positive 
association between board characteristics and voluntary disclosure however, CEO duality is 
negatively associated with voluntary disclosure. Beekes et al. (2016) employed a sample of 
more than 5,000 listed firms among 23 countries from 2003 to 2008, to examine the association 
between CG, companies’ disclosure practices and equity market transparency. Their findings 
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indicate that companies who are governed efficiently are related to frequent stock market 
disclosure. 
Recently, Alnabsha et al. (2017) attempt to examine the influence of CG (board attributes and 
ownership structure) and firm characteristics on both mandatory and voluntary disclosure by 
using Libyan companies over the period 2006-2010. The results reveal that the corporate 
disclosure is linked with board size, board meetings, frequency, board composition and audit 
committee presence. Furthermore, they found that the disclosure level is positively linked to 
firm age, auditor type, listing status, liquidity and industry type. In the same vein, Maskati & 
Hamdan (2017) used a sample of 41 listed Bahrain companies to study the association between 
CG and voluntary disclosure. The results highlight that voluntary disclosure is positively 
associated with shareholder large ownership, board size and independence of board directors. 
Similarly, Yilmaz et al. (2017) examined the possible effect of CG mechanisms on voluntary 
disclosure in Turkey. This study conducted content analysis on Borsa Istanbul hospitality firms. 
The results indicated that voluntary disclosure is not affected by CG mechanisms and the firms 
do not satisfy CG indicators (such as board of directors and CG rules compliance report) in 
their annual reports. 
With a specific focus on India, using a sample of 30 technology firms listed on the BSE in 
India, Kamath (2008) empirically investigated the extent of voluntary intellectual capital 
disclosures in India’s emerging information, communication and technology sector as well as 
the association between the extent of disclosures and firm size. The outcomes indicate a 
significantly small extent of intellectual capital disclosures in Indian firms. The disclosures of 
Information Technology sectors are more than any other sectors’ disclosures, however, there 
is no relationship between firm size and the extent of disclosure. Nandi & Ghosh (2013) 
investigated the relationship between CG, firm-level characteristics and corporate disclosure 
level among Indian companies from 2000 to 2010. Their findings show a negative relationship 
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between corporate disclosure and board characteristics. Abraham et al. (2015) examined 
compliance of Indian firms with both mandatory and voluntary disclosure of CG requirements 
of Clause 49 of the Stock Exchange Board of India, using firms listed on the BSE-100 index 
over the period 2004 to 2006. Their results indicate that Indian firms are highly compliant with 
the CG disclosure requirements of Clause 49, and the disclosure increased after amendments 
to this clause. Furthermore, they found private firms disclose more than firms controlled by the 
government. Charumathi & Ramesh (2015b) employed the data from a 156 firm-year 
observation of Indian firms listed on the National Stock Exchange (NSE) during the period 
2010 to 2013. The aim of the study was to find the impact of certain determinants on the level 
of voluntary disclosure. The study used the approach of disclosure index and content analysis 
to measure voluntary disclosure. Leverage, firm size and institutional ownership emerged as 
the main sources to determine voluntary disclosures. Similarly, Madhani (2016) used a sample 
of 54 Indian listed companies for the period 2011 to 2012. The study aims to identify whether 
CG and disclosure practices of private and public sector companies are significantly different. 
The results indicate that there was no evidence of any significant difference in the CGD scores 
of companies across various types of ownership. 
 Based on the above studies, it is noted that CG have an impact on corporate voluntary 
disclosure. Nevertheless, the findings are mixed and there is no agreement regarding the nature 
and significance of this influence for each CG mechanism. Although the outcomes of these 
studies do not necessarily extend FLID practices, they are still a useful guide for the hypotheses 
development, and also when considering the suitable research methods. 
Secondly, prior study mainly took the determinants of FLID into consideration. For instance, 
Celik et al. (2006) investigate the factors that may influence the level of FLID in annual report 
and utilized a sample of 233 firms listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) in 2004. They found 
that the extent of FLID is positively and significantly related with firm size. However, FLID 
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level is negatively associated with ownership structure, foreign investment, ratio of 
institutional investors and profitability. Furthermore, they found that financial performance and 
ownership structure are the determinant factors affecting the level of FLID. Similarly, Aljifri 
and Hussainey (2007) investigate various factors that may influence the level of FLID among 
46 listed UAE companies. The outcome showed that the level of FLID is significantly and 
positively associated with the degree of financial leverage, whereas profitability is related 
negatively to the level of FLID.  
Hussainey & Al-Najjar (2011) investigate the factors that may influence future-oriented 
information in the UK annual reports. Using a sample 8098 firm-years over the period 1996-
2002, the results indicated that firm size is the key factor that affects the firms’ future-oriented 
information. It also revealed that future-oriented information is affected by firm profitability 
and percentage of both directors (outsider and insider) ownership. Moreover, corporate 
dividend policy has a positive relationship with corporate narrative reporting. By the same 
token, Mathuva (2012a) attempted to investigate the determinants of the FLID by using 91 
firm-year observations during the period 2009 and 2011 among non-financial listed companies 
in Nairobi. Their outcomes reveal that companies with high debt, better performance, greater 
capital investment and higher foreign investment concentration have more FLID as compare 
to cross-listed companies. Similarly, Uyar & Kilic (2012) studied the impact of CG attributes 
on the level of FLID among publicly traded 138 Turkish corporations listed on the Istanbul 
Stock Exchange (ISE) for 2010. Their findings show that firm size and auditor size are the 
significant variables in explaining the level of FLID. In addition, using a sample of the top 40 
firms listed on Italian Stock Exchange, Menicucci (2013a) examined the determinants of the 
level of FLID in Management Commentaries in Italy. They found that profitability is 
significantly associated with FLID but firm size and leverage are not significantly associated 
with the extent of FLID.   
 33 
 
Employing a sample of 125 firms listed on Jordanian stock exchange for 2011, Alkhatib (2014) 
attempted to investigate the factors that may affect the level of FLID. Disclosure index was 
adopted to measure the extent of FLID, where the value of one is given for a disclosed item 
and zero if undisclosed. The findings show that auditor type, firm size and profitability is 
significantly associated with FLID, but leverage has no association. Furthermore, Athanasakou 
and Hussainey (2014) examine FLID credibility in annual reports. Using 10,095 annual reports 
of UK non-financial listed firms over the period 1996 – 2007. The findings indicated that the 
FLID is negatively related with firm value. Whereas, it is positively linked to volatility of 
operations, issuance of debt, decline in performance, underperforming industry peers and miss 
analysts’ earnings forecast.   
Recently, Mousa & Elamir (2018) attempt to investigate the factors that may influence FLID 
and used a sample of Bahraini listed firms from 2010 to 2013. They employed a disclosure 
index of 56 items to measure the level of FLID. They found that firm size and leverage have 
significant association whereas profitability, liquidity and industry type have insignificant 
relationship with the level of FLID. In the same vein, Kuzey (2018) investigated the 
determinants of FLID in integrated reporting. Using a sample of 55 non-financial firms whose 
reports are available in the Integrated Reporting Examples Database in 2014. The study utilized 
content analysis and disclosure index to examine the quantitative and qualitative FLID in 
integrated reporting. An unweighted approach as a dichotomous variable used to measure the 
existence or absence of each item (the score is assign as 1 if the firm disclosed the item at least 
once, 0 otherwise). The results indicated that females on board and firm size have a positive 
association with FLID, while leverage has a negative association with FLID. On the other hand, 
the study failed to find any association between FLID and profitability, industry type, board 
size and composition. 
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Several previous studies examine the possible relationship between CG and FLID. O’Sullivan 
et al. (2008) investigate the link between CG attributes and FLID using a sample of largest 300 
public listed companies in Australia for the year 2000 and 2002. Their results show that in 2000 
the FLID is positively related to CG, audit quality, auditor’s meeting frequency, use of a big 6 
auditor and auditor’s independence. However, in 2002 none of the CG factors are significantly 
related to FLID of company. 
Wang & Hussainey (2013) investigated the relationship between CG and the level of FLID 
using sample of UK FTSE All-Share companies from 1996-2007. They found that CG affect 
firms’ decisions regarding whether to disclose more information voluntarily or not. 
Additionally, the FLID of well-governed companies enhanced their capital market ability to 
expect future earnings. Their outcomes indicate that FLID has a positive relationship with firm 
and board size, dividends yield, leverage and composition of board. While, FLID has a negative 
correlation with profitability, managerial ownership and CEO duality. In the same vein, Al-
Najjar & Abed (2014) investigated the relationship between CG and the level of FLID in the 
UK, by using the top 500 UK-listed companies. They found that firm size, independence of 
audit committee, operating cash flow and cross-listing status is positively and significantly 
associated with FLID. However, blockholder ownership, profitability and leverage are 
negatively linked with FLID. Likewise, Navarro & Urquiza (2015) investigated the association 
between board of directors’ characteristics and FLID, using a sample of 40 companies for the 
year 2007. Their outcomes indicate that independent boards of directors and board size are 
positively related to FLID. Whereas, CEO duality has no association with FLID. It further 
highlight that independent directors are aware of the need to rise the FLID as it would help to 
improve analysts’ forecasts and increase market transparency.  
Liu (2015) conducted a study to investigate the possible link between mechanism of CG and 
FLID among listed Chinese firms for the period 2008 till 2012. The study found that the level 
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of FLID improve due to increase in the proportion of independent directors in board and the 
presence of financial expertise in audit committee. It further concluded that improvement in 
FLID is not related to managerial and state ownership. Similarly, Qu et al. (2015) examined 
the relationship between CG and quality of FLID among non-financial Chinese companies 
listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen for the year 2010. The study use precision and accuracy as a 
proxy to measure the quality of FLID, and sales forecasts as proxy for FLID. Their findings 
suggest that good CG have a positive impact on sales forecast disclosure. Moreover, effective 
CG tend to improve accuracy of non-financial information. Charumathi & Ramesh (2015a) 
examined the determinants of the level of FLID in India. Using a sample of the Bombay Stock 
Exchange (BSE) 100 companies for the years from 2010-2014, the study reveal that there was 
little progress being made to improve FLID for five years. Their results reveal that the high 
proportion of independent directors, firm size and profitability are positively associated with 
FLID level. However, promoters’ ownership, institutional ownership and industry type have 
no relationship with the level of FLID.  
Recently, Agyei-Mensah & Agyei-Mensah (2017) investigated the association between CG, 
corruption and FLID. Using 174 firm-year observations in listed companies among two African 
countries, Botswana and Ghana for the year 2011-2013. The researchers used FLID index to 
measure the level of FLID. The outcomes reveal that companies in Botswana, known as the 
least corrupt country have more FLID than companies in Ghana, which is the one of the most 
corrupt countries in sub-Saharan Africa. They found that FLID in Ghana is influenced by the 
ratio of independent board members. On the other hand, FLID in Botswana is associated with 
ownership concentration. Similarly, Agyei-Mensah (2017) attempted to examine the effect of 
CG on the FLID among listed companies in Ghana. The study found that there is significant 
relationship between board ownership concentration and the level of FLID. 
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Based on the above discussion, it is noted that many studies have measured level or quantity 
of voluntary disclosure (Agyei-Mensah, 2017; Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Al-Najjar & Abed, 
2014; Charumathi & Ramesh, 2015a; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Hussainey et al., 2003; 
Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011; Mathuva, 2012b; Menicucci, 2013c; Mousa & Elamir, 2018; Qu 
et al., 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). The majority of them have avoided measuring the 
quality of disclosure and used quantity  (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Alsaeed, 2006; Cooke, 1989; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hossain et al., 2005; Hossain & Reaz, 2007; Inchausti, 1997; Singhvi 
& Desai, 1971; Wallace et al., 1994), or precision and accuracy as a proxy for quality of 
disclosure (Hui & Matsunaga, 2014; Qu et al., 2015). The problem involved in such approaches 
is that the accuracy of financial disclosure may be undermined by these inappropriate 
measurements. Similarly, Botosan (2004) and Urquiza et al. (2009) argued that the quantity of 
information disclosed does not necessary imply its quality, also quantity and quality are 
inseparable and difficult to measure. Additionally, Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) suggest that it 
is not adequate to use the extent of disclosure (quantity of disclosure) to represent its quality 
and adopted a multidimensional framework to measure disclosure quality. Consequently, 
investigating the quality of FLID among listed non-financial companies in India is important 
as Indian companies are legally obliged to reveal certain minimum information. 
In contrast to the prior empirical studies that employed disclosure quantity as a proxy for its 
quality, the present research challenges this proposition by measuring the quality of FLID by 
adopting a multidimensional framework designed by Beattie et al (2004), which is further 
developed by Beretta & Bozzolan (2008). Since both quantity and the richness dimensions are 
considered in this framework.  
To the best of researcher’s knowledge, no previous research examined the impact of CG on the 
quality of FLID in developing countries, particularly in India. Consequently, the current study 
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attempts to investigate the impact of CG on quality of FLID in Indian non-financial listed 
companies. 
2.8.2. Empirical Studies of FLID and FV  
Previous studies suggested that voluntary disclosure can improve FV by reducing agency 
problems associated with information asymmetry (e.g. Plumlee, Brown, Hayes, & Marshall, 
2015; Shi, Kim, & Magnan, 2014; Welker, 1995). Other researchers argue that disclosure 
enables investors to reduce estimation risk, thereby reducing the cost of financing (Barry & 
Brown, 1985; Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991; O. Kim & Verrecchia, 1994).  
The empirical evidence on the impact of voluntary disclosure on FV is still inclusive, and the 
results are mixed. Several studies examined the association between disclosure and FV through 
its influence on the cost of capital (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Elzahar, Hussainey, Mazzi, & 
Tsalavoutas, 2015; Kim & Shi, 2011; Plumlee, Brown, & Marshall, 2008; Plumlee et al., 2015). 
However, the empirical studies that examine the direct impact of corporate voluntary disclosure 
on FV are limited and have mixed results. For instance, Hassan et al. (2009) examine the 
relation between the level of voluntary and mandatory disclosure and FV in Egypt over the 
period 1995-2002. The study used market-to-book ratio as a measure of FV. They found no 
relationship between FV and voluntary disclosure whereas mandatory disclosure is negatively 
associated with FV. By contrast, Uyar & Kiliç (2012) used a sample of 129 manufacturing 
firms listed on Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) in 2010. The study aim was to investigate the 
association between voluntary disclosure and FV. The study used market-to-book ratio and 
market capitalisation as proxies to measure FV. Their findings show that voluntary disclosure 
is positively related to market-to-book value measure of FV, while there is no significant 
association found between voluntary disclosure and market capitalisation.  Belgacem & Omri 
(2014) studied the impact of voluntary disclosure on FV in the Tunisian Stock Market for the 
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period 2000 till 2008. The study found insignificant relation between FV and voluntary 
disclosure.   
Recently, Nekhili et al. (2016) used a sample of 98 French firms to examine the influence of 
Research & Development narrative disclosure on the firm’s market value of equity. For the 
period 2000–2004. The association between R&D-related disclosure and market value 
influenced differently. A positive relationship is found when they control for R&D 
capitalization. While, a negative association found when controlling for R&D intensity. They 
also find that equity-based compensation and audit committee independence are the most 
important drivers for R&D narrative disclosure. By the same vein, Alotaibi & Hussainey 
(2016b) investigated the influence of quantity and quality corporate social responsibility 
disclosure (CSRD) on FV. Using a sample of 171 non-financial companies listed in the Saudi 
stock market over the period 2013-2014. The study measured CSRD quality by following Beest 
el al (2009) and capture all qualitative attributes of information quality as defined in the 
conceptual framework of the IASB (2010 a). While, they used disclosure index to measure the 
quantity of CSRD. Their outcomes indicate that a positive relationship between quality and 
quantity of CSRD and market capitalisation. Conversely, they did not find the same outcomes 
when they use either Tobin’s Q or Return on Assets (ROA) as proxies for FV. This suggests 
that both quantity and quality of CSRD have the same impact on FV. Their results indicated 
that the association between voluntary disclosure and FV depends on the measure of FV (e.g., 
Tobin’s Q, ROA and market capitalisation).   
Few studies examined the association between the FLID and FV and the results found are either 
positive or negative, hence mixed. For instance, Kent & Ung (2003) investigated the FLID 
relating to earnings in Australia. The study used a sample of 100 firms listed on Australian 
Stock Exchange for the year 1991-1992. They found that firms with steady earnings tend to 
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provide more FLID. In the same vein, Wang & Hussainey (2013) investigated whether the 
level of FLID that are driven by governance are informative about future earnings by using a 
sample of UK FTSE All-Share firms for the year 1996-2007. The results show that FLID of 
firms that are governed efficiently contain value relevant information for investors. It also helps 
to improve stock market ability to predict future earnings. Similarly, Muslu et al. (2014) utilised 
computer-intensive techniques to investigate the properties of the quantity of FLID in the 
MD&A for a large sample of 10-K filings filed with the SEC for the period 1994 to 2007. Their 
results show that companies provide prospective information in the MD&A to reduce poor 
information environments in the stock market. Moreover, FLID provide useful information to 
the stock market as they increase the link of current stock returns with future earnings. 
Nevertheless, FLID are unable to completely reduce the poor information environments for 
companies with high FLID. 
Furthermore, Bravo (2015) examined whether FLID and firm’s reputation cause a reduction in 
stock returns by using a sample size of 73 US firms. The method of content analysis is being 
used to measure FLID. The result indicate that FLID has a huge impact on capital market and 
firms of sound reputation affect extensively on stock return volatility. However, Hassanein & 
Hussainey (2015) examined the impact of the change of forward-looking financial disclosure 
(FLFD) on FV, by using UK FTSE companies listed on the London Stock Exchange from 2005 
to 2011. They found that the changes in FLFD has a negative effect on the value of poorly 
performing companies, while, it has no effect on the value of well-performing companies.  
Based on the review of the literature, most studies did not focus on the potential influence of 
quality of disclosure on FV. Accounting research used disclosure quantity as a proxy for its 
quality (Baek et al., 2004; Healy & Wahlen, 1999; Hussainey & Mouselli, 2010; Mouselli, 
Jaafar, & Hussainey, 2012). Prior studies that examine the effect of the quality of corporate 
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disclosure has employed different proxies that might not directly measure disclosure quality. 
For example, Healy et al. (1999) found that higher disclosure quality measured by analysts 
disclosure ratings (AIMR) are related to higher stock returns. Their outcomes suggest that 
companies with high quality of disclosure attract the attention of investors and analysts and 
increase stock liquidity. In addition, in Korea, Baek et al. (2004) found that companies with 
higher disclosure quality measured by the existence of American Depositary Receipts (ADR) 
experience a smaller decrease in their value during the financial crises. In the same vein, 
Hussainey & Mouselli (2010) and Mouselli et al. (2012) investigated the association between 
disclosure quality and FV among UK firms. They measured disclosure quality by using the 
quantity of future oriented statements. Their findings indicate that future oriented earnings 
statements could explain differences in stock returns.  Furthermore, a recent study by Elzahar 
et al. (2015) investigated the influence of disclosure quality of Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) on cost of capital. They measured the quality of the KPI disclosure by following ASB's 
guidelines. The study reported a negative and significant association between the KPIs 
disclosure and cost of capital. In addition, in the US, Plumlee et al. (2015) investigated the 
association between voluntary environmental disclosures (VED) quality and FV that is 
estimated by using future cash flows and cost of equity. They measured VED quality using a 
disclosure index consider the type of the disclosure (positive/neutral/negative). They found that 
VED quality is associated with FV through both the cash flow and the cost of equity 
components. 
Based on the above discussion, it is pointed out that voluntary disclosure and FV is sensitive 
to the type of disclosure, and the proxy used for measuring FV. This suggests that the 
association between corporate voluntary disclosure and FV is still an open empirical question. 
In contrast to the prior empirical studies that employed disclosure quantity as a proxy for its 
quality, the present research challenges this proposition by measuring the quality of FLID by 
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adopting a multidimensional framework designed by Beattie et al (2004), which is further 
developed by Beretta & Bozzolan (2008). Both quantity and the richness dimension are 
considered in this framework.  
To the best of researcher knowledge, no previous research investigate the impact of the quality 
of FLID on FV in developing countries, particularly in India. Consequently, the current study 
attempts to bridge this gap by examining the impact of FLID quality on FV among Indian non-
financial listed companies. 
2.8.3. Empirical Studies of FLID and ACUAF 
Lang & Lundholm (1996) highlight that financial analysts are an essential part of capital 
market. They mentioned that analyst forecast information can be used for many purposes as it 
contains information on earnings forecast, buying and selling guidance and other useful 
information for managers, brokers and investors. The empirical studies that examine the 
relationship between voluntary disclosure and ACUAF are limited. Firstly, Lang & Lundholm 
(1996) investigated the association between information disclosure and ACUAF. The study 
used reports of the Financial Analyst Federation Corporate Information Committee (FAF) for 
the period 1985 till 1989. The study found that firms with greater disclosure policies tend to 
have larger analyst following. It also found that more informative disclosure policies lead to 
high ACUAF and more likely to reduce dispersion among individual analyst forecast.   
Barron et al. (1999) examined the relation between Management Discussion and Analysis 
(MD&A) information quality and ACUAF. The study highlight that high quality of 
Management Discussion and Analysis lead to lower dispersion and error in ACUAF.  
Moreover, they found that high level of FLID regarding capital expenditure and operation is 
linked with more ACUAF. Whereas, Hope (2003) investigated the relation between ACUAF 
and extent of annual report disclosure by using firms from 22 countries. The study found that 
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disclosure level is positively associated with ACUAF means that analysts use disclosure as a 
useful source. 
Vanstraelen et al. (2003) conducted a study across three European countries that are Belgium, 
German and Netherlands and examined the assoication between nonfinancial disclosure level 
and analyst forecast and dispersion. They found that bigger companies tend to provide great 
extent of both backward and forward looking information disclosure voluntarily. Moreover, 
the study reported that high level of FLID is linked with lower dispersion and higher ACUAF.    
By using data of companies from 31 countries, Dhaliwal et al. (2012) investigated the 
relationship between non-financial information and ACUAF. The study used presence of stand-
alone report related to corporate social responsibility as a proxy for non-financial information 
disclosure. The study found that the relationship between the two variables is much stronger in 
companies and countries that are stakeholder oriented. However, the issuance of stand-alone 
report is negatively associated with ACUAF.  
Recently, Saleh & Roberts (2017) investigated the association between online corporate 
reporting quality and analyst behaviour by using UK listed companies. The study found that 
the quality is an important element to increase analyst following. However, the study found no 
association between quality of online corporate reporting and analyst EPS forecast.  
Regarding FLID, Bozzolan et al. (2009) used a sample of non-financial Italian, German, French 
and Switzerland companies listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for year 2002 till 
2004. The study conducted content analysis to FLID and investigate its impact on accuracy and 
dispersion. The study presented that FLID are more efficient to improve ACUAF and reduce 
dispersion.  
Based on the discssion above, it is noted that there is no single study that examined the 
association between QFLID and ACUAF, specifically in developing countries such as India. 
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This study objective to examine the possible relationship between these two variables among 
non-financial Indian companies to fulfil this gap of literature.  
2.9. Research Gap 
The review of extant empirical literature reveals that existing studies on the determinants and 
consequences of FLID suffer from several weaknesses. Firstly, and in terms of determinants of 
FLID (CG and FLID), limited empirical studies have examined the link between CG and FLID 
in different countries and provided mixed results (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Al-Najjar & 
Abed, 2014; Kuzey, 2018; Liu, 2015; O’Sullivan, Percy, & Stewart, 2008; Qu et al., 2015; 
Uyar & Kilic, 2012); particular in India (Charumathi & Ramesh, 2015a). The majority of prior 
studies have avoided measuring the quality of disclosure and used quantity (Al-Najjar & Abed, 
2014; Alsaeed, 2006; Cooke, 1989; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hossain, Ahmed, & Godfrey, 
2005; Hossain & Reaz, 2007; Inchausti, 1997; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Wallace, Naser, & 
Mora, 1994), or precision and accuracy (Hui & Matsunaga, 2014; Qu et al., 2015) as a proxy 
for quality of disclosure. Most of these studies used quantity as a proxy to measure the quality 
of disclosure (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Alsaeed, 2006; Cooke, 1989; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; 
Hossain et al., 2005; Hossain & Reaz, 2007; Inchausti, 1997; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Wallace 
et al., 1994). Botosan (2004) and Urquiza et al. (2009) argued that the quantity of information 
disclosed does not necessarily imply its quality. Additionally, Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) 
suggest that it is not adequate to use the extent of disclosure (quantity of disclosure) to represent 
its quality and adopted a multidimensional framework to measure disclosure quality. 
Accordingly, this study extends, as well as contributes to, the extant research by adopting a 
multidimensional framework to measure the quality of FLID among listed non-financial 
companies in India. Furthermore, studies examining the antecedents of CG and FLID have 
mainly focused on general features of the firms (in the study) (Cooke, 1992; Waweru, 2014). 
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Consequently, this study extends and contributes to CG research by examining the impact of 
thirteen CG mechanisms on the quality of FLID. In addition, in the Indian context, only 
Charumathi & Ramesh (2015a) examined the association between CG and FLID, and they 
focused on the quantity, rather than quality, of FLID. Thus, this study extends and contributes 
to the Indian context by examining the impact of thirteen CG mechanisms on the quality of 
FLID. 
Secondly, few of the empirical studies examined the association between the FLID and FV; 
the results found are either positive or negative, hence mixed (Bravo, 2015; Hassanein & 
Hussainey, 2015; Kent & Ung, 2003; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). These mixed results might 
be because of the measuring of FLID, as they only focused on the quantity of FLID rather than 
the quality. For instance, Wang & Hussainey (2013) found a positive relationship between 
FLID and FV, whereas Hassanein & Hussainey (2015) reported a negative association between 
the change in FLIFD and FV. However, no single study has investigated the link between 
QFLID and FV in general, and particularly in India. Hence, the present research focuses on the 
quality of FLID by adopting a multidimensional framework, including both the quantity and 
richness dimension. Based on this, the current study extends and contributes to the extant 
literature by investigating the impact of QFLID on FV among listed non-financial companies 
in India.  
Finally, only a limited number of studies have examined the relationship between voluntary 
disclosure and ACUAF in general (Barron, Kile, & O'KEEFE, 1999; Hsu & Chang, 2011; Lang 
& Lundholm, 1996; Li Eng & Kiat Teo, 1999; Maaloul, Ben Amar, & Zeghal, 2016; 
Vanstraelen, Zarzeski, & Robb, 2003). Only the study by Bozzolan et al. (2009), however, 
examined the impact of FLID on ACUAF. They have mainly focused on the quantity of FLID 
rather than its quality, and the study was conducted in four western countries (Italy, Germany, 
France and Switzerland). However, no single study has investigated the link between QFLID 
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and ACUAF in general, and in India in particular. Hence, the present research focuses on the 
quality of FLID by adopting a multidimensional framework, which includes both the quantity 
and the richness dimension. Therefore, the present research extends as well as contributes to 
the literature by examining the impact of the quality of FLID on ACUAF among non-financial 
Indian listed firms. 
2.10. Summary 
The main objective of this research is to examine the determinants and consequences of QFLID 
among non-financial Indian companies listed on BSE. This chapter provide a review of the 
previous literature regarding FLID. Firstly, it review FLID through: its definitions, nature, 
motivations, uesfuless, the quality of FLID and determinants of FLID. Secondly, it covers the 
empirical studies regarding the impact of CG on FLID. The literature highlight that previous 
studies examined the relation between CG and voluntary disclosure in general (Alhazaimeh et 
al., 2014; Aljifri et al., 2014; Beekes et al., 2016; Maskati & Hamdan, 2017; Samaha et al., 
2015; Yilmaz et al., 2017). On the other hand, some studies examined the direct impact of CG 
on FLID (Agyei-Mensah, 2017; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Charumathi & Ramesh, 2015a; Liu, 
2015; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; M. Wang & Hussainey, 2013) and found mixed results, but in 
general CG influence FLID.  
Finally, it reviewed the empirical studies regarding the impact of QFLID on both FV and 
ACUAF. The association between corporate disclosure and FV can be indirect due to its impact 
on cost of capital (Botosan & Plumlee, 2002; Elzahar et al., 2015; J. W. Kim & Shi, 2011; 
Plumlee et al., 2008; Plumlee et al., 2015), or direct (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016b; Hassan et 
al., 2009; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Mendes-Da-Silva & de Lira Alves, Luiz Alberto, 
2004; Patel, Balic, & Bwakira, 2002; Plumlee et al., 2008; Plumlee et al., 2015). However, 
limited studies have investigated the impact of FLID on FV (Bravo, 2015; Hassanein & 
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Hussainey, 2015; Kent & Ung, 2003; Wang & Hussainey, 2013), and they found maxed 
findings. Furthermore, few studies have examined the impact of voluntary disclosure on 
ACUAF (Barron et al., 1999; Hope, 2003; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Saleh & Roberts, 2017; 
Vanstraelen et al., 2003). While, Bozzolan et al. (2009) investigated the association between 
FLID and ACUAF.    
As the initial aim of current research is to examine the determinants and consequences of 
QFLID, this study measures the quality of FLID by adopting a multidimensional framework 
designed by Beattie et al (2004), which is further developed by Beretta & Bozzolan (2008). 
Based on the previous literature, this research expects there is impact of CG on the quality of 
FLID. Furthermore, it is also expected there is impact of quality of FLID on FV and ACUAF. 
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Chapter Three: Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses Development 
3.1. Introduction 
This chapter review the theories and covers the study’s hypotheses development. In previous 
research CG and the firm characteristics have determined FLID. On the other hand, FLID has 
an impact on both FV and ACUAF. This chapter attempts to test the association between CG 
and QFLID in order to identify the variables that are linked with QFLID. Furthermore, it 
investigates the impact of QFLID on both FV and ACUAF.  
This chapter consists of the following sections: section 3.2 covers the dominant theories related 
to CG, QFLID, FV and ACUAF. Section 3.3 presents the research hypotheses development. 
Section 3.4 is a summary of the present chapter. 
3.2. Theories    
Previous studies have used various theories to explain disclosure practices such as agency, 
signalling, stakeholder, resource dependence, capital need, legitimacy and political cost 
theories (Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; Alnabsha et al., 2017; Barako et al., 2006; M. Elmagrhi et 
al., 2017; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 
2013; Samaha, Dahawy, Hussainey, & Stapleton, 2012; Samaha et al., 2015; Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013). These theories are used to inform and interpret different motivations 
according to the nature of the study.  
3.2.1. Agency Theory 
Jensen & Meckling (1976) explain that, in the agency relationship, the principal engages with 
an agent to act on its behalf. The agency relationship often leads to conflicts of interest and 
information asymmetry. Conflict of interest starts when an agent acts to achieve their own 
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personal interests while making decisions and neglecting the consequences for shareholders. 
Information asymmetry reflects the gap between the amount of information in the hands of the 
management and that held by market participants (Fields, Lys, & Vincent, 2001). As managers 
work in the firm daily, they are knowledgeable and aware of all business transactions whereas 
stakeholders depend on periodic information from the company such as annual and interim 
reports.  
Agency theory offers an explanation on why managers disclose information voluntarily (Chow 
& Wong-Boren, 1987; Cooke, 1991; Firth, 1980). Since shareholders monitor the activities of 
the managers, so managers use voluntary disclosure to satisfy their shareholders and to convey 
a message to them that they are acting according to their best interest (Chow & Wong-Boren, 
1987; Cooke, 1991; Firth, 1980; Hossain, Perera, & Rahman, 1995). By disclosing greater and 
high quality information, the uncertainties of their investors are minimised, leading to a 
significant decrease in the cost of external financing (Watson et al., 2002). Quality of disclosure 
is considered as one of the monitoring mechanisms used by investors. It can reduce information 
asymmetry between an agent and principal, so it can lower agency costs (Huang & Zhang, 
2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Junker, 2005). 
With regard to CG, agency theory suggests that the introduction of CG mechanisms reduces 
agency costs by monitoring managerial opportunism (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Lubatkin, Lane, 
Collin, & Very, 2005; Solomon, 2007). Barako (2004) argues that sometimes managers do not 
consider shareholders’ interests and this necessitates a CG mechanism, which ensures that 
various interests are protected for the good of the firm. In accordance with agency theory 
assumptions, several empirical studies use CG and firm characteristics as determinants of 
corporate voluntary disclosure (Agyei-Mensah, 2017; Agyei-Mensah & Agyei-Mensah, 2017; 
Ajinkya, Bhojraj, & Sengupta, 2005; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Charumathi & Ramesh, 2015a; 
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Ho & Shun Wong, 2001; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011; Kuzey, 2018; Lang & Lundholm, 
1993; Mousa & Elamir, 2018; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Agency theory suggest that building 
an institution based on CG mechanisms helps to protect both stakeholders’ and management 
interests. For example, reducing executive board members can lead to more independence of 
the board (Adolf & Gardiner, 1932; Al-Janadi, Rahman, & Omar, 2013; Chen & Jaggi, 2001; 
Solomon, 2007). This may enable the board members to show a greater sense of accountability 
(Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; Conyon & He, 2011; Fama, 1980). Furthermore, board diversity 
reduces information asymmetry due to increased supervision of management operation (Walt 
& Ingley, 2003). Moreover, separating CEO and chairperson positions decreases agency 
problems as it enforces managers to operate according to shareholders’ interests (Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Jensen, 1993). In addition, audit committees are considered to be a crucial 
instrument to oversee managerial activities (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Klein, 1998).  
According to agency theory, managers use voluntary disclosure as a source to reduce 
information asymmetry. Sheu et al., (2010) highlight that as disclosure decreases information 
asymmetry among managers and stakeholders so it increases FV. Healy & Palepu (1993) point 
out that managers’ better disclosure behaviour enables investors to understand their business 
activities effectively and decrease uncertainty related to the company’s future performance 
which may influence its share price and FV (Hassan et al., 2009). The information regarding 
FLID reduces both issues of information asymmetry and agency costs (Hassanein & Hussainey, 
2015). It also decreases the uncertainty surrounding a firm’s future performance and minimises 
managers’ ability to gain private benefits that increase the anticipated cash flow to shareholders 
(Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015). FV tends to increase due to high quality of disclosure as it 
either decreases capital costs or maximises cash flows or both (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016b; 
Elzahar et al., 2015).   
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To conclude, agency theory recommends that CG mechanisms improve overall governance and 
help companies to minimise agency cost and improve both QFLID and FV (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Siddiqui, Razzaq, Malik, & Gul, 2013). Thus, this study seeks 
to investigate the impact of CG on the QFLID and how QFLID impacts FV among non-
financial Indian listed companies. Agency theory suggests that disclosure quality improves 
overall FV (Huang & Zhang, 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Junker, 2005). 
3.2.2. Signalling Theory 
Akerlof (1970) developed signalling theory that highlights the information asymmetry problem 
and how it could be reduced by signalling more information to others (Morris, 1987). In 
addition, the theory posits that investors rely on information provided by the firm 
(Abhayawansa & Abeysekera, 2009). In this regard, Watts & Zimmerman (1986) mention that 
managers adopt voluntary disclosure to signal information to their investors about their 
operations. This theory suggests credible information should be disclosed via voluntary 
disclosure. Additionally, signalling theory suggests that companies disclose more information 
to decrease information asymmetry problem and signal high quality of disclosure to investors 
(Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016a; Oyelere et al., 2003). However, company managers usually 
decide to disclose information only when the marginal benefits from disclosure exceed the 
associated cost (Hughes, 1986).  
 Jensen & Meckling (1976) point out that good CG enables companies to reduce the issue of 
information asymmetry. Lundholm & Myers (2002) expected that FLID of companies with 
effective CG tends to have value-relevant information for investors. Prior studies predicted 
negative association between voluntary disclosure and the issue of information asymmetry 
(Brown, Hillegeist, & Lo, 2004; Coller & Yohn, 1997; Welker, 1995). Gordon et al., (2010) 
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argue that voluntary disclosure sends signals to the marketplace as it anticipates an increase in 
a company’s net present value (NPV) which increases the value of stock.  
Verrecchia (1983) reported that managers with better information signal high quality 
information to the capital market and to competitors. In addition, managers in need of finance 
convey positive signals to both investors and debt holders (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016b). More 
specifically, Hussainey & Aal-Eisa (2009) show that FLID is superior to dividend information 
as it reduces investor uncertainty regarding future earnings. In the same context, managers  
provide more FLID to interested parties as it reduces information asymmetry, improves 
owners’ confidence regarding the company’s future performance (Hassanein & Hussainey, 
2015; Hossain & Hammami, 2009; Singhvi & Desai, 1971; Uyar, Kilic, & Bayyurt, 2013) and 
fulfils the investors’ requirement of providing information (Wang & Hussainey, 2013). 
Companies may use FLID to signal to investors that they are generating positive results related 
to their profitability, which improves companies’ FV (Sun, Salama, Hussainey, & Habbash, 
2010). Another advantage of using FLID by managers is that it improves ACUAF due to a 
reduction in information asymmetry (Bozzolan et al., 2009; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; 
Lundholm & Myers, 2002). This study expects to find positive impact of QFLID on both FV 
and ACUAF. 
Based on the above, it is noticed that signalling and agency theories share similar attributes as 
both are associated with rational behaviour and information asymmetry issues among firms 
and investors. Both theories consider disclosure as a key tool to decrease information 
asymmetry (Morris, 1987). Furthermore, these theories suggest that disclosure quality 
mitigates information asymmetry issues between managers and stakeholders and improves FV 
and ACUAF.  
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3.2.3. Resource Dependence Theory   
Resource dependence theory explains that the role of internal CG structure, that includes 
directors and committees, is not just to ensure effective monitoring of managers. However, 
they also connect company to critical resources that can be utilised to maximise firms’ financial 
performance (Alnabsha et al., 2017; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer, 1972; Pfeffer, 1973). It 
suggests that companies can use CG to use such resources to improve their performance (Chen 
& Roberts, 2010). Moreover, Pfeffer & Salancik (2003) mention that this theory considers the 
board as a source to reduce outside uncertainty instead of just dichotomising directors as 
executives and non-executives of the board. This theory highlights that CG is an important 
resource for the company as it improves voluntary disclosure (Alnabsha et al., 2017).  
 In line with resource dependence theory, prior studies suggest that CG decreases 
environmental uncertainty as directors bring different resources that are used to improve 
company legitimacy which improves the firms’ performance (Hillman et al., 2000; Nicholson 
& Kiel, 2007). Both board and outside directors provide necessary resources, such as their 
knowledge, to the firms and represent the interest of all stakeholders. It can help the company 
to gain a competitive advantage due to having a direct relationship with the environment (An, 
Davey, & Eggleton, 2011; Chen & Roberts, 2010; Hillman et al., 2000; Kiel & Nicholson, 
2003; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). This theory also suggests that non-executive directors procure 
external resources by their proficiency, prestige and networking (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). 
Spencer (1983) stated that the role of a non-executive director should be advisory not decision-
making, in that their experience and expertise are fully acknowledged, their advices are 
influential but they should not intervene the establishment of corporate policies. In short, non-
executive directors enrich the board’s expertise primarily through advice regarding strategic 
decision-making.  
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Resource dependence theory suggests that firms tend to disclose more voluntary information 
to gain access to crucial resources (Amran, Lee, & Devi, 2014; Branco & Rodrigues, 2008). 
Furthermore, this theory suggests that better voluntary disclosure gives companies more chance 
to obtain crucial resources with better costs, which helps to build a solid reputation (Branco & 
Rodrigues, 2008; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Oliveira, Lima Rodrigues, & Craig, 2011; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Pirson & Turnbull, 2011). In this regard, it is argued that voluntary 
disclosure reduces information asymmetry which leads to better financing, investment and 
liquidity effects (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Botosan, 1997; I. Brown, Steen, & Foreman, 
2009). By the same token, Castanias & Helfat (2001) and Haniffa & Cooke (2002) argue that 
increased disclosure reduces the concerns of stakeholders regarding managers’ strategies. This, 
in turn, may lead to reduced capital restrictions, improved finance access, and to gaining 
financial benefits in the future (Alnabsha et al., 2017; Cheng, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014; 
Hoang, Abeysekera, & Ma, 2016).    
To conclude, resource dependence theory suggests that the CG is a company resource, 
comprised of expertise, image, and information links (Alnabsha et al., 2017; Hoang et al., 
2016). The board of directors performs a monitoring role and provides necessary resources, for 
instance business contracts, experience and knowledge that improves financial performance 
(Chen, 2011; Nicholson & Kiel, 2007). Furthermore, a larger board with the presence of more 
independent directors could improve the company with critical competitive resources, give 
constructive advices to the management, and contribute to a better monitoring system. This, in 
turn can lead to improvement in QFLID. 
3.2.4. Stakeholder Theory 
Stakeholders are defined as “any individual or group who can influence or is influenced by the 
achievement of a corporate’s aim” Freeman (1983; 2010, p. 54). According to Clarkson (1994) 
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and Rizk et al. (2008), a firm’s stakeholders can be divided into two groups: (1) primary or 
powerful group comprised of all individuals who contribute to the business such as 
shareholders, investors, suppliers, employees, providers and government. (2) a secondary 
group, which does not essentially contribute to the survival of the business, but can affect or 
be affected by a firm’s operations, for instance, society and media. Stakeholder theory is 
established on the assumption that a company’s continued survival needs the support of 
stakeholders. This theory assumes that the behaviour of different stakeholder groups (primary 
groups) enhance management’s ability to relate corporate needs with their environments. The 
more influential the stakeholder is, the more the company must adopt stakeholder management. 
According to Freeman et al. (2010), it is necessary to take into consideration the interests of all 
stakeholders rather than only the shareholders. Donaldson & Preston (1995) indicate that 
stakeholder theory has three viewpoints, namely descriptive accuracy, instrumental power, and 
managerial perspective or normative validity. The first two perspectives assume that a company 
should strategically manage primary stakeholders by classifying them with the self-interest of 
the organisation, whereas the normative view suggests that managers should pay attention to 
all stakeholder groups.  
Based on the descriptive and instrumental perspectives of stakeholder theory, corporate 
disclosure is considered as a tool to manage the perception of only the primary stakeholder 
group (Ullmann, 1985). Consequently, it is employed for the strategic purpose of gaining 
agreement and support for the company’s continuing operation, rather than for responsibility 
purposes (Deegan & Samkin, 2008). In line with this concept is the perception of the important 
stakeholder group concerning the firms managed through corporate disclosure. However, the 
managerial or normative stakeholder point of view demonstrates that companies have specific 
duties and obligations to different stakeholders and that corporate disclosure is necessary for 
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the firm to ensure greater accountability by disclosing information to relevant stakeholders 
(Guay, Kothari, & Watts, 1996). 
Although this theory widely adopted in the literature, it has been criticised for several reasons. 
It is not adequate to explain the dynamics, which link the company to the stakeholders (Key, 
1999). It is also not justifiable and practicable to determine all stakeholders, as that may 
negatively affect the welfare of the company (Etzioni, 1998; Sternberg, 1997). In addition, it 
is reliant on the particular power of stakeholders and, thus, may ignore the other stakeholders 
who are likely to be regarded as less important (Deegan, 2002). Therefore, the stakehoher 
theory is excluded in the present research.  
Since this study aims to examine the determinants and consequences of QFLID, this research 
relied on agency, signalling, and resource dependence theories. These theories are more 
appropriate to explain the main relationships used by this study, and more adequate for 
developing the hypotheses of this study.  
3.3. Research Hypotheses Development 
3.3.1. Hypotheses Related to CG and QFLID 
This section explains the development of the research hypotheses related to the first objective, 
examining the association between CG mechanisms and QFLID in Indian listed companies 
based on relevant theoretical and empirical evidence.  
To examine this relationship, a total of thirteen CG related variables are taken into 
consideration. The development of the hypotheses for board of directors, audit committee, and 
ownership structure are as follows: 
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3.3.1.1. Board of Directors’ Characteristics 
An essential element in determining voluntary disclosure is the characteristic of the board of 
directors (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Beasley, 1996; Davidson, Nemec, & Worrell, 1996; 
Madhani, 2015; Maskati & Hamdan, 2017; Samaha et al., 2015). It is a key tool for 
shareholders to exercise control on top management (John & Senbet, 1998). Accordingly, 
board effectiveness mitigates agency costs, and enhances the firm’s transparency. 
Consequently, board characteristics could influence the QFLID. The current study examines 
five board characteristics, namely board size, CEO duality, board independence, frequency of 
board meetings and the presence of females on the board. 
3.3.1.1.1. Board Size 
According to agency theory, board size is a potential variable of CG used to monitor 
management performance (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016a; Fama & 
Jensen, 1983). Earlier studies show that board size makes the decision-making more effective. 
For instance, Laksmana (2008) highlights that a large board increases the chance of having a 
diverse board that can lead to better expertise . Similarly, Samaha et al. (2012) mention that 
senior executives cannot dominate prominently if the size of the board is large. Moreover, Ntim 
et al. (2012) reported that companies with a large board size show high disclosure compared to 
those with a small board size. On the contrary, Herman (1981) and Jensen (1993) indicate that 
large board size creates issues, for example less communication and monitoring, which have a 
negative impact on disclosure behaviour. According to the Resource-dependence theory 
perspective, larger boards improve corporate reputation due to having a greater diversity of 
experience (Alnabsha et al., 2017; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005; Linsley & Shrives, 2006).  
Prior studies to examine the association between board size and voluntary disclosure provided 
mixed results. Few studies found a positive association between board size and corporate 
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disclosure in general (Barako et al., 2006; Laksmana, 2008; Samaha et al., 2015), whereas 
others found no association between board size and the level of disclosure (Cheng & 
Courtenay, 2006; Ebrahim & Fattah, 2015; Kuzey, 2018; Lakhal, 2005; Othman, Ishak, Arif, 
& Aris, 2014). On the other hand, some researchers argue that board size reduces board 
effectiveness so board members feel less motivated, which can cause low levels of disclosure 
(Byard, Li, & Weintrop, 2006; Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; Yermack, 1996). In the Indian 
context, the Indian Corporate Governance Code (ICGC) number (49) recommends that a board 
of directors should comprise of at-least four members. The total number of directors (executive 
and non-executive) on the board is used as a proxy to measure board size. Based on the above 
discussion, the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H1.1: There is a significant positive association between board size and QFLID among Indian 
listed companies. 
3.3.1.1.2. CEO Duality  
CEO duality occurs when the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chairman of the board 
of directors is the same person. According to agency and resource-dependence perspective, 
CEO duality has a negative impact on disclosure and firms’ performance (Reverte, 2009). From 
the agency theory perspective, separation of chairman and CEO positions reduces agency 
problems as it motivates managers to work according to the interests of their shareholders 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Jensen, 1993). Similarly, the resource-
dependence theory suggests that separating CEO and board chairman positions improves a 
firm’s legitimacy and stakeholders’ participation by promoting equality and fairness in the 
decision making process (Alnabsha et al., 2017; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). It is argued that 
separation between the role of chairman and CEO increases board independence and leads to 
efficient monitoring and management performance (Conheady, McIlkenny, Opong, & 
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Pignatel, 2015; Donnelly & Mulcahy, 2008; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Jensen, 1993). Likewise, 
CEO duality gives the CEO power to make decisions according to his best interests with less 
interference (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Similarly, CEO duality creates a strong individual 
power base, which might affect the efficient control exercised by the board (Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Previous empirical studies give mixed results on CEO duality. A number of studies found that 
CEO duality and voluntary disclosure is negatively associated (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Gul 
& Leung, 2004; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Li, Pike, & Haniffa, 2008). However, some studies 
found no association between CEO duality and the level of voluntary disclosure (Aljifri et al., 
2014; Alnabsha et al., 2017; Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016a; Babío Arcay & Muiño Vázquez, 
2005; Barako et al., 2006; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Liu, 2015).  
In the Indian context, ICGC (49) recommend that if the CEO is also the chairman then half of 
the board of directors should be independent. From the above, this study expects to find a 
negative association between CEO duality and QFLID. The hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H1.2: CEO duality and the QFLID are negatively and significantly associated among Indian 
listed companies. 
3.3.1.1.3. Board Independence  
Independence of boards received huge interest from academic research and CG regulations 
(Chen, 2011; Johanson & Østergren, 2010). Independent directors monitor management's 
performance and decrease information asymmetry between managers and stakeholders  
(Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Lim et al., 2007), and thereby increase the level of  voluntary 
disclosure (Lang & Lundholm, 1993). In addition, board independence protects shareholders 
interests and reduces agency costs (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Furthermore, resource-
dependence theory assumes that independent directors procure external resources by their 
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proficiency, prestige and networking (Chen, 2011; R. M. Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Nicholson 
& Kiel, 2007; Tricker, 1984). In this regard, increased board independence enhances corporate 
response to stakeholders’ informational needs (Lopes & Rodrigues, 2007). 
Empirically, it is shown that independent directors support the board and committees by using 
their experience and knowledge (Barako et al., 2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Bozec (2005) 
reports that a large number of independent directors improve managerial monitoring, which 
creates the possibility to hinder managerial initiatives. Accordingly, prior research on the 
association between board independence and voluntary disclosure provided mixed results. 
Many empirical studies found board independence and voluntary disclosure is positively 
associated (Adams & Hossain, 1998; Chen & Jaggi, 2001; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Huafang 
& Jianguo, 2007; Lim et al., 2007; Liu, 2015; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007; Samaha et al., 2015; 
Wang & Hussainey, 2013), whereas, other studies found either no association  (Aljifri et al., 
2014; Ebrahim & Fattah, 2015; Kuzey, 2018; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; Uyar & Kilic, 2012) or 
a negative association (Barako et al., 2006; Chapple & Truong, 2015; Eng & Mak, 2003; 
Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Gul & Leung, 2004; Madhani, 2015) between two variables. 
In the Indian context, ICGC (49) recommends that half of the board directors should be 
independent. From the above discussion, this study expects that there is a positive association 
between board independence and QFLID. Therefore, this study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
H1.3: There is a significant positive association between the percentage of board independence 
and the QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
3.3.1.1.4. The Frequency of board meetings 
The frequency of board meetings is considered to be an essential tool of CG as it enables board 
directors to effectively control a company’s operations and monitor its financial reporting 
 60 
 
activities  (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016a). According to agency theory, the board of directors 
has the power to monitor the decisions made by top level management, which is one of the 
main bases of the decision control system (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In addition, the frequency 
of board meetings highlights the commitment of the board in terms of sharing information with 
management (Brick & Chidambaran, 2010). It helps to enhance managerial monitoring, which 
has a positive impact on corporate disclosure (Ntim & Oseit, 2011). Whereas Carcello  (2002) 
mentions that board meetings’ frequency might not be beneficial in terms of shareholders’ 
interests, others such as Vafeas (1999) warned that the time directors spend on meetings might 
be used for routine tasks like presenting management reports instead of monitoring 
management performance.     
Prior empirical studies found a positive association between the frequency of board meetings 
and voluntary disclosure (Alnabsha et al., 2017; Barros, Boubaker, & Hamrouni, 2013; Brick 
& Chidambaran, 2010; Kent & Stewart, 2008; Laksmana, 2008). Nevertheless, Alhazaimeh et 
al. (2014) found no association between frequency of board meetings and voluntary disclosure. 
In the Indian context, ICGC (49) recommends that a board should hold at least four meetings 
a year. Following previous studies, this study expects to find a positive relationship between 
QFLID and the frequency of board meetings. It examines the following hypothesis: 
H1.4: There is a significant positive association between the number of meetings and the 
QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
3.3.1.1.5. Females’ Presence on the Board  
The presence of female members on the board acts as a key tool that consolidates board 
effectiveness and efficiency (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003a; Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, & 
Simpson, 2010; Walt & Ingley, 2003). Gender diversity (number of female directors) is a 
challenging research issue (Singh, Vinnicombe, & Johnson, 2001) and it is an important 
dimension of CG (Liao, Luo, & Tang, 2015). Board gender diversity could bring several 
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benefits, such as effective decision making and exchanging and presenting new ideas (Alvarez 
& McCaffery, 2000; Barako & Brown, 2008; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003b; Dowling & 
Aribi, 2013). It can also give the company a competitive edge as it improves the creativity and 
knowledge of the board (Watson, Kumar, & Michaelsen, 1993). According to agency theory, 
board gender diversity enhances board efficiency as it prevents managers exploiting 
shareholders’ wealth and improves board independence (Barako & Brown, 2008; Carter et al., 
2003b; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). According to the resource-dependence theory perspective, 
board diversity improves the relationship between firms and the external environment by 
quality disclosure that helps them to gain critical resources (Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer, 1972).  
Empirical research examining the association between female board directors and corporate 
disclosure practices showed mixed results. For instance, Barako & Brown (2008); Chapple & 
Truong (2015); Kuzey (2018) and Liao et al. (2015) reported a positive association between 
gender diversity and voluntary disclosure. Sartawi et al. (2014), however, found no relationship 
between the two variables. In the Indian context, ICGC (49) recommends that boards should 
have at least one woman director. Based on the above discussion, this study expects that the 
presence of females on the board would increase QFLID. Therefore, the hypothesis is set as 
follows:   
H1.5: There is a significant positive association between the percentage of the presence of 
females on the board and the QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
3.3.1.2. Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure has been also considered as a key determinant to improving CG practices 
(Ebrahim & Fattah, 2015; Konijn, Kräussl, & Lucas, 2011; La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999). Nevertheless, empirical research on ownership structure and 
voluntary corporate disclosure gives contradictory results (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 2010; 
 62 
 
Ebrahim & Fattah, 2015). The following subsections cover three ownership structures within 
Indian listed companies, known as block holder, institutional and promoter ownership. 
3.3.1.2.1. Block holder Ownership 
Block holder ownership is defined as the ratio of ordinary shares held by substantial 
shareholders (that is 5% or more) (Eng & Mak, 2003; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007). As block 
holders act as owner managers because they have unlimited access to information (Samaha et 
al., 2012),  therefore companies with concentrated ownership tend to involve less voluntarily 
in compliance with CG rules (Ismail & Sinnadurai, 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013) and 
reduce information asymmetry, which decreases agency conflicts (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Reverte, 2009). Habbash (2010) highlights that block holder ownership includes various 
investors, such as individuals, private companies, trusts, banks and more. According to agency 
theory, block holder ownership reduces agency costs, therefore companies with high block 
holder have less incentive to provide extra information (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Eng & Mak, 
2003).  
 Empirically, the association between block holder ownership and voluntary disclosure 
reported mixed results. For instance, numerous studies found a negative association between 
block holder ownership and voluntary disclosure (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Garcia-Meca & 
Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010; McKinnon & Dalimunthe, 1993; Mitchell, Chia, & Loh, 1995; 
Schadewitz & Blevins, 1998), whereas Huafang & Jianguo (2007) and O’Sullivan et al. (2008) 
found a positive relationship between these two variables. On the other hand, other authors do 
not report any significant association between disclosure and ownership concentration 
(Abdelbadie & Elshandidy, 2013; Alqatamin et al., 2017; Eng & Mak, 2003; Hidalgo et al., 
2011; Nekhili, Boubaker, & Lakhal, 2012; Nekhili et al., 2016).  
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Based on the above discussion, this research expects a negative relationship between block 
holder ownership and QFLID. This study proposes the following hypothesis: 
H1.6: There is a negative association between the level of block holder ownership and the 
QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
3.3.1.2.2. Institutional Ownership 
It has been argued that institutional ownership plays a key role in CG structure. It oversees 
managers’ discretion and improves information effectiveness presented in the capital market 
(Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003; Ferreira, 2010; Koh, 2003). Agency theory highlights that 
institutional ownership helps to gain effective control over the company, as managers disclose 
more information to satisfy institutional shareholders thus gaining their backing to gain access 
to important resources (Alnabsha et al., 2017; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Charumathi & Ramesh, 
2015a; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). El-Gazzar (1998) points out that higher institutional 
ownership increases the motivation of managers to publish more voluntary information to 
increase shareholders’ confidence. By the same token, Qu et al. (2015) reported that CG and 
institutional ownership encourages managers to disclose more QFLID. 
Empirically, prior studies investigated the association between institutional ownership and 
voluntary disclosure. For example, Barako et al. (2006); Bushee & Noe (2000); Carson & 
Simnett (1997); Guan et al. (2007); Mathuva (2012b) and Al-Bassam et al. (2015) found  a 
positive relationship between institutional ownership and voluntary disclosure, whereas 
Alqatamin et al. (2017) found that institutional ownership and the level of disclosure are 
negatively and significantly associated with each other. On the other hand, Charumathi & 
Ramesh (2015a); Jouini (2013) and Wang & Hussainey (2013) reported no association between 
the two variables. This study expects to find a positive association between institutional 
investors and QFLID. The hypothesis is set as follows: 
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H1.7: There is a positive association between institutional ownership and the QFLID among 
Indian listed companies. 
3.3.1.2.3. Promoters’ Ownership 
According to the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), a promoter is defined as an 
individual or group of individuals who control the firm or act as an instrument in the 
formulation of a plan or programme pursuant to which the securities are offered to the public 
and those named in the prospectus as promoters (Ganguli & Agrawal, 2009; Kumar & Singh, 
2013). Promoter ownership is considered as several types of investors, including individuals, 
family members and corporate bodies (Selarka, 2005).  
To protect the interest of the investing community, laws and regulations in India require that 
promoters should have at least 20% of the post issue share capital. They should either 
contribution at least 20% of the proposed issue or ensure shareholding of at least 20% of the 
post issue capital, the participant has to be locked for at least three years. This requirement 
should not be applicable if a firm remains listed for three years or more in a stock exchange 
and has a track record of payment of dividend for at least three immediately preceding years 
(Ganguli & Agrawal, 2009). Kumar & Singh (2013) highlight that promoters in Indian firms 
raised the problem of owner-manager control. Charumathi & Ramesh (2015a) argue that 
companies with a higher promoters’ holding have less incentive for higher disclosure. 
Empirically, Charumathi & Ramesh (2015a) found no significant association between 
promoter ownership and FLID in Indian companies. This study considers the following 
hypothesis: 
H1.8: There is a negative association between promoter ownership and the QFLID among 
Indian listed companies. 
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3.3.1.3. Audit Committee 
The audit committee is one of the important subcommittees of board of directors which 
monitors the financial reporting processes; thereby it affects corporate disclosure by reducing 
information asymmetry (Mangena, & Pike, 2012). Appuhami & Tashakor (2017) indicated that 
the role of audit committee is to improve the picture of disclosure and prevent mangers 
benefitting personally. From an agency theory perspective, an audit committee can be 
considered as an instrument to reduce agency costs (Ho & Wong, 2001b; Klein, 1998), 
therefore, it increases the quality of reporting (Bradbury, Mak, & Tan, 2006; Collier, 1993; 
Cotter & Silvester, 2003; Nelson, Gallery, & Percy, 2010). In line with Zaman et al. (2011), 
this study uses five dimensions to assess the audit committee effectiveness, namely audit 
committee size, audit committee independence, frequency of audit committee meetings, audit 
committee financial expertise, and number of female members on the audit committee. 
3.3.1.3.1. Audit Committee Size 
The audit committee improves the extent of disclosure of financial reports (Al-Janadi et al., 
2013). Agency theory highlights that companies with a good audit committee disclose more 
information and reduce agency costs (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016a; Barako et al., 2006). 
Bedard et al., (2004) indicate that committee size should be large enough to achieve effective 
monitoring, although not so large as to adversely affect the decision making process. 
Furthermore, research on organisational behaviour indicates that larger-sized audit committees 
tend to be less productive (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016a; Jensen, 1993; Karamanou & Vafeas, 
2005). Consequently, firms need to maintain a balance between the size of the audit committee 
and its responsibilities, as a large audit committee has an ambiguous effect on the process of 
monitoring (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). 
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With regard to empirical results, earlier studies documented a positive association between 
audit committee size and voluntary disclosure (Abeysekera, 2010; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; 
Albitar, 2015; Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Beasley, 1996; Hidalgo et al., 2011; Laksmana, 2008; 
Li et al., 2008; Ntim, Lindop, & Thomas, 2013; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; Samaha et al., 2015). 
On the other hand, Aljifri & Hussainey (2007) and Magena & Pike (2005) reported no 
association between audit committee size and FLID. In the Indian context, ICGC (49) 
recommends that an audit committee should have least three members. From the discussion, it 
could be argued that there is a positive relationship between audit committee size and QFLID, 
so the following hypothesis is formulated: 
H1.9: There is a significant positive association between the audit committee size and the 
QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
3.3.1.3.2. Audit Committee Independence 
Bedard et al. (2004) highlight that independence of the audit committee is important for a 
company to operate effectively. Agency theory assumes that audit committee independence 
reduces agency costs. The independence of audit committee members can significantly 
contribute to the effectiveness of the committee (Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt, 2003), as it enables 
the committee to achieve their objectives with greater responsibility (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 
2004). Previous studies found that independence of the audit committee improves the quality 
of financial disclosure and also evaluates management performance accurately (Cerbioni & 
Parbonetti, 2007; Forker, 1992; Ho & Shun Wong, 2001). Furthermore, Song & Windram 
(2004) and Uzun et al. (2004) highlight that greater board independence lowers issues of 
financial reporting and corporate fraud. With regard to empirical results, Aljifri et al. (2014) 
and Ho & Wong (2001) found positive and significant association between audit committee 
independence and FLID. In the Indian context, ICGC (49) recommends that at least two-thirds 
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of the members must be independent in the audit committee. Consequently, the above 
discussion results in the following hypothesis:  
H1.10: There is a positive association between audit committee independence and the QFLID 
among Indian listed companies. 
3.3.1.3.3. Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings 
Frequent audit committee meetings enhance the effectiveness of the audit committee, and 
improve the accuracy of financial statements, which leads to better audit quality (Beasley, 
Carcello, Hermanson, & Neal, 2009). The frequency of audit committee meetings is considered 
as the only publicly available quantitative indicator about the diligence of audit committees 
(Raghunandan & Rama, 2007). Based on the agency theory, as frequent audit committee 
meetings increase audit activities, hence they enable the audit committee to monitor 
management activities effectively and reduce agency conflicts (Xie et al., 2003). Due to 
increase in monitoring, it reduces information asymmetry and improves the extent of disclosure 
activities (Nelson et al., 2010).  
 Earlier studies, such as Barros et al. (2013); Beasley et al. (2009); Bronson et al. (2006); 
Karamanou & Vafeas (2005) and Kelton & Yang (2008) provide empirical evidence of a 
positive association between the frequency of audit committee meetings and voluntary 
disclosure . On the other hand, other studies found no relationship between the two variables 
(Alhazaimeh et al., 2014; Matoussi, Karaa, & Maghraoui, 2004; Othman et al., 2014). In the 
Indian context, ICGC (49) recommends that audit committees should organise at least four 
meetings a year. Based on the above discussion, this study expects to find a positive 
relationship between the frequencies of audit committee meetings with the QFLID. 
Accordingly, the hypothesis below is set as follows: 
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H1.11: There is a positive association between the frequency of audit committee meetings and 
the QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
3.3.1.3.4. Audit Committee Financial Expertise 
Audit committee expertise is an important element in decreasing financial misstatements 
(Abbott et al., 2004; Beasley et al., 2009; Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004) and it 
improves financial reporting quality (Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2006). An audit committee with 
good expertise provides credible and high-quality information to the market (Smith, 2003). In 
the same vein, an audit committee with financial expertise effectively monitors the financial 
reporting process and improves disclosure activities (Liu, 2015; Mangena & Pike, 2005; 
McDaniel, Martin, & Maines, 2002). Agency theory suggests that an experienced audit 
committee leads to enhanced auditing activities (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
Moreover, it assumes that the audit committee is viewed as one of the monitoring agents within 
a company which is instrumental in improving the quality of financial reporting (Cheng & 
Courtenay, 2006; Vafeas, 2000) and useful in reducing agency costs. Zahra & Pearce (1989) 
highlight that an audit committee formed of diverse skills and experience resists managerial 
domination and works according to the stakeholders’ interests.  
Empirical results of earlier studies reported a positive association between financial expertise 
and disclosure (Abbott et al., 2004; Felo, Krishnamurthy, & Solieri, 2003; Felo & Solieri, 2009; 
Kelton & Yang, 2008; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2006; Liu, 2015; Mangena & Pike, 2005). 
Therefore, this study expects to find a positive relationship between audit committee financial 
expertise and QFLID, hence it proposes the following hypothesis: 
H1.12: There is a positive association between audit committee financial expertise and the 
QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
3.3.1.3.5. Females’ Presence on the Audit Committee 
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Singh et al. (2001) point out that gender diversity (presence of women in top management) is 
becoming a challenging research issue nowadays, and Liao et al. (2015) consider gender 
diversity to be an important CG dimension. Recent studies highlight that the presence of 
females on boards and audit committees improves corporate monitoring and enhances reporting 
processes that lead to better disclosure quality (Ittonen, Miettinen, & Vähämaa, 2010; Stewart 
& Munro, 2007; Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011). Based on an agency theory perspective, gender 
diversity reduces the issue of information asymmetry and improves monitoring of management 
activities (Carter et al., 2003a; Walt & Ingley, 2003). It also helps them to moderate the possible 
conflicting anticipations of stakeholders who have different interests, hence it improves CG 
(Liao et al., 2015). Empirically, Liao et al. (2015) reported a positive and significant association 
between company disclosure and gender diversity. Consequently, this study expects that the 
presence of women in audit committees improves QFLID. Hence, the hypothesis is as follows: 
H1.13: There is a significant positive association between the percentage of females’ presence 
on the audit committee and the QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
3.3.2. Hypothesis Related to QFLID and FV 
Previous studies examined the impact of disclosure on FV (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016b; 
Mendes-Da-Silva & de Lira Alves, Luiz Alberto, 2004; Plumlee et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2014; 
Uyar & Kiliç, 2012). However, limited studies examined the association between FLID and 
FV. Nevertheless, the results of prior studies are contradictory. Wang & Hussainey (2013) 
showed that FLID of well-governed companies increase the stock market’s ability to predict 
future earnings, and contain value relevant information for investors. Bravo (2015) examined 
whether FLID and the firm’s reputation causes a reduction in stock returns. The result indicated 
that FLID has a huge impact on the capital market, and firms of sound reputation are affected 
extensively by stock return volatility. However, Hassanein & Hussainey (2015) examined the 
 70 
 
impact of the change of forward-looking financial disclosure (FLFD) on FV, by using UK 
FTSE companies. They found that the changes in FLFD has a negative effect on the value of 
poorly performing companies, while, it has no effect on the value of well-performing 
companies. 
According to agency and signalling theories, a high quality of disclosure enables firms to 
enhance their valuation process and reduce information asymmetry among managers and 
investors. Therefore, high quality disclosure increases FV, as it either reduces the cost of 
capital, or maximises cash flows, or sometimes both (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016b; Elzahar et 
al., 2015). Drawing on agency theory, FLID decreases information asymmetry and agency 
costs (Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015). This, in turn, decreases the uncertainty surrounding the 
firm’s future performance and, thereby, could increase the anticipated cash flow to 
shareholders (Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015).  
The empirical evidence about the impact of voluntary disclosure on FV is still inclusive and 
gives mixed results. Some studies found that voluntary disclosure is positively related to FV 
(Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016b; Cheung, Jiang, & Tan, 2010; Elzahar et al., 2015; Mendes-Da-
Silva & de Lira Alves, Luiz Alberto, 2004; Nekhili et al., 2016; Plumlee et al., 2015; Uyar & 
Kiliç, 2012; Wang & Hussainey, 2013), whereas Hassanein & Hussainey (2015) reported a 
negative association between the change in FLIFD and FV. Hassan et al. (2009) found no 
association between voluntary disclosure and FV. 
Most of the studies examine disclosure in general and FV, and do not consider QFLID. 
Moreover, no study has considered developing countries, particularly India. Based on the above 
discussion, this study expects that the QFLID positively affects the FV. Consequently, the 
hypothesis of this study is set as follows: 
H2: There is a positive association between the QFLID and FV among Indian listed companies. 
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3.3.3. Hypothesis Related to QFLID and ACUAF 
Jennings (1987) showed that management forecasts and financial analysts’ revisions have 
significant associations with stock return, which confirms the management forecasts’ 
credibility; once this is discovered, subsequent information disclosed by the company will be 
seen as credible. Lang & Lundholm (1996) highlight that financial analysts are an essential part 
of capital market. They mentioned that analyst forecast information can be used for many 
purposes as it contains information on earnings forecast, buying and selling guidance and other 
useful information for managers, brokers and investors. 
Limited studies examined the relationship between voluntary disclosure and ACUAF. Lang & 
Lundholm (1996) investigated the association between information disclosure and ACUAF 
and found that firms with greater disclosure policies tend to have a larger analyst following. 
Similarly, Barron et al. (1999) examined the relationship between Management Discussion and 
Analysis (MD&A) information quality and ACUAF and reported that a high level of FLID 
regarding capital expenditure and operation is linked with more ACUAF. Vanstraelen et al. 
(2003) conducted a study across three European countries and examined the assoication 
between nonfinancial disclosure level and analyst forecast and dispersion. They found that the 
greater extent of disclosure is associated with lower dispersion and high ACUAF.  
With regard to FLID, Bozzolan et al. (2009) used a sample of non-financial Italian, German, 
French and Swiss companies and discovered that FLID is more efficient to improve ACUAF 
and reduce dispersion. According to the signalling theory perspective, managers signal more 
information to the market to reduce information assymetry. Thus, if the managers provide more 
disclosure information, it will increase analyst following and improve accuracy. Hence, it is 
expected that the QFLID enhances ACUAF.  
Overall, both theoretical and empirical literature reveals that analysts can obtain useful 
information from voluntary disclosures to anticipate a firm’s future earnings. FLID, as a key 
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example of corporate voluntary narratives, comprises earnings-sensitive financial information 
that has the potential to impact on ACUAF. Based on the above discussion of empirical studies, 
it is noted that there is no single study that examined the association between QFLID and 
ACUAF in developing countries such as India. This study examines the relationship between 
these two variables and expects the following hypothesis: 
H3: There is a positive association between the QFLID and ACUAF among Indian listed 
companies. 
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Figure 3. 1 Theoretical Framework of Determinants and Consequences of QFLID 
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QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure FV denotes frim value. ACUAF denotes accuracy of 
analysts forecast. BSIZE denotes board size. DP denotes the CEO duality. FBM denotes the frequency of board 
meetings during the year.  BI denotes the independence of board. FPB denotes the ratio of female presence on 
the board of directors. BloOwn denotes blockholder ownership. InsOwn denotes institutional ownership. 
ProOwn denotes promoter ownership. ACSIZE denotes audit committee size. ACM denotes the frequency of 
audit committee meetings during the year. IAC denotes the independence of the audit committee. ACFEXP 
denotes audit committee financial experts. FPAC is the ratio of female presence on the audit committee.  LEVE 
denotes the leverage ratio. PROF denotes profitability. LIQU denotes liquidity. GROW is firm growth. CSIZE 
denotes Firm size. IndType denotes industry type.  
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3.4. Conclusion 
The present chapter tries to give a review of the relevant theories adopted in the disclosure 
literature to explain the possible association between CG and QFLID, as well as the impact of 
QFLID on both FV and ACUAF. However, it is noted that no single theory is capable of giving 
an explanation of corporate disclosure inclusively. The review of the relevant theoretical 
framework clarifies that each theory has its own assumptions and unique perspectives to 
explain the phenomenon of disclosure.  
Given that the current research is concerned with the relationship between CG and QFLID, it 
applies agency, signalling and resource dependence theories to inform and interpret previous 
findings. Moreover, this research is concerned with the impact of QFLID on FV and ACUAF; 
the agency and signalling theories are applied to explain and interpret the study results. 
The research hypotheses are formed based on the integrated theoretical framework and the 
empirical literature review. This chapter covers the hypotheses to examine the association 
between CG and QFLID. Based on theories and the literature on CG and corporate disclosure, 
the present study expects an association between CG and QFLID among non-financial Indian 
companies. In addition, the current chapter illustrates the relevant hypotheses to examine the 
association between QFLID and FV. Based on literature of corporate disclosure and FV, this 
research expects to find a significant and positive association between QFLID and FV. Lastly, 
the current study proposes a positive and significant impact of QFLID on ACUAF. 
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
4.1. Introduction 
The present chapter explains the research methods used in the current study. It contains the 
following sections: Section 4.2 explains the research methodology. Section 4.3 focuses on the 
sample selection procedures. Section 4.4 discusses the process of measuring the study’s 
variables. Section 4.5 presents the empirical models of the study. Section 4.6 focuses on the 
empirical procedures of data analysis. The final section, 4.7, summarises the present chapter.   
4.2. Research Methodology   
Howell (2012, p. 82) explained that methodology has an impact on the methods and it also 
influences what knowledge needs to be considered and the consequent results of the 
examination. To achieve the study objectives, this section discusses the research philosophy, 
strategy, approach and the design adopted. The figure below presents the research 
methodology.  
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Figure 4.  1 The research methodology 
 
4.2.1. Research Philosophy 
The most important step in organising any social science research is that the rationale for the 
selection of research philosophy should be determined and explained (Saunders, 2011). Collis 
& Hussey (2003) point out that research philosophy explains the approach used to collect, 
analyse and utilise the data. The research philosophy refers to the assumptions of the research, 
including what data need to be collected, how research is carried out, and how results can be 
analysed. Positivism and interpretivism are the two key research paradigms (Bernard & 
Bernard, 2012; Bryman, 2015). According to Annells (1996) the positivism approach observes 
and describes a steady reality as per the objective perspective, while the interpretivism 
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philosophy targets the differences between organising a research and the reality that must be 
comprehended. The positivism approach considers that reality is objective and independent 
from researchers, and observers are not part of research.  The positivism philosophy involves 
studying literature to determine a relevant theory (theories), and using the selected theory 
(theories) to develop hypotheses. Once developed these hypotheses are tested to be either 
confirmed or rejected in order to select a theory (theories) (Bryman, 2015; Saunders, 2011). 
On the contrary, the interpretivism philosophy assumes that observers should not be 
independent from what is being observed. This philosophy suggests that researchers need to 
interact with what is being researched in order to gain a better understanding of a social 
situation (Bryman, 2015; Saunders, 2011). 
Research philosophies and methods are the two main concepts that are consistent in a research 
paradigm. In this study, the positivism paradigm is adopted, and this approach is convenient 
because this research relies mainly on companies’ annual reports to examine FLID in non-
financial Indian listed companies. According to Saunders (2011), the positivism philosophy is 
more beneficial if the nature of the problem requires identifying, and factors which influence a 
result need understanding. Therefore, this research adopts the positivism paradigm as it aims 
to examine: (i) the impact of CG mechanisms on QFLID; (ii) the impact of QFLID on FV; and 
(iii) the impact of QFLID on ACUAF, among non-financial Indian listed companies. 
4.2.2. Research strategies 
With regard to the methodology adopted in this study, Punch (1998) points out that it is 
essential to utilise a suitable research approach to address the research issues. In social sciences, 
two methods have been used, namely quantitative and qualitative. The researcher used a 
quantitative approach to relate causes and to influence references to theory in order to test the 
study’s hypothesis. A quantitative approach suggests a mathematical approach in which 
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collected data need to be quantified. According to Bryman (2015) and Berg (2004), the 
quantitative method utilises various statistical analyses and provides solid measurement 
approaches that make the findings more reliable and easier to generalise. Furthermore, this 
method improves the generalisation ability as it deals with a larger sample size and is able to 
be managed over a longer time period (Berg, 2004).  
On the other hand, a qualitative approach takes a non-numerical, descriptive approach into 
consideration to collect information to present understanding of the phenomenon (Berg, 2004). 
Moreover, it considers interpretations of observations and words as it articulates reality and 
makes an attempt to explain the nature of people in natural circumstances (Amaratunga, Baldry, 
Sarshar, & Newton, 2002). This method utilises analysis to explore knowledge, as it is not just 
limited to quantification of data (Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015). However, the qualitative 
method suffers from some drawbacks. This approach uses a small sample for the analysis, 
which is not sufficient to represent the whole population (Hakim, 1987). Another drawback is 
that the level of reliability and transparency is comparatively lower in this method (Berg, 2004) 
and this approach is time-consuming, therefore it may lead to inefficient tools being used to 
provide sufficient explanations (Berg, 2004). The most convenient research approach for 
positivist researchers to adopt is data-based surveys (Collis & Hussey, 2013; Saunders, 2011). 
Following the positivism philosophy, this study mainly utilises quantitative data (Crotty, 1998). 
To achieve the study objectives this strategy uses theories which assist the researcher to discuss 
the results based on association among different variables.    
4.2.3. Research approach 
Concerning the research approach, research paradigms are divided into two principal research 
approaches, namely deductive and inductive (Saunders & Lewis, 2009; Saunders, 2011). 
According to Sekaran (2003: 37), deductive research is defined as “the process by which we 
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arrive at provide reasoned conclusion by logical generalisation of a known fact” whereas 
inductive research is “a process where we observe certain phenomena and provide 
conclusions”.  
Robson (2002) explained that the deductive approach begins by establishing a testable 
hypothesis and finishes by investigating the results of the inquiry, leading to either confirming 
or adjusting the theory according to the findings. This approach enforces the need to gather 
quantitative data to examine the established hypothesis, and use a well-structured methodology 
to facilitate the replication of the outcome (Gill & Johnson, 2010). In other words, this approach 
moves from general to specific aspects (Collis & Hussey, 2013). 
On the other hand, the inductive approach begins with data collection and then moves to data 
analysis, leading to formulation of the theory (Babbie, 2010). In this approach, the theory 
follows the data rather than vice versa in the deductive approach (Saunders, Lewis, & 
Thornhill, 2007). Collis & Hussey (2013) suggest that the inductive approach is considered as 
a study that develops theory from the observations and inferences of empirical reality. 
Consequently, the aim of the inductive approach is to develop a theory and underpin the 
phenomena being investigated; hence it moves from specific to general.  
Bryman & Bell (2007) suggest that the deductive approach, which focuses on testing a theory, 
is linked with quantitative research, whereas the inductive approach (building a theory) is 
associated with qualitative research. In addition, Saunders et al. (2007) state that the deductive 
approach is highly associated with the positivist paradigm, while the inductive approach is 
aligned with the interpretivist paradigm. 
The aim of this study is to investigate the nature of corporate disclosure activities and to 
examine the impact of CG mechanisms on the QFLID and both FV and ACUAF among Indian 
non-financial companies. However, this study does not consider the development of a 
particular theory. Therefore, the appropriate approach is deductive, because positivist research 
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often adopts a deductive approach (Collis & Hussey, 2013; Saunders, 2011). Furthermore, 
previous disclosure literature provides strong evidence that deductive research is the 
appropriate research approach (Barako et al., 2006; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002). 
Based on the above discussion of research paradigm, the current research has adopted the 
positivism paradigm. This approach is convenient because this research relies mainly on 
companies’ annual reports to examine FLID in non-financial Indian listed companies since it 
is investigating the actuality of a phenomenon that already exists between CG and QFLID and 
between QFLID and both FV and ACUAF in Indian listed companies. Furthermore, this 
research also requires the use of existing theories in developing hypotheses, which can be 
rejected or confirmed according to the study results (Saunders et al., 2009). The research 
method used in the present study is consistent with the quantitative strategy, based on the 
positivism philosophy. This strategy uses theories that help the researcher to find a link between 
study variables and achieve the research aims (Crotty, 1998). Therefore, the research strategy 
is planned to examine the hypothesis through the collected data. To achieve study objectives 
this strategy uses theories (agency, signalling and resource dependence theories) which assist 
the researcher to discuss the results based on association among different variables.  However, 
as this study does not consider the development of a particular theory, the appropriate approach 
is deductive, because positivist research often adopts a deductive approach (Collis & Hussey, 
2013; Saunders, 2011). This research applied the deductive approach, since the study’s 
hypotheses were built according to the existing literature and theories. Furthermore, consistent 
with the positivists’ approach, statistical analysis techniques were used to examine these 
hypotheses. This method is consistent with the main aim of this research, which is to investigate 
the determinants and consequences of QFLID among Indian non-financial companies. 
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4.3. Sample Selection Procedure and Data Collection 
4.3.1. Sample Selection Procedure  
The initial sample is made up of the top 500 companies listed on the BSE from 2006 to 2015. 
The reason for choosing this sample size is that the BSE-500 index represents approximately 
93% of the total market capitalisation of the BSE, as BSE represents about 90% of over-all 
Indian market capitalisation. The reason for considering a 10-year period (from 2006-2015) is 
to ensure an adequate and consistent observation which strengthens the results of this study. 
Following prior researchers (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Alqatamin et al., 2017; Athanasakou & 
Hussainey, 2014; Hui & Matsunaga, 2014; Sun et al., 2010), financial firms were excluded 
from the initial sample because of their unique reporting requirements and differing disclosure 
regulations. In addition, companies with missing data were excluded (Habbash, Xiao, Salama, 
& Dixon, 2014). The study also excludes any companies established after 2006. In addition, 
companies controlled by government and foreign companies were not considered as they 
influenced by different regulations and social obligations, which may be difficult to account 
for (Haldar & Rao, 2011).  Thus, the final sample of this study is 212 companies. Table 4.3 and 
Table 4.4 below present the final sample for the current study sorted by industry type.  
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Table 4. 1 Sample selection 
BSE-500 index Number of Companies Number of 
Observations 
Initial sample 500 5000 
Excluded:   
Financial and insurance companies (94) (940) 
Foreign Companies (65) (650) 
Government Controlled Companies  (43) (430) 
Companies established after 2006 (25) (250) 
Missing data (61) (610) 
Final sample 212 2120 
 
Table 4. 2 Final sample sorted by industry 
Sector Number of companies Sector Ratio  
Oil & Gas 21 9.91% 
Services 42 19.81% 
Construction 22 10.37% 
Trading companies  15 7.07% 
Pharmaceuticals and health care    31 14.62% 
Clothes 14 6.60% 
Food and Drinks   14 6.60% 
Automobile & Motorcycle manufacturers 12 5.66% 
Equipment    18 8.49% 
Agriculture & Fishing   14 6.60% 
Metals & Mining   9 4.25% 
Total 212 100% 
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4.3.2. Data Collection 
This study uses secondary data, i.e. annual reports, because they provide the most 
comprehensive and pertinent data on an annual basis. Moreover, it is considered as a key 
resource for users to evaluate voluntary disclosure information (Botosan, 1997; Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993; Neu, Warsame, & Pedwell, 1998). In addition, these reports are easier to 
compare across firms than other informal channels, such as direct contact with analysts or press 
releases (Chang & Most, 1985; Jizi, Salama, Dixon, & Stratling, 2014). A total of 2120 annual 
reports of non-financial Indian listed firms from 2006 till 2015 were collected from the BSE 
and companies’ websites. In addition, the majority of companies’ annual reports are available 
within the first quarter of the following fiscal year.  
Data regarding QFLID and CG were manually gathered from companies’ annual reports. 
Furthermore, the OSIRIS database was used as an additional source for collection of financial 
data. In the case of unavailability of such information, Bloomberg was used to get the required 
data.  
4.4. Measurement of the Research Variables 
This part focuses on the variables employed in this research and clarifies the measurement of 
each variable. It begins by determining both dependent and independent variables, followed by 
control variables, and then discusses how these variables are measured. 
4.4.1. Measuring the QFLID 
The concept of quality is quite complex, and it has a multifaceted and subjective nature (Beattie 
et al., 2004). Therefore, no method or theory has enabled the researcher to develop certain 
proxies to measure this concept. Beattie et al. (2004) mentioned two categories to measure 
disclosure: subjective ratings and semi-objective studies. Few studies used the qualitative 
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approach also used the method of readability and linguistic analysis to measure quality of 
disclosure, whereas other studies adopted quantity or level as a proxy to measure disclosure 
quality (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Bozzolan et al., 2009; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; 
Hussainey et al., 2003; Mathuva, 2012b; Qu et al., 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). However, 
the notion of using information quantity to obtain a certain proxy for quality measurement is 
unclear to evaluate whether it is suitable or not. Urquiza et al. (2009) argued that using a high 
number of sentences to measure disclosure may not implicate high transparency and might not 
be suitable to present higher disclosure quality.   
Beattie et al. (2004) developed a valuation framework to measure voluntary disclosure that 
enables researchers to measure the extent of disclosure spread across various topics. Following 
Beattie’s framework (2004), Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) considered both the qualitative and 
quantitative perspectives of FLID and developed a new framework. They highlighted that 
disclosure quality is not limited to its magnitude, so it also consider what information is 
disclosed and the topics covered in disclosure.    
To measure the QFLID, this study adopted a multidimensional framework designed by Beattie 
et al (2004), which is further developed by Beretta & Bozzolan (2008). Since both the quantity 
dimension and the richness dimension are considered in this framework. 
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Source: (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008) 
Figure 4.  2 The Multidimensional Framework of QFLID 
 
The following sections address these two dimensions: quantity and richness, as these 
dimensions measure the QFLID. 
4.4.1.1. Quantity Dimension (QD) 
To measure the QFLID in annual reports, this study uses manual content analysis as the 
essential measurement, quantity dimension is measured by the relative number of items 
disclosed by the firm in its annual reports, which is adjusted for size and industry. Beattie et al 
(2004) suggested that the standardised residuals of an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression 
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could be used as a good proxy for disclosure quantity, using industry and size as independent 
variables. In this context, earlier studies supported the impact of industry and size on disclosure 
quantity (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Urquiza et al., 2009).   
The content analysis approach has been extensively utilised and is considered to be a key tool 
for measuring FLID (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Alqatamin et al., 
2017; Aribi & Gao, 2010; Athanasakou & Hussainey, 2014; Beattie et al., 2004; Hassanein & 
Hussainey, 2015; Hussainey et al., 2003; Kuzey, 2018; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). It is defined 
as “a technique used for the research of manifest content of communication and take objective, 
systematic and quantitative description into consideration” (Bernard, 1952, p. 18).  
Beattie et al (2004) highlighted that content analysis classifies text units into categories to draw 
valid inferences, and to maintain reliability in the classification procedures. In thematic 
analysis, which is also known as textual content analysis, scholars conclude inferences from 
themes intrinsic to the message by systematically classifying data into categories using manual 
or computerised content analysis (Jones & Shoemaker, 1994). Regarding the current study, the 
content analysis method is adopted to obtain data about the QFLID, which is collected from 
annual reports of non-financial Indian listed companies.   
Bryman & Bell (2003) explain that content analysis is a suitable choice for quantifying data 
through analysis of texts and documents, which can be easily replicated in pre-determined 
categories. Furthermore, it is useful in exploratory research in cases where there is no need of 
generalisations to be made and no specific theory required to be employed (Kolbe & Burnett, 
1991). The rationale behind utilising content analysis is that it has many benefits, for instance 
it is easy to apply, it is used for both quantitative and qualitative analysis, it deals with a textual 
content and it describes the trends in communication content. To collect data from annual 
reports, researchers prefer the method of content analysis due to its advantages. Various earlier 
studies regarding different types of voluntary disclosure used content analysis to examine the 
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extent of the disclosure (Aribi, 2009; Chakroun & Hussainey, 2014; Habbash & Ibrahim, 2015; 
Salama, Dixon, & Habbash, 2012).  
Several steps are required when content analysis is used to measure FLID (Krippendorff, 1980; 
Wolfe, 1991). These steps are: determining the document required for measuring disclosure; 
determining the recoding unit; determining the coding mode and testing the viability of 
reliability. 
1. Determining the document  
The crucial stage to conduct content analysis in disclosure studies is to determine the document 
that will be used for the analysis. However, most of the earlier studies do not cover the 
information regarding what sections of annual reports should be utilised for analysis. The focus 
of this study is to measure FLID by using the annual reports of non-financial Indian listed 
companies. The reason behind this is that FLID is more likely to be included in annual reports 
rather than financial statements. Deciding which sections should be analysed in an annual 
report is an essential stage in any content analysis study (Krippendorff, 1980). According to 
Beattie et al. (2004), annual reports contain the following sections which can be utilised for 
content analysis: Financial Highlights, Summary Results, Chairman’s Statement, CEO’s 
Review, Financial Director’s Report and the review of the company’s finance, business and 
operations. In the current study, FLID data is derived from narrative sections in firms’ annual 
reports, such as Chairman’s Statement, Outlook section, Director’s Report, and Management 
Discussion and Analysis (MD&A). The reason for using these sections is that they are available 
in the annual reports of non-financial Indian listed companies.  
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2. Determining the recording units   
The next step after determining the document is the selection of recording units. Previous 
literature discussed various units such as pages, sentences, paragraphs, group of words or a 
whole document can be used as a recording unit for content analysis.       
Beattie et al (2004) highlighted that sentences are a large recording unit, so it is important to 
divide them into text units as each group of words is a specific single piece of information and 
they are meaningful according to the context. ‘Text unit’ captures a piece of information and it 
is a part of the sentence (Beattie & Thomson, 2007). Previous studies criticised coding by 
paragraphs, sentences and words, since different information related to the future may be 
contained within the same sentence or paragraph and coding by words is considered to be 
meaningless without the sentence. Based on this discussion, this study used text units as a 
recording unit.  
3. Determining the Coding Mode  
Content analysis has been utilised in prior studies as a research method to capture different 
types of information in annual reports. Previous studies used two methods to conduct content 
analysis, the manual method (coded by hand) which is used in many studies (Adjaoud, Zeghal, 
& Andaleeb, 2007; Alnabsha et al., 2017; Alqatamin et al., 2017; Eng & Mak, 2003; Kuzey, 
2018; La Rosa & Liberatore, 2014), and the computerised method (computer-aided) which is 
employed by other researchers (Elshandidy, Fraser, & Hussainey, 2013; Hussainey et al., 2003; 
Merkley, 2014). 
Manual content analysis is more beneficial compared to computerised content analysis as it 
uses both quantitative and qualitative analyses, and it permits researchers to explain words and 
phrases much better within the context (Beattie et al., 2004; Deumes, 2008). Although the 
computerised content analysis saves time, effort, and allows examination of a large sample, 
there are some concerns about the robustness of computer-aided content analysis. The 
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computer-aided content analysis is not an adequate method in examining the intellectual capital 
disclosure in annual reports (Beattie & Thomson, 2007). Hussainey (2004:53) reported that 
“Manual content analysis is more effective than computerised analysis to identify themes in 
the texts.” Furthermore, computerised content analysis deals with explicit data but it is unable 
to detect implicit, or tacit, meanings or items (Carney, 1972). According to Beretta & Bozzolan 
(2008), manual content analysis classifies text units into categories to draw valid inferences 
with the aim of quantifying the items of disclosure, or reading a narrative section to identify 
and determine the information that is linked with FLID (Celik et al., 2006).  
4. Determining the Categories and Selection of Keywords  
To identify FLID disclosure, this study follows Barako et al. (2006) and Maali et al. (2006) and 
determines four categories. Wallace and Naser (1996) and Francis et al. (2008b) argued that no 
theory or consensus has been made so far regarding determining the criteria for categories that 
can be used to measure the extent of the disclosure. The selection of categories can be done 
either by evaluating previous literature or by investigating FLID content (Marston and Shrives 
1991; Clarkson et al. 1994; Bryan 1997; Barako et al. 2006). 
This study included both financial and non-financial information to determine the categories 
and to generate the list of FLID items. This study follows a list of 35 forward-keywords, which 
was developed by Hussainey et al. (2003). This includes words such as forecast, forthcoming, 
outlook, will, and likely to create a checklist of items that can be used in this study (see 
Appendix 4.1). Following earlier studies (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; 
Alqatamin et al., 2017; Athanasakou & Hussainey, 2014; Celik et al., 2006; Charumathi & 
Ramesh, 2015a; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Hussainey et al., 2003; Mathuva, 2012b; Wang 
& Hussainey, 2013), a list consisting of 50 FLID items, split across four categories, has been 
created. The list of items and categories has been sent to certain individuals who were selected 
on the basis of their knowledge and experience regarding accounting practices. The individuals 
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are in the field of either academics or accounting. The feedback confirmed the four categories 
but the list of FLID items has been reduced to 34 items. This method of determining categories 
and key words is in line with earlier studies (e.g. Kent and Ung 2003; Barako et al. 2006; 
O’Sullivan et al. 2008; Menicucci 2013).  
The results in the modified checklist are classified into four main categories, which are 
consistent with prior studies of FLID (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Alqatamin et al., 2017; 
Bozzolan & Ipino, 2007; Hutton, Miller, & Skinner, 2003; Vanstraelen et al., 2003). The four 
categories are: (1) financial information (15 items), (2) strategic information (5 items), (3) 
company trend (5 items) and (4) environment information (9 items). This method is consistent 
with earlier research (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Alqatamin et al., 2017; Kent & Ung, 2003; 
Menicucci, 2013a; O’Sullivan et al., 2008) (See Appendix 4.2). 
5. Testing Reliability and Validity 
To ensure credibility of content analysis, reliability and validity are the key tools. Reliability 
explains “the extent to which any measuring procedure yields similar results on repeated trials” 
(Carmines & Zeller, 1979, p. 11). This means that the method of content analysis is reliable to 
produce similar results while different researchers measure disclosure (Marston & Shrives, 
1991). On the other hand, validity points out “the extent to which any measuring instrument 
measures what it is intended to measure” (Carmines & Zeller, 1979, P. 17). Neuendorf (2004) 
defined reliability and validity of content analysis as the extent to which a measuring process 
produces similar results in repeated trials. In the same vein, Aribi & Gao (2011) state that the 
reliability and validity of content analysis are determined to ensure that different researchers 
code the unit in same way which decreases the chances of inaccuracy and biases. This study 
took several steps to ensure reliability and validity of content analysis: Firstly, a set of specified 
and explicit coding instruments has been introduced to reduce conflicts and achieve objectivity 
(Aribi & Gao, 2010). Secondly, different coders examined five annual reports to ensure that all 
 91 
 
coders use the same coding procedures (Aribi & Gao, 2010; Hussainey, 2004). Finally, the 
results of coding the five annual reports have been compared and reviewed by three academic 
experts in the area of accounting to identify possible disagreements, to assess reliability and to 
secure consistency. In this regard, clear definitions of categories and subcategories and 
explicitly formulated decision rules and procedures of FLID were established and developed, 
as mentioned earlier. 
Internal consistency reliability is a situation where the same results of a study can be produced 
by another researcher (Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004; Beattie & Thomson, 2007). The 
Cronbach’s alpha is the common measure used for internal consistency of disclosure indices. 
It explains how well the data items in a variable are positively associated, and it presents the 
average of associations among the items utilised to measure the variable. Consequently, 
consistent with previous researchers (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Botosan, 1997; Elshandidy, 
Fraser, & Hussainey, 2013; Hassan, Romilly, Giorgioni, & Power, 2009; Jouini, 2013), this 
study adopted Cronbach’s alpha to measure reliability of the FLID checklist. It has been 
suggested by prior that the level of reliability of the disclosure index is reliable when the value 
of coefficient of Cronbach’s alpha is 0.80 or more (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Botosan, 1997; 
Carmines & Zeller, 1979; Hassan et al., 2009; Jones & Shoemaker, 1994). Table 4-3 shows the 
reliability of the sub-groups and as a whole. 
As indicated in Table 4-3 the coefficient value of Cronbach’s alpha for the FLID index is 
approximately 83.9%, indicating a high degree of reliability for FLID index. 
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Table 4. 3 Summary of Cronbach’s Alpha test for FLID index 
       Group No of items 
Group test 
correlation 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Alpha if 
group deleted 
Financial information 15 .879 
.839 
.853 
Strategic information 5 .807 .802 
Company trend 5 .829 .793 
Environment information 9 .842 .845 
Overall  34  .839  
 
Following Beattie et al. (2004) the dimension of disclosure quantity is measured by using the 
relative number of text units, which is adjusted by two factors, size and industry type, that have 
been consistently found to influence the level of disclosure. The standardised residuals from 
an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression of the number of text units on industry and size 
are used as proxy of the quantity dimension. 
RQDi = ODi − EDi 
Where; RQDi is relative quantity disclosure index for firmi; ODi is observed disclosure for 
firmi; EDi is estimated disclosure for firmi. 
Next, the RQD index is standardised (STRQD) by using the maximum and the minimum of 
the relative quantity of disclosure of the firms analysed.  
                                                               STRQDi = 
maxj RQDj − RQDi
maxj RQDj − minj RQDj
 
4.4.1.2. Richness Dimension (RCN) 
The richness is measured by considering both the width (WID) and the depth (DEP) of 
disclosure.  
(1). Width (WID) relies on both coverage (COV) and dispersion (DIS) of disclosure across 
subtopics. 
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i) Coverage (COV) is measured by the ratio of items (sub items) disclosed at least once, divided 
by total number of items (sub items) that are taken into consideration. 
COVi =  
1
st
 ∑ INFij
st
j=1
 
Where; INFij Value (1) if firm i discloses information about the item j in the annual report, (0) 
otherwise; st = the number of items (sub items). 
ii) Dispersion of disclosure (DIS) indicates how concentrated disclosed items are among the 
checklist items. DIS is measured by the concentration of the items disclosed  
DISi =  − ∑ Pi
2
n
i=1
 
Where; Pi is the ratio of disclosure of item i measured by the number of items disclosed in 
category i; DISi  statistic will have a value between 1 and 1/n: a minimum value of 1/n when 
all text units fall into one category, and a maximum value of 1 when text units are spread 
equally among categories.  
The arithmetic mean of both coverage (COV) and dispersion (DIS) is used to obtain the value 
of width (WID):  
COV and DIS indices help in estimating how information in annual reports is distributed across 
themes in the disclosure checklist. Larger DIS and COV indices reveal the higher spread of 
information (SPR). Thus, the current study calculates the spread as the average of COV and 
DIS as follows: 
                                                               WIDi =  
1
2
 (COVi +  DISi) 
(2). Depth (DEP) depends on type of measure (TOM), economic sign (ES), and outlook profile 
(OTL). 
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i) Type of measure (TOM) indicates that the text unit disclosed in a firm’s annual report is 
either quantitative (e.g. earnings are likely to be about USD 84-87 billion next year) or 
qualitative (e.g. profits next year expected to increase 20%). TOM is measured as the ratio of 
the number of text units containing a measure of the total number of text units disclosed in the 
annual report. 
TOMi =  
1
idi
 ∑ TOMij
idi
j=1
 
Where; idi stands for the number of text units disclosed in the annual report of firmi; TOMij 
has been given a value of (1) if the text units are disclosed (qualitative or quantitative) in the 
annual report of firm i, (0) otherwise. The examples of text units collected from annual reports 
are as follows: profits next year expected to increase by 20%, earnings are likely to be about 
USD 84-87 billion next year.  
ii) Economic sign (ES) is measured by counting the number of text units disclosed which 
include an indication of the anticipated effect on future performance, ES is measured as a 
proportion of the total number of text units disclosed in the annual report of the firm. 
ESi =  
1
idi
 ∑ ESij
idi
j=1
 
Where; idi stands for number of text units disclosed in the annual report of firmi.;  ESij  has a 
value of (1) if the text units disclosed have an expected impact on the future performance of 
the firm i (share price, ROA, ROE, … etc.). An example of this is that if the company adds a 
new segment, thereby increasing their profitability, or if there is an increase in the income of 
homebuyers that leads to counter the impact of higher interest rates. Otherwise, it has a value 
of (0).  
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The outlook profile (OTL) considers the disclosures (on decisions, actions or programs) that 
the management has taken and the extent of forward looking information disclosed 
representing the company’s internal environment.  
OTLi =  
1
2
1
idi
 ∑ OTLij
idi
j=1
 
Where; OTLi is the outlook profile index for firmi.; idi represents the number of text units 
disclosed by firm i. 
 OTLij has been allocated a value of (2) if the information disclosed in text units of the annual 
report of firm i refers to decisions, actions or programs, and is forward-looking oriented which 
is beneficial for investors’ forecasts (sales, earnings, revenue, income, and other financial data) 
(e. g. the company will add a new segment, thereby increasing their sales).  
The value is (1) if the information disclosed in text units of the annual report of firm i refers to 
decisions/actions taken, actions/planned actions, or programs/actual state of business, or is 
forward-looking information, and is considered as beneficial for investors’ forecasts (sales, 
earnings, and other financial data). For example, inflation puts pressure on input costs which 
affects earnings, or the company introduces a new segment which can boost sales. Otherwise, 
it has a value of (0).  
The value of Depth (DEP) is the average of three dimensions (TOM, ES and OTL). 
DEPi =  
1
3
 (TOMi +  ESi + OTLi) 
The richness (RCN) dimension is the average of both Width (WID) and Depth (DEP) 
dimensions:  
RCNi =  
1
2 
 (WIDi +  DEPi) 
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The QFLID is obtained by averaging the Richness (RCN) dimension and the Standardised 
Relative Quantity (STRQT) dimension: 
QUALITYi =  
1
2
 (STRQDi +  RCNi) 
4.4.2. Measuring the FV 
To investigate the impact of the QFLID on FV, this study uses Tobin’s Q (TQ ratio) as a proxy 
to measure FV in the main analysis. Additionally, MC is utilised as an additional proxy for FV 
to check the robustness of results. The reasons for using two measures of FV are as follows: 
Firstly, there is no agreement in earlier literature that confirms the best measure of FV (Haniffa 
& Hudaib, 2006; Mangena, Tauringana, & Chamisa, 2012; Ntim, Opong, & Danbolt, 2015; 
Plumlee et al., 2015). Secondly, using two different proxies to measure FV provides a 
robustness check for the results (Christensen, Kent, Routledge, & Stewart, 2015; Mangena et 
al., 2012; Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Ntim, 2015; Terjesen, Couto, & Francisco, 2016). 
Thirdly, this research focuses on TQ ratio and MC because these measures are extensively 
utilised in the literature (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016b; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Kumar 
& Singh, 2013; Tan, Xu, Liu, & Zeng, 2015; Uyar & Kilic, 2012), which may improve 
comparability with previous studies.  
Yermack (1996) defined TQ ratio (market-based measures) as the market value of equity 
divided by the replacement cost. Likewise, TQ ratio is termed as the proportion of market value 
to the replacement value of company’s assets (Gaio & Raposo, 2011). Haniffa & Hudaib, 
(2006) mentioned that TQ ratio is used to investigate whether corporate management is using 
its assets effectively in order to maximise shareholders’ wealth. TQ ratio interprets the market 
expectation of economic return generated by the company’s assets (Bitner & Dolan, 1996). TQ 
ratio reflects the current market value of the firm’s stock as it is a market-based measure 
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(Thomsen, Pedersen, & Kvist, 2006). It measures the extent to which a firm expects to earn a 
higher than average return on invested capital (Abdullah et al., 2009).  
Different authors measured TQ ratio in various ways. For instance, Yermack (1996) divided 
market value by replacement cost to calculate TQ ratio, while Booth & Deli (1996) calculated 
TQ ratio by dividing the market value by the total assets. Consequently, this study used TQ 
ratio as a proxy to measure FV by following previous researches (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016b; 
Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Kumar & Singh, 2013; Tan et al., 2015), and computes it as:  
TQ ratio = 
(Total debt + Market value of equity)
Book value of total assets
  
MC is used as a second measure as it can determine FV, which is an important indicator in the 
financial sector and assists to evaluate the development of a country (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 
2016b; Uyar & Kilic, 2012). Following earlier studies, MC is measured as the market value of 
common equity at the end of a company’s financial year. Accordingly, MC is crucial from the 
viewpoint of shareholders to measure FV. In the current study, MC is an additional proxy for 
measuring FV. It is vital to note that TQ ratio and MC, which are measures of FV, are 
considered as the dependent variables in this research. 
4.4.3. Measuring the Accuracy of Analysts’ forecast (ACUAF) 
This section discusses the method used to measure ACUAF in order to examine its relation 
with QFLID. Botosan (2004) indicated that if the disclosed information is of higher quality, it 
assists the users of information to make financial decisions more effectively. Earlier studies 
found a significant association between ACUAF and disclosure (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; 
Bozzolan et al., 2009; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Lee, 2017; Vanstraelen et al., 2003). The 
studies highlighted that high quality disclosure assists analysts to effectively evaluate cash flow 
in the future by considering better earnings forecasts.  
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From the above discussion, this study suggests that the QFLID will be high if it is positively 
linked with ACUAF. Following earlier studies (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Bozzolan et al., 
2009; Hope, 2003; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Vanstraelen et al., 2003), this study measures the 
ACUAF as follows: 
ACUAF = - |AEPSt – MAFt| / PSt 
Where, 
AEPS = actual earnings per share in period t, 
MAF = the median analysts’ forecast of earnings per share in period t, 
SP = beginning of share price in period t 
This study used Bloomberg to collect both forecasted and actual earnings per share. The 
forecast accuracy is defined as the negative of the absolute value of the analyst forecast error, 
deflated by stock price.  
In addition, the current study used dispersion (DISAF) as an alternative measurement of 
dependent variable (ACUAF) to test whether the main results are robust by applying different 
measurement or not. Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) argue that the quality of disclosed information 
will be high if it is negatively and significantly related to DISAF. A number of prior researchers 
(Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Bozzolan et al., 2009; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Lee, 2017; 
Vanstraelen et al., 2003) indicated that DISAF is more likely to be low when firms publish a 
high quality of information disclosure. Following Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) and Lang & 
Lundholm (1996), DISAF measures as follows: 
DISAF = 
1
𝑗
√∑ (𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑡𝑗−𝐸?̂?𝑆𝑡)𝑗
𝟐
PP𝑡
 
EPSt represents analyst earnings per share, 𝐸?̂?𝑆𝑡 is mean of earning per share, PP𝑡 is price per 
share and J represents the number of analysts that are following the company.  
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4.4.2. Measuring the Independent Variable (CG variables) 
This study examines several CG characteristics to determine their impact on the QFLID among 
non-financial Indian listed companies. The study considers three CG mechanisms, namely: 
board of directors’ characteristics, ownership structure, and audit committees as an independent 
variable. These variables contribute to understanding how these mechanisms affect disclosure 
practices of Indian listed non-financial companies. Each of these mechanisms is further divided 
into various variables to enable a more detailed and appropriate measurement, as seen in Table 
4.5. 
Consistent with previous research, the explanatory variables involved in this research are 
measured as follows: with regard to the board of director’s characteristics, board size (BSIZE) 
is measured as the total number of board members (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Elshandidy et al., 
2013; Liu, 2015; Qu et al., 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Board independence (BI) is 
calculated as the proportion of the number of independent (non-executive) directors to the total 
number of board members (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Charumathi & Ramesh, 2015a; 
Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Liu, 2015; Qu et al., 2015). The study used a dummy variable to 
measure CEO duality: (1) if the CEO of the company serves as a board chairman, (0) otherwise 
(Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Liu, 2015; Qu et al., 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Frequency of 
board meetings (FBM) is measured as the number of meetings during the year (Al-Najjar & 
Abed, 2014; Liu, 2015; Qu et al., 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Female presence on the 
board of directors (FPB) is measured as the number of females serving as board directors 
divided by the total number of board members (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013; Ntim, 2015; Sartawi 
et al., 2014; Ujunwa, 2012).  
Concerning ownership structure, institutional ownership (Ins.Own) is computed as institutional 
ownership to total owners’ ratio (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Charumathi & Ramesh, 2015a; Liu, 
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2015; Qu et al., 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). The proportion of block holder ownership 
(at least owning 5% of total company ordinary shareholdings) is used to measure block holder 
ownership (Blo.Own) (Abdelsalam & Street, 2007; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014). Promoters’ 
holding (Pro.Own) was measured as the ratio of shares held by promoters (Charumathi & 
Ramesh, 2015a). 
Regarding audit committee characteristics, independence of audit committee (IAC) is 
measured as the ratio of independent directors on the audit committee (Al-Najjar & Abed, 
2014; Liu, 2015; Qu et al., 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Audit committee size (ACSIZE) 
is measured as the total number of audit committee members (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Liu, 
2015; Qu et al., 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Audit committee meetings (ACM) is 
measured as the number of meetings held during the year (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Liu, 2015; 
Qu et al., 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). The ratio of the members with accounting 
experience and financial qualifications to audit committee size is used to measure audit 
committee financial expertise (ACEXP) (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Liu, 2015; Qu et al., 2015; 
Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Finally, the study used the number of females in the audit 
committee divided by the total number of audit committee members to measure females’ 
presence on the audit committee (FPAC) (Sartawi et al., 2014; Thiruvadi & Huang, 2011). 
4.4.3. Measuring the Control Variables (firm characteristics) 
This research employs three empirical models to test the research hypotheses. In the first 
model, QFLID is considered as a dependent variable, and CG as an independent variable. 
However, in the second and the third models the QFLID becomes the independent variable 
while the FV and ACUAF are considered dependent variables. Firm characteristics have been 
widely used in prior research as control variables of FLID, FV and ACUAF. In addition, in 
order to reduce potential issues related with omitted variables, including endogeneity issues, 
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this research controls for numerous variables (Ntim et al., 2013; Wooldridge, 2015). Following 
previous research (Albitar, 2015; Aljifri et al., 2014; Alkhatib, 2014; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; 
Barako, 2007; Celik et al., 2006; Hossain et al., 2005; Kent & Ung, 2003; Khlif & Hussainey, 
2016; Kuzey, 2018; Liu, 2015; Uyar & Kilic, 2012; Wang & Hussainey, 2013), six control 
variables have considered in this study, namely firm size, leverage, profitability, liquidity, 
growth and industry type.  
4.4.3.1. Firm Size 
Signalling theory suggests that firms with a larger size are likely to catch the attention of 
financial analysts to gain the information needed in making rational advices (Hussainey & Al-
Najjar, 2011; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Furthermore, agency theory suggests that larger firms 
perform a greater number of complex business transactions as compared to smaller companies, 
and thereby are likely to incur high agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Leftwich, Watts, 
& Zimmerman, 1981; Pérez, 2004). Therefore, larger companies publish more voluntary 
disclosures to decrease these costs. Empirically, several studies documented a positive 
association between corporate disclosure and firm size (Albitar, 2015; Aljifri et al., 2014; 
Alkhatib, 2014; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Barako, 2007; Celik et al., 2006; Dembo & 
Rasaratnam, 2014; Eng & Mak, 2003; Ferguson, Lam, & Lee, 2002; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; 
Hossain et al., 2005; Kent & Ung, 2003; Khlif & Hussainey, 2016; Liu, 2015; Soliman, 2013; 
Uyar & Kilic, 2012; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). On the other hand, other empirical studies 
reported that corporate voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with firm size (Aljifri & 
Hussainey, 2007; Mathuva, 2012b; Menicucci, 2013b; O’Sullivan et al., 2008). The current 
study assumes that large Indian listed companies disclose more QFLID.  
Firm size is regarded as an important factor that influences FV and ACUAF (Bozzolan et al., 
2009; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Samaha et al., 2012). It 
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is argued that larger companies are more likely to employ more skilled managers and large 
assets base which enable them to enhance their values (Baek et al., 2004; Black, Love, & 
Rachinsky, 2006; Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006; Klapper & Love, 2004). Some previous empirical 
research reports a positive relationship between firm size and both FV and ACUAF (Baek et 
al., 2004; Belgacem & Omri, 2014; Bozzolan et al., 2009; Hassan et al., 2009; Hassanein & 
Hussainey, 2015; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Sheu et al., 2010). Following previous studies, the 
natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the year is used to measure firm size (Elshandidy 
& Neri, 2015; Sartawi et al., 2014). 
4.4.3.2. Profitability 
In line with past research, it is suggested that company profitability controls the potential 
effects on the FLID (Alkhatib & Marji, 2012; Alkhatib, 2014; Urquiza et al., 2009; Uyar & 
Kilic, 2012). Signalling theory assumes that, if companies are performing well, they are liable 
to signal their activities to investors (Watson, 2002). Profitable firms tend to disclose additional 
information, because managers are motivated to increase disclosure to ensure their position and 
it will also assist them to legitimise their continued management (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Ntim 
& Soobaroyen, 2013). Accordingly, it is noted that high profit firms disclose more information 
than those with small profits (Alkhatib & Marji, 2012; Uyar & Kilic, 2012). 
Empirically, numerous previous studies found that profitability impacts significantly and 
positively on voluntary disclosure (Albitar, 2015; Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; Charumathi & 
Ramesh, 2015a; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; 
Khlif & Hussainey, 2016; Mathuva, 2012b; Soliman, 2013; Wang & Hussainey, 2013), 
whereas other studies documented a negative association between profitability and corporate 
disclosure (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Aljifri et al., 2014; Celik et al., 2006; Chen & Jaggi, 
2001; Inchausti, 1997; Wallace et al., 1994). Furthermore, others reported that profitability has 
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no significant impact on disclosure practices (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Allegrini & Greco, 
2013; Alqatamin et al., 2017; Barako et al., 2006; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Uyar & Kilic, 
2012). This study expects a positive and significant association between profitability and the 
QFLID. Following the previous study, return on assets (ROA) (net income before tax divided 
by total assets) is being used to measure profitability.  
4.4.3.3. Leverage 
Previous research indicated leverage as an essential factor that may have an impact on 
disclosure practices (Abraham & Cox, 2007; Ho & Wong, 2001a; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 
2011; Oyelere et al., 2003). Agency theory assumes that firms who have higher leverage tend 
to incur higher monitoring costs (Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; A. 
Watson et al., 2002). To decrease these costs, companies disclose more information to show 
their capability of meeting any obligations set by the creditors (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; A. 
Watson et al., 2002). In addition, providing more FLID is one way of reducing the adverse 
effects of the high levels of debt (Mathuva, 2012b). In the same vein, from a signalling theory 
view, managers disclose more information voluntarily when the firm has a high leverage ratio 
as it will attract investors and it will also signal to creditors that the company is capable of 
meeting both short- and long-term requirements (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). Therefore, it is 
expected that leverage is positively associated with the level of corporate disclosures (Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013).  
Several studies have indicated that leverage ratio has an impact on voluntary disclosure 
(Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Hassan et al., 
2009; Hossain et al., 1995; Mathuva, 2012b; Merkley, 2014; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013), whereas others do not find any relationship between the two variables 
(Abraham & Cox, 2007; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Celik et al., 2006; Chow & Wong-Boren, 
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1987; Ho & Wong, 2001a; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Menicucci, 2013a; Nekhili et al., 2012; 
Nekhili et al., 2016; Nor, Saleh, Jaffar, & Shukor, 2010; Uyar & Kilic, 2012; Wallace et al., 
1994). The link between leverage and both FV and ACUAF has mixed results. Empirically, 
some past research found a negative association between leverage and both FV and ACUAF 
(Banerjee, Gokarn, Pattanayak, & Sinha, 2009; Bozzolan et al., 2009; Jackling & Johl, 2009; 
Kumar & Singh, 2013; Mangena et al., 2012; Uyar & Kiliç, 2012). On the other hand, 
appositive relationship provided by McConnell & Servaes (1995). Following previous studies 
(Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; O’Sullivan et al., 2008), the ratio of a firm’s total long-term debt at 
the end of the year to total assets at the end of year is used to measure leverage. 
4.4.3.4. Liquidity 
The current study utilises the company’s liquidity to control the potential effects on the QFLID. 
Liquidity is an indicator of the company’s ability to cover its current obligations. Signalling 
theory assumes that managers of high liquidity companies tend to disclose more information, 
as it signals their ability in managing liquidity as compared to managers who are managing 
lower liquidity (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). Wallace & Naser (1995) indicate that it is 
expected that companies with a high liquidity ratio disclose more to demonstrate their ability 
to meet their short-term liabilities. Furthermore, Abd-Elsalam & Weetman (2003) indicate that 
high liquidity proportions lead to an increase in disclosed information, whereas agency theory 
suggests that firms with a lower liquidity ratio might disclose more information to reduce 
agency costs and to reassure shareholders and creditors (Wallace et al., 1994). 
Empirically, several previous studies document that liquidity impacts significantly and 
positively on voluntary disclosure (Camfferman & Cooke, 2002; Elshandidy et al., 2013; Ezat 
& El-Masry, 2008; Samaha & Dahawy, 2010). On the other hand, other studies reported that 
corporate voluntary disclosure is negatively influenced by firm liquidity (Aly, Simon, & 
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Hussainey, 2010; Menicucci, 2013c; Naser, Al-Khatib, & Karbhari, 2002; Wallace et al., 
1994), while other researchers document that liquidity has no significant impact on disclosure 
practices (Agyei-Mensah, 2012; Aljifri et al., 2014; Alsaeed, 2006; Barako et al., 2006; Elzahar 
& Hussainey, 2012; Mangena & Pike, 2005; Mathuva, 2012a).  
Liquidity might play an important role in improving FV and ACUAF. Previous research found 
significant positive association between liquidity and FV (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016b; 
Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015). Bozzolan et al. (2009) found that liquidity has positive impact 
on ACUAF, whereas Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) found no relationship between two variables. 
In the current study, the ratio of the company’s current assets to current liabilities is used to 
measure liquidity. 
4.4.3.5. Firm growth  
The survival of the firm is dependent on its growth. If the growth of the firm is higher, then the 
probability of its survival will be much higher (Henry, 2008). If the opportunity regarding 
growth is high for a company then it becomes more attractive and they will receive a better 
valuation (Beiner, Drobetz, Schmid, & Zimmermann, 2006). The high growth rate may raise 
the issue of higher information asymmetry between management and shareholders (Smith Jr & 
Watts, 1992). Therefore, voluntary disclosure can be used as an incentive to reduce such issues 
(Gul & Leung, 2004). It is suggested that companies with high growth tend to increase their 
FLID activities which indicates both are positively associated. 
According to the signalling theory, growth tends to be positively associated with disclosure 
(Lev & Penman, 1990). Moreover, Frankel et al. (1995) pointed out that companies that have 
high growth prospects suffer from frequent agency problems because of a higher level of 
information asymmetry as compared to other companies. It is argued that firms with better 
growth opportunities are more attractive and, thus, are more likely to receive better valuation 
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(Henry, 2008). Previous studies support the above argument and found that firm growth has a 
positive association with FV (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Henry, 2008).This study used firm 
growth as a control variable and examined its association with QFLID. It is also used a control 
variable for both FV and ACUAF. Hence, following prior studies firm growth is measured by 
the ratio change of sales. 
4.4.3.6. Industry Type 
Another determinant of firm information disclosure is the type of industry (Alkhatib & Marji, 
2012; Celik et al., 2006). Omar & Simon (2011) indicate that firms which are operating in 
various sectors are bound to additional disclosure requirements. For example, manufacturing 
firms are enforced to disclose additional information as compared to firms operating in the 
service industry, because the operations of manufacturing firms are highly likely to harm the 
environment. According to signalling theory, if an industry is more homogeneous, then the 
companies adopt similar reporting practices (Aly et al., 2010; Malone, Fries, & Jones, 1993; 
Wallace et al., 1994). In this regard, if a firm within an industry fails to follow the same 
disclosure practices as compared to other firms in the same industry, this gives a signal that it 
is hiding bad news (Craven & Marston, 1999; Oyelere et al., 2003). 
Empirically, mixed statistically significant results are found. Previous studies found a 
significant association between sector type and the extent of corporate disclosure (Ahmed & 
Courtis, 1999; Aljifri, 2008; Aljifri et al., 2014; Cooke, 1992; Haniffa & Cooke, 2005; 
Muttakin & Khan, 2014; Salama et al., 2012). On the other hand, others document that industry 
type has no significant impact on FLID (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Alqatamin et al., 2017; 
Eng & Mak, 2003; Mathuva, 2012a; McNally, Eng, & Hasseldine, 1982; Raffournier, 1995; 
Wallace et al., 1994). Following earlier studies (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Alkhatib, 2014; 
Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Mathuva, 2012a), the industrial factor 
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is predicted to influence the quality of FLID among the non-financial Indian listed companies. 
Furthermore, the relationship between industry type and both FV and ACUAF supported by 
past studies (Elsayed, 2007; Hope, 2003; Ntim, 2013; Wahba, 2015) which report that a firm’s 
industry significantly effects its market valuation. To classify the industry type, the sample in 
this study is divided into eleven types of industries and is coded from 1 to 11 (Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2008; Charumathi & Ramesh, 2015a). 
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Table 4. 4 Definition and measurement of variables 
Abbreviated 
name 
Full name Description Data source 
Dependent 
variables 
   
QFLID Quality of forward-looking 
information disclosure 
Ratio of FLID quality (dependent variable in model one 
and independent variable in model two) measured by 
multidimensional apportion  
Company annual report 
TQ ratio Tobin’s Q ratio (Total debt + Market value of equity) / Book value of total 
assets 
Osiris database 
MC Market capitalization Measured as the market value of common equity at the end 
of a company’s financial year 
Osiris database 
ACUAF Accuracy of analysts forecast Accuracy is defined as the negative of the absolute value of 
the analyst forecast error, deflated by stock price 
Bloomberg database 
DISAF Dispersion of analysts forecast The standard deviation of the change over the fiscal year in 
the median forecast from the preceding month, deflated by 
the stock price as of the beginning of the fiscal year. 
Bloomberg database 
Independent 
variables 
   
BSIZE Board size Total number of board members Company annual report 
BI Board independence Ratio of the number of independent directors divided by the 
total number of board members. 
Company annual report 
DP CEO duality Dummy variable: (1) if the CEO of the company serves as 
a board chairman, (0) otherwise 
Company annual report 
FBM Frequency of board meetings The number of board meetings during the year Company annual report 
FPB Female presence on the board 
of directors 
The number of females serving as board directors divided 
by the total number of board members 
Company annual report 
Ins.Own Institutional ownership Institutional ownership to total owners’ ratio Company annual report 
Blo.Own Block holder ownership Proportion of block holder ownership (those who own at 
least 5% of total company ordinary shareholdings) 
Company annual report 
Pro.Own Promoters ownership The ratio of shares held by promoters Company annual report 
IAC Independence of the audit 
committee 
The ratio of independent directors on the audit committee Company annual report 
ACSIZE Audit committee size The number of audit committee members Company annual report 
ACM Audit committee meetings Number of meetings during the year Company annual report 
ACFEXP Audit committee financial 
Expertise 
The ratio of the members with accounting experience and 
financial qualifications to audit committee size 
Company annual report 
FPAC Female presence on the audit 
committee 
The number of females in the audit committee divided by 
the total number of members of the audit committee 
Company annual report 
Control 
variable 
   
CSIZE Company size Measured by the natural logarithm of total assets Osiris database 
PROF Profitability Measured by net income to total assets Osiris database 
LIQU Liquidity Measured as the proportion of the company’s current assets 
to its current liabilities 
Osiris database 
LEVE Leverage The ratio of a company’s total debt at the end of the year to 
total assets at the end of year 
Osiris database 
GROW Growth Measured by the ratio change of sales Osiris database 
IndType Type of industry  The sample in this study is divided into eleven types of 
industry and is coded from 1 to 11 
Osiris database 
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4.5. Research Empirical Models 
This study covers the following objectives: 
1- To examine the impact of CG mechanisms on QFLID among non-financial Indian listed 
companies.  
2- To examine the impact of the QFLID on FV among non-financial Indian listed 
companies. 
3- To investigate the association between QFLID and ACUAF among non-financial 
Indian listed companies.  
This study used three regression models to test the hypotheses and fulfil its objectives. The first 
model investigates the effect of CG mechanisms on the QFLID. The second model examines 
the impact of the QFLID on FV measured by TQ ratio. The third model investigates the impact 
of QFLID on ACUAF. The estimated regression models are presented as follows: 
 
1. QFLID= β0 + β1BSIZE + β2DP + β3FM + β4BI + β5FPB + β6BloOwn + β7InsOwn 
+ β8ProOwn + β9ACSIZE + β10ACM + β11IAC + β12ACFEXP + β13FPAC + 
β14FCSIZE + β15IndType + β16LEVE + β17PROF + β18LIQU + β19GROW + e. 
 
2. TQ ratio = β0 + β1QFLID + β2CSIZE + β3LEVE + β4LIQU+ β5GROW + β6IndType 
+ e. 
3. ACUAF = β0 + β1QFLID + β2CSIZE + β3LEVE + β4PROF + β5LIQU+ β6GROW + 
β7IndType + e. 
Where, 
QFLID denotes the Quality of FLID; β0 denotes the constant term; TQ ratio denotes proxies 
to measure firm value (FV); ACUAF denotes accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecast; BSIZE 
 110 
 
denotes the board size; DP stands for CEO duality; FBM stands for the frequency of board 
meetings; BI denotes the board independence; FPB denotes the ratio of female presence on the 
board; BloOwn denotes block holder ownership; InsOwn denotes institutional ownership; 
ProOwn denotes promoters’ ownership; ACSIZE denotes audit committee size; ACM denotes 
audit committee meetings; IAC denotes Independence of audit committee; ACFEXP denotes 
audit committee financial experts; FPAC denotes the ratio of female presence on the audit 
committee; CSIZE denotes company size; IndType denotes industry type; PROF is 
profitability; GROW stands for firm growth; LIQU denotes liquidity and e denotes the error 
term.  
4.6. Empirical Procedures of Data Analysis: 
This section discusses three statistical techniques used in this study. These are preliminary 
analysis, multivariate analysis and sensitivity analysis.  
4.6.1. Preliminary Analysis     
This study used three preliminary analyses termed as: descriptive statistics, univariate analysis, 
and correlation matrix. Descriptive statistics summarise and describe basic features of the data 
in regards to the tests of central tendency and shape of distribution on a single variable in a 
reasonable way. The first statistics used for the continuous variables in a data set is known as 
tests of central tendency. It is also called measures of location and includes mean, median, 
standard deviation, maximum and minimum values.  Both the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
and the correlation matrix methods test the correlation among sample explanatory variables 
and clarify the level of linear association among two explanatory variables (Gujarati & Porter, 
2011). A higher degree of the correlation coefficient among the explanatory variables harms 
the results of the regression analysis, due to the multicollinearity issue (Grewal, Cote, & 
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Baumgartner, 2004; Gujarati, 2008; Harris & Raviv, 2006). They suggest that (at level of) ± 
0.80 or higher would indicate the start of a serious multicollinearity issue that could influence 
the regression findings. 
4.6.2. Multivariate Analysis 
There are two methods that can be used to conduct multivariate analysis: parametric and non-
parametric methods. These methods will be used by the researcher according to the nature and 
characteristics of the data. Gujarati (2003) highlights five necessary assumptions that need to 
be investigated before the selection of the two multivariate analysis methods. The assumptions 
are as follows: (1) Linearity suggests that there is linear association between both the 
explanatory and dependent variables, (2) normality assumes that the data is normally 
distributed, (3) the hypothesis of heteroscedasticity assumes that the dependent variables are 
constantly changed, (4) independence assumes that there should be no association among the 
error terms of two or more observations and (5) multicollinearity assumes that there is no 
collinearity between independent variables of the study. 
In order to determine which method is appropriate for the present research (parametric or non-
parametric), several tests are checked. To investigate the problem of normality, this study 
conducted a histogram test. Quantile-Quantile (Q-Q plot) test is being used to examine the 
issue of linearity. To test heteroscedasticity, the study utilised Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg 
and White’s general tests. Lastly, the study used pairwise Pearson correlation matrix and VIF 
tests to examine the problem of independence and multicollinearity.  
4.6.2.1. Panel Regression Analysis 
There are three main types of data used by researchers to conduct empirical analysis. These 
are: cross-sectional, time series and panel data. The cross-sectional data is based on the value 
of one or more variables, collected for various entities/units used as a sample over the same 
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time period, whereas, the values of one or more variables are observed over a time period in 
the time series data. Lastly, panel data is similar to cross-sectional units (companies) and 
observed over time (years) (Gujarati, 2003). 
The flaw of cross-sectional data analysis is that it suffers from the issue of heteroscedasticity 
and auto-correlation that can have an impact on the validity of the results. Panel data analysis 
overcome the issues related to cross-sectional data analysis (Petersen, 2009). It is very 
beneficial as it enables researcher to measure the individual effects that are non-observable and 
reduces the reliability issue of explanatory variables regarding the explanation of dependent 
variables (Serrasqueiro & Nunes, 2008). Moreover, when the panel data regression model is 
based on cross-sectional and time-series data, it increases the degree of freedom and data 
quantity (Gaud, Jani, Hoesli, & Bender, 2005; Pesaran, Shin, & Smith, 2000).  
To examine the research hypotheses of the study, regression analysis is utilised as the main 
tool. There are two types of regression analysis: panel and pooled. The major difference 
between them is that panel regression can differentiate among the firms and over time, which 
helps the researcher to take any unobservable heterogeneity out of the sample, but pooled 
regression is unable to do this (Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999). This study organised 
various tests to make the choice between the panel and pooled regression models. Following 
(Twumasi-Ankrah, Ashaolu, & Ankrah, 2015), the Chow test and the Breusch-Pagan 
LaGrange Multiplier (LM) are used and, based on their results, this study chose the panel 
regression model to conduct the analysis. 
There are many advantages of using panel data analysis. It takes both spatial (units) and worldly 
(time) scope into consideration, which is crucial to examine linear information. It is also a key 
source for longitudinal data analysis, specifically when there are various sources of 
information. When the perceptions for individual analysis are longer, panel data analysis has 
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various procedures that are useful to scrutinise variations in a specific type of cross-sectional 
unit over a time period (Gujarati 2003; Gujarati 2008).  
Panel data analysis is useful because it reduces the level of co-linearity among the variables 
and also provides extra instructive information regarding the data. Due to its combination of 
the cross-sectional and time series dimension, panel data regression makes the analysis more 
effective and also offers flexibility. It considers certain variables that exclude heterogeneity in 
the estimation process. It is also helpful in analysing complicated behavioural models such as 
technological change that cannot be done by using either cross-sectional or time series analysis.  
From the above discussion, this study uses panel data regression. Many studies  used panel data 
to study the relationship among different variables (Chih et al. 2008; García‐Meca and 
Sánchez‐Ballesta 2009; Chang and Sun 2010; Yu et al. 2010; Wang and Hussainey 2013; Ben 
Othman and Mersni 2014; Ali et al. 2015; Böcking et al. 2015). Random effect and fixed effect 
models are the two main models of panel data regression. The random effect model assumes 
that individual effects are random disturbances drawn from the probability distribution, 
whereas the fixed effect model considers that the individual effect term is constant. 
4.6.3. Additional Analyses and Robustness Test 
This research used additional analyses to check the sensitivity of primary findings and to 
confirm whether they are robust to various measurements. Firstly, the current research used 
high QFLID and low QFLID firms to examine whether or not the main results differ due to 
this. Secondly, different alternative measurements are used for the explanatory variables. For 
instance, the study used MC (proxy to measure FV) as an alternative measurement to test 
whether the main findings are robust to various measures or not. Moreover, the study used 
DISAF (proxy for ACUAF) as an alternative measurement to confirm the robustness of the 
main results.  Finally, the current research used two-stage least squares (2SLS) (the lagged 
 114 
 
value of CG mechanisms and FLID utilised as instrumental variables) to control the 
endogeneity issue. 
4.7. Chapter Summary  
The current chapter discusses the methodology and identifies the research methods utilised to 
achieve the aim and objectives of this study.  The methods covered in the chapter are to examine 
the relationship between CG mechanisms and the QFLID, and impact of the QFLID on both 
FV and ACUAF. It explains manual content analysis and a multidimensional approach that is 
used to measure the QFLID. In addition, TQ ratio and MC are used as proxies to measure FV. 
Furthermore, ACUAF and DISAF are used to measure analysts’ earnings forecast. The data 
analysis is achieved by employing fixed effect models of panel regression. The present research 
used 212 non-financial Indian listed companies (2120 company's observations) from 2006 to 
2015 to test the hypothesis. Chapter 5 will cover the methods discussed in this chapter, and 
present the summary of descriptive statistics for all variables employed, to examine the impact 
of CG on the QFLID among non-financial Indian listed companies and discuss the results 
obtained from the multivariate analysis. 
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Chapter Five: CG Mechanisms and QFLID 
5.1. Introduction 
The present chapter examines the impact of CG on the QFLID in non-financial Indian listed 
companies’ annual reports. Furthermore, this chapter aims to examine the research hypotheses 
related to the relationship between the independent variables (CG) and the QFLID. This chapter 
consists of the following sections: section 5.2 covers descriptive statistics of regression 
variables. Section 5.3 presents the multicollinearity issue. Section 5.4 explains the results of 
the multivariate analysis. Section 5.6 describes additional and sensitivity analyses. Section 5.6 
deals with the endogeneity problem and section 5.7 covers a summary of this chapter.  
5.2. Descriptive Statistics of the Regression Variables  
Table 5.1 presents descriptive statistics’ results of QFLID (dependent variable), CG 
(independent variable) and control variables (company characteristics).  
With regard to the dependent variable (QFLID), Table 5.1 below displays that the maximum 
of QFLID of the sample firms is 68% while the minimum score is 0%. This is similar to Aljifri 
and Hussainey (2007), as their study found that the maximum FLID score among UAE 
companies is 70% and the minimum FLID score is 0%. This range shows that a variation exists 
among Indian listed companies in their decision-making process regarding FLID.  The overall 
mean of QFLID is 50.70%, higher than the average found in Charumathi & Ramesh’s (2015) 
study, as the study found the overall mean of FLID in Indian companies was 42.12%. Notably, 
the average is closer to Sartawi et al.  (2014),  who found that the overall mean of voluntary 
disclosure in Jordanian companies was 49%. Furthermore, the current study employed a 
median value of 51.49% to classify high and low QFLID, similar to Nalikka’s (2009) value of 
50.46% for listed Finnish companies.   
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Regarding boards of directors, the average board size is around 10 members, ranging from 24 
to 4 members. This indicates that Indian companies comply with the Indian Corporate 
Governance Code (ICGC) number (49), which recommends that a board of directors should 
comprise of at-least four members.  It is similar to the results of Jackling & Johl (2009), who 
reported that the mean value of board size is 9.56, with a minimum of 4 and a maximum of 18 
members among Indian listed companies. Moreover, the result is relatively comparable with 
the previous results of Darko et al. (2016), who found that the average board size is around 9 
among Ghanaian companies. With reference to CEO duality, approximately 44% of CEOs in 
companies serve as board chairman. This is in line with ICGC (49), which indicates that if the 
CEO is also the chairman then half of the board of directors should be independent. The result 
is relatively higher than the mean value provided by Jackling & Johl (2009), who reported 35% 
among Indian listed companies. On the other hand, Chau & Gray (2010) reported an overall 
mean of 54% among Hong Kong listed companies, higher than this study’s result.  
Furthermore, the results found that the average proportion of independent directors is 53%, 
with a range from 16% to 92%. This highlights that almost half of the board directors are 
independent. This is consistent with ICGC number (49), which stated that half of the board 
directors should be independent. This finding is quite similar to Charumathi & Ramesh 
(2015a), as the study reported  a 50.62% average proportion of independent directors in Indian 
listed companies, ranging from 12.45% to 80%. Table 5.1 reports that the average number of 
board meetings is approximately 6 per year and ranges from 4 to 17 meetings. It is in line with 
ICGC number (49), which recommends that a board should hold at least four meetings a year. 
Similar to this study result, Jackling & Johl (2009) found the mean value of the number of 
board meetings among Indian companies is 6. With regard to females’ presence on the board, 
the mean value is about 5.7% and the range is from 0% to 75%. The results indicate that Indian 
companies do not comply with ICGC number (49) because it recommends that boards should 
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have at least one woman director. This outcome is quite similar to Perryman et al. (2016), who 
reported that the overall mean of females on boards is 5%. 
In terms of ownership structure, the overall mean of block holder ownership is about 29% and 
ranges between 0% and 82%. Furthermore, the overall mean of institutional ownership is 22% 
and ranges from 0% to 70%, which is similar to Charumathi & Ramesh (2015a), who reported 
that the mean of institutional ownership of Indian companies is 30.14%. The overall mean of 
promoters’ ownership is approximately 53.41% and ranges from 0% to 97%. This result is 
similar to the findings of Charumathi & Ramesh (2015a) and Ganguli & Agrawal (2009), who 
reported 54.185% and 52.954% as overall means among Indian companies, respectively.  
Regarding audit committees, the study found that the average audit committee size is 4 
members and ranges from 3 to 8 members. The result follows ICGC number 49 as it suggests 
that an audit committee should have least three members. This result is in line with Darko et 
al. (2016), who provided the mean value of 4 among Ghanian companies. This study found the 
mean value of the number of audit committee meetings is 5, with a range of 1 to 12. This result 
meets the benchmark of ICGC number (49), which mentions that audit committees should 
organise atleast four meetings a year. As compared to Darko et al. (2016), the mean value of 
this study is lower, as they reported an overall mean of 7 among Ghanian companies. The 
descriptive results reported that the proportion of audit committee independence is about 83%, 
ranging from 25% to 100%. This figure complies with ICGC number (49), which indicates that 
at least two-thirds of the members must be independent in the audit committee. Moreover, the 
mean value of the proportion of audit committee who have financial expertise is about 94%, 
and the range is from 25% to 100% respectively. The average number of females’ presence in 
audit committees is approximately 4.2%, with a maximum of 75% and minimum of 0%. This 
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outcome is closer to Ujunwa et al. (2012) who found that, among Nigerian firms, the average 
number of females on committees is 4.6%.   
In terms of control variables the average company size (measured as natural log of total assets) 
is 7.595252, ranging widely from 5.115201 to 9.744242. The value found is lower as compared 
to Darko et al.’s (2016) findings, who found that the overall mean value is 8.202602 among 
Ghanian companies. In addition, leverage ranges from .00036% to 99%. The mean value of 
leverage is 51.96%. This is similar to the findings of Hassanein & Hussainey (2015), who 
reported that the overall mean is 52.70% among UK listed companies. However, the result is 
lower than the mean value reported by Ganguli & Agrawal (2009), who reported that the 
average among Indian companies is 85.5%. Furthermore, profitability ranges from -84% (loss) 
to 99% (profit) with a mean of 10%. Table 5.1 reports an overall mean of 2% of liquidity 
(current ratio), and ranges from 0.13 to 22. This outcome is similar to the findings of Hassanein 
& Hussainey (2015), who reported a mean value of 1.61% among UK listed companies. 
GROW ranges from -.49 to 2.57 with a mean of .25. Concerning the industry type, the 
minimum and maximum values range from 1 to 11 respectively.  
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Table 5. 1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Median SD. Max Min 
QFLID 2120 .5070467 .5149583 .0764422 .6852885 0 
BSIZE 2120 10.76415 10 3.174943 24 4 
DP 2120 .4429245 0 .4968489 1 0 
FBM 2120 6.096698   6 1.921682 17 4 
BI 2120 .5375833 .5333333 .1220746 .9230769 .1666667 
FPB 2120 .0570695 0 .0911046 .75 0 
BloOwn 2120 .2905447 .28 .1617609 .82   0 
InsOwn 2120 .2277695 .21 .1330907 .7 0 
ProOwn 2120 .5341775 .5237 .1637402 .976 0 
ACSIZE 2120 4.011792 4 .9400896 8 3 
ACM 2120 4.825389 4 1.431699 12 1 
IAC 2120 .8308458   .8 .1491018 1 .25 
ACFEXP 2120 .9435579   1 .1121762 1 .25 
FPAC 2120 .0428279 0 .1022903 .75 0 
LEVE 2120 .5196675 .5610039 .2319884 .9933107 .0003641 
LIQU 2120 2.050434   1.6 1.676653 22   .13 
PROF 2120 .1016844 .0859759 .1019813   .991509 -.84 
GROW 2012 .2578197 .1900197  .330587 2.571437 -.4916848 
CSIZE 2120 7.595252 7.557725 .6993978 9.744242 5.115201 
IndType 2120 4.662736 4 2.795015 11 1  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
QFLID stands for quality of forward-looking disclosure. BSIZE is board size, measured as number of board 
members. DP is the role duality, a dummy variable: value of 1 is given if company’s CEO serves as a board 
chairman, 0 otherwise. FBM is frequency of board meetings during the year.  BI presents board independence, 
measured as the ratio of number of independent non-executive directors to the total number of board members. 
FPB is the ratio of females’ presence on the board of directors. BloOwn is blockholder ownership, measured by 
the ratio of shares held by blockholder (5% or more). InsOwn is institutional ownership, measured by the ratio 
of shares held by institutional. ProOwn is promoter ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by promoters. 
ACSIZE is audit committee size, measured by the number of audit committee members. ACM is the frequency of 
audit committee meetings during the year. IAC is the independence of the audit committee, measured by the ratio 
of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee. ACFEXP is audit committee financial experts, 
measured by the ratio of audit committee members with financial experience to audit committee size. FPAC is the 
ratio of females’ presence in the audit committee. LEVE is the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a firm’s 
total debt at the end of the year to total assets at the end of year. LIQU is liquidity, measured as the ratio of the 
company’s current assets to its current liabilities. PROF is profitability. GROW is firm growth, measured by the 
change of sales. CSIZE is Firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. IndType is industry type, 
the sample in this study is divided into eleven types of industry and is coded from 1 to 11.  
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5.3. Multicollinearity 
Multicollinearity is an issue that arises when a linear relationship exists (i.e. a high degree of 
correlation) among two or more independent variables. Due to this issue, it is difficult to 
distinguish the individual impacts of explanatory variables, which may have high differences 
(Murray, 2005; O’brien, 2007). In addition, high multicollinearity leads to high standard errors, 
diminished power, and large confidence intervals (Garson, 2012). To check for a 
multicollinearity issue among explanatory variables, this study utilised a correlation matrix and 
variance inflation factors (VIF) with tolerance values. 
The correlation matrix is an effective instrument for examining the association among 
explanatory variables. Regarding the cut-off correlation percentage, there is a difference in 
views among researchers (Alsaeed, 2006). Some researchers, such as Tabachnick et al. (2001), 
consider 70% as serious correlation, whereas others consider 80% as the correlation cut-off 
point (Alsaeed (2006); Gujarati (2003; 2008) . Table 5.2 presents the correlation matrix among 
all explanatory independent variables used in the present study. The results presented in Table 
5.2 highlight that block holder ownership and promoters’ ownership is highly correlated, with 
a coefficient of 68.21%. The result is lower than the cut-off point which indicates that a 
multicollinearity issue is not present among these variables (Gujarati, 2008; Tabachnick et al., 
2001).  
Secondly, this study uses VIF and Tolerance tests to examine whether independent variables 
are highly correlated or not. Gujarati (2009), Field (2009), and Gujarati (2003), indicate that if 
the value of VIF is more than 10 and the tolerance coefficient is greater than 10%, there is an 
issue.  The results presented in Table 5.3 show that a multicollinearity problem is non-existent 
among explanatory variables. The maximum value of VIF is 2.28 and its mean is 1.39, 
indicating no multicollinearity issue. 
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Table 5. 2 Pearson Correlation Matrix: CG Mechanism and Control Variables 
*** Significant at 1% level or better; ** Significant at 5% level or better; * Significant at 10% level or better. QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. BSIZE denotes board size, measured by the 
number of board members.  DP denotes the role duality, a dummy variable: 1 if company’s CEO serves as a board chairman, 0 otherwise. FBM denotes the frequency of board meetings during the year.  BI denotes the 
independence of board, measured by the ratio of the number of independent non-executive directors to the total number of board members. FPB denotes the ratio of females’ presence on the board of directors. BloOwn 
denotes blockholder ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by blockholder (5% or more). InsOwn denotes institutional ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by institutional. ProOwn denotes 
promoter ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by promoters. ACSIZE denotes audit committee size, measured by the number of audit committee members. ACM denotes the frequency of audit committee 
meetings during the year. IAC denotes the independence of the audit committee, measured by the ratio of independent non-executive directors on the audit committee. ACFEXP denotes audit committee financial experts, 
measured by the ratio of audit committee members with financial experience to audit committee size. FPAC denotes the ratio of females’ presence in the audit committee. LEVE denotes the leverage ratio, measured by 
the ratio of a firm’s total debt at the end of the year to total assets at the end of year. LIQU denotes liquidity, measured as the ratio of the company’s current assets to its current liabilities. PROF denotes profitability. 
FSIZE denotes Firm size, Measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. IndType denotes industry type; the sample in this study is divided into eleven types of industry and is coded from 1 to 11. 
 QFLID BSIZ DP FBM BI FPB BloOwn InstOwn ProOwn ACSIZ ACM IAC ACEXP FPAC LEVE LIQU PROF GROW FSIZE IndType 
QFLID 1.000                    
BSIZ 0.063*** 1.000                   
DP -0.029 0.109*** 1.000                  
FBM 0.059*** 0.102*** -0.019 1.000                 
BI -0.051** -0.195*** 0.119*** -0.019 1.000                
FPB 0.107*** -0.034 -0.040 -0.005 0.019 1.000               
BloOwn 0.043** 0.158*** 0.044** 0.171*** -0.002 0.010 1.000              
InstOwn 0.130*** 0.208***  0.109*** 0.175*** 0.018 -0.035 0.590*** 1.000             
ProOwn -0.123*** -0.110*** 0.013 -0.166*** -0.076*** 0.017 -0.682*** -0.534*** 1.000            
ACSIZ -0.046** 0.235*** -0.004 0.021 0.037 0.029 0.082*** -0.030 0.011 1.000           
ACM 0.051** 0.154*** -0.091*** 0.212*** -0.052** -0.028 0.167*** 0.237*** -0.142*** -0.008 1.000          
IAC 0.029 0.069*** 0.030 0.068** 0.121*** -0.108*** -0.005 0.086*** -0.036 -0.111*** 0.076*** 1.000         
ACEXP -0.005 0.129*** 0.049***  0.077** -0.023 -0.286*** 0.069*** 0.134*** -0.096*** -0.080*** 0.083*** 0.265 1.000        
FPAC 0.111*** 0.030 -0.065** 0.057** 0.001 0.594*** 0.036 0.013 0.002 0.062** 0.036 -0.127 -0.215*** 1.000       
LEVE 0.113*** .0.108*** -0.068* 0.048** -0.052** -0.070*** -0.040 0.048** 0.002 0.015  0.057** -0.060 -0.040 -0.027 1.000      
LIQU -0.140*** -0.089*** 0.039 -0.047** 0.032 0.003 -0.031 -0.069* 0.003 -0.004 -0.127*** -0.029 -0.091*** 0.035 -0.220*** 1.000     
PROF 0.049 0.069*** 0.046** -0.045** 0.043** 0.040 0.000 0.017 0.087*** 0.028 0.017 0.054 -0.078*** 0.063** -0.259*** 0.093*** 1.000    
GROW -0.058***  -0.020 0.033 -0.021 0.021 0.005 -0.016 0.008 0.023 -0.026 -0.016 -0.001 0.025 0.020 0.008 0.023 0.109*** 1.000   
FSIZE 0.032 0.196*** -0.049** 0.135*** 0.065** 0.069*** 0.157*** 0.331*** -0.073*** 0.056** 0.202*** 0.213   0.027 0.081*** -0.044* -0.164*** -0.051** -0.0197 1.000  
IndType -0.092*** -0.010  0.001 0.038 -0.000 -0.004 -0.08*** -0.09*** 0.007 0.055* -0.092*** 0.036 0.014 0.027 -0.023 0.063** -0.006 0.0059 0.046 1.000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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Table 5. 3 Multicollinearity test results Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
               Variable VIF Tolerance 1/VIF 
BSIZE 1.32   0.756636 
DP 1.18     0.846992 
FBM 1.11     0.898419 
BI 1.25     0.799386 
FPB 1.64 0.608042 
BloOwn 2.28   0.439205 
InsOwn 1.97 0.506835 
ProOwn 2.15 0.465632 
ACSIZE 1.15     0.868373 
ACM 1.16     0.859807 
IAC 1.19     0.836952 
ACFEXP 1.24     0.806656 
FPAC 1.60 0.624095 
LEVE 1.21     0.823965 
LIQU 1.12     0.889079 
PROF 1.16     0.862205 
GROW 1.02 0.980308 
CSIZE 1.36 0.733489 
IndType 1.05     0.952526 
Mean VIF 1.38 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
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5.4. Multivariate Analysis  
The researcher examined several tests to select the best model for the study. Following 
Twumasi-Ankrah et al. (2015), this study used the Chow test to choose either the panel data 
model or the pooled data model. In doing so, Twumasi-Ankrah et al. (2015) indicate that if F-
test of Chow test is significant (F-value <0.05) then the null hypothesis will be rejected, 
meaning that the panel data model is better than the pooled model, and vice versa. The findings 
of Chow test show that F-test is significant at 1% level (see Appendix 5.1). Therefore, this 
study uses the panel data model to examine the association between the independent variable 
(CG mechanisms) and the dependent variable (QFLID). There are two types of panel data 
regression models: fixed effects model and random effects model. Regarding the error term, 
both models have various assumptions.  
 The random effect assumes that individual effects are random disturbances drawn from the 
probability distribution. However, the fixed effect model suggests that the individual effect 
term is constant. In panel data, the same cross-sectional units are surveyed over time as they 
have space (Damodar N.. Gujarati, 2003). The Hausman’s test is used in the current study to 
decide between the random and fixed effects models (Greene, 2008). The result of the 
Hausman’s test in this study indicates that it is significant (P-Value = 0.000), accordingly, fixed 
effect models are preferred (see Appendix 5.2). 
Table 5.4 presents the outcomes related to regression analysis of the fixed effects model. 
QFLID is a dependent variable, while CG mechanisms (board size, CEO duality, number of 
board meetings, board independence, females’ presence on the board, blockholder ownership, 
institution ownership, promoters’ ownership, audit committee size, audit committee 
independence, audit committee financial expertise, audit committee meetings and females on 
the audit committee) are independent variables. The company’s characteristics (firm size, 
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profitability, leverage, liqudity, firm growth and industry type) are control variables included 
in the regression model. 
Table 5.4 reports 𝑅2 value of 48.39%, which means that the independent variable explains 
48.3% of the variation of dependent variables including six company characteristics as control 
variables. In social science research, a result of more than 20% is highly acceptable (Abd-
Elsalam & Weetman, 2003; Aljifri et al., 2014). Furthermore, this result is in line with the 
previous studies, such as Haniffa & Cooke (2002) at 46% and Akhtaruddin (2005) at 56%. 
Table 5.4 also indicates that the P-Value is highly significant (0.001), indicating that this model 
has a good explanatory power for the model utilised in the primary analysis. 
5.4.1. Findings and Discussion of CG and QFLID 
This section discusses CG mechanisms, followed by the control variables. Table 5.4 illustrates 
a comparison of the results of the panel data. The study examined CG mechanisms (board 
characteristics, audit committee, and ownership structure) by employing a multivariate 
analysis. The results show that CG variables are associated with QFLID.      
5.4.1.1. Board Characteristics  
The current study examined five board characteristics, namely board size, CEO duality, 
frequency of board meetings, board independence and female presence on the board. 
Board Size (BSIZE) 
The results presented in Table 5.4 exhibit that BSIZE is significantly and positively associated 
with QFLID at 1% significance level (coef. = .0013898, t = 3.39, p < 0.001), hence H1.1 of 
the study is accepted. The result suggests large board sizes tend to be more effective. 
Consequently, it is expected that firms with a larger BSIZE disclose more QFLID as compared 
to smaller BSIZE. The findings are in line with the agency theory perspective, which highlights 
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that senior executives are unable to dominate boards of a larger size, hence these boards 
disclose greater information (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Alnabsha et al., 2017; Fama & Jensen, 
1983; John & Senbet, 1998; Samaha et al., 2012). Likewise, the result is compatible with the 
resource dependence theory, which assumes that larger boards disclose higher quality 
information than smaller boards. Due to greater diversity in large boards, it improves overall 
corporate disclosure activities (Abeysekera, 2010; Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Alnabsha et al., 
2017; Lajili & Zéghal, 2005). Empirically, this outcome is compatible with several studies 
which reported a positive association between BSIZE and extent of disclosure (Barako et al., 
2006; Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011; Laksmana, 2008; Samaha et al., 2015; Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013). However, several studies reported no association between BSIZE and FLID, 
for example Alhazaimeh et al. (2014); Arcay and Muiño (2005); Cheng and Courtenay (2006); 
Kuzey (2018) and  Liu (2015).   
CEO Duality (DP) 
Regarding DP, Table 5.4 shows no significant relationship between DP and QFLID (coef. = 
.0001386, t = 0.05, p < 0.959). This outcome suggests that separation between the positions of 
CEO and chairman in Indian companies is unable to explain the variation in QFLID. Therefore, 
this result rejects hypothesis H1.2, which expected a significant negative association between 
DP and QFLID.  
In relation to the theoretical underpinnings, this outcome is not in line with agency and 
resource-dependence theory, which assume that DP has a negative impact on corporate 
disclosure and its performance. From an agency theory perspective, separation of chairman and 
CEO positions reduces agency problems as it encourages managers to make decisions 
according to shareholders’ interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Jensen, 
1993). Similarly, the resource-dependence theory suggests that separating the positions of CEO 
and board chairman can improve information disclosed voluntarily because DP can negatively 
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affect the board’s disclosure policies due to a power of position (Alnabsha et al., 2017; Elzahar 
& Hussainey, 2012). Empirically, this result is in line with previous research (Aljifri et al., 
2014; Alnabsha et al., 2017; Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016a; Babío Arcay & Muiño Vázquez, 
2005; Barako et al., 2006; Cheng & Courtenay, 2006; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; Liu, 2015), 
who found no significant association between DP and disclosure. However, the result is not 
compatible with other prior studies (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Gul & Leung, 2004; Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Li et al., 2008) who reported a significant and negative association between DP 
and level of disclosure. 
Board Independence (BI) 
With regard to BI, in Table 5.4 the regression results show that the proportion of board 
independence is positively and significantly associated with the QFLID at 5% level of 
significance (coef. = .0158821, t = 2.01, p < 0.030). Hence, this finding supports hypothesis 
H1.3, which expects to find a positive relationship between BI and the QFLID. This result is 
in line with the argument that independent directors act as a mechanism to monitor 
management's performance and decrease the information asymmetry between managers and 
owners (Lim et al., 2007). This positive association is consistent with the theoretical 
underpinnings derived from the agency and resource dependence theories. From the agency 
theory perspective, the existence of independent directors can decrease information asymmetry 
between managers and owners (Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Furthermore, resource dependence theory assumes that independent directors 
obtain external resources through their proficiency, prestige and networking, hence providing 
various resources such as business contracts, experience and expertise, which lead to improve 
strategic decision-making of the company (Chen, 2011; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Nicholson & 
Kiel, 2007; Tricker, 1984). A board consisting of more independent directors enables 
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companies to get hold of crucial resources that can help them to gain a competitive advantage 
and improve the overall monitoring of management activities, hence improving QFLID.  
This result is in line with prior studies (Adams & Hossain, 1998; Chen & Jaggi, 2001; Cheng 
& Courtenay, 2006; Elshandidy & Neri, 2015; Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Jallow, Hussainey, 
& Aljifri, 2012; Lim et al., 2007; Liu, 2015; Patelli & Prencipe, 2007; Samaha et al., 2015; 
Wang & Hussainey, 2013), which reported BI is positively and significantly associated with 
voluntary disclosure. On the other hand, this finding contradicts other researchers who found 
either no association between the two variables (Aljifri et al., 2014; Ebrahim & Fattah, 2015; 
Kuzey, 2018; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; Uyar & Kilic, 2012), or negatively associated with each 
other (Barako et al., 2006; Chapple & Truong, 2015; Eng & Mak, 2003; Ghazali & Weetman, 
2006; Gul & Leung, 2004; Madhani, 2015). 
Frequency of Board Meetings (FBM) 
As presented in Table 5.4, there is a positive and significant association between the coefficient 
of the FBM and QFLID at 1% significance level (coef. = .0016248, t = 3.95, p < 0.000). As 
expected, this finding supports hypothesis H1.4, which expects to find a significant and positive 
relationship between the FBM and the QFLID. This result is compatible with the argument that 
a higher frequency of meetings improves managerial monitoring, thereby leading to a positive 
influence on disclosure quality (Alnabsha et al., 2017; Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016a), and 
positively impacts on corporate performance (Carcello et al., 2002). Theoretically, this finding 
can be explained by the agency theory perspective; an increase in the frequency of board 
meetings enables the board to monitor management activities more effectively, hence reducing 
agency conflicts (Xie et al., 2003). Increased monitoring reduces information asymmetry and 
agency costs, thereby leading to increased disclosure (Nelson et al., 2010). Empirically, this 
finding is in line with previous research (Alnabsha et al., 2017; Barros et al., 2013; Brick & 
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Chidambaran, 2010; Kent & Stewart, 2008; Laksmana, 2008) who report a positive relationship 
between these two variables.  
Female Presence on the Board (FPB) 
Table 5.4 presents that the coefficient of FPB is positively and significantly associated with the 
QFLID at 1% level of significance (coef. = . 0467019, t = 3.48, p < 0.001). This result supports 
the alignment of interest hypothesis H1.5, which proposes a positive relationship between the 
FPB and the QFLID among Indian listed companies. It supports the idea that FPB explains the 
disclosure practices in annual reports of companies (Gibbins, Richardson, & Waterhouse, 
1990). This result is according to the perspective of the agency theory, which assumes that 
board gender diversity enhances board efficiency and prevents managers exploiting 
shareholders’ wealth by improving board independence.(Barako & Brown, 2008; Carter et al., 
2003b; Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012). Similarly, from a resource-dependence theory 
perspective, board diversity improves the relationship between companies and their external 
environment which leads to improved disclosure quality (Hillman et al., 2000; Pfeffer, 1972). 
In the same vein, prior studies suggest that the presence of female directors on a board increases 
reporting transparency (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; T. Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Estélyi 
& Nisar, 2016), and improves the reliability of the board and corporate legitimacy (Ashforth 
& Gibbs, 1990; Liao et al., 2015).  
Empirically, the significant and positive result is consistent with Barako & Brown (2008); 
Chapple & Truong (2015); Kuzey (2018) and Liao et al. (2015) who reported a positive and 
significant association between gender diversity and voluntary disclosure. Sartawi et al. (2014), 
however, found no relationship between the two variables.   
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5.4.1.2. Ownership Structure 
Ownership structure has been suggested as an important determinant of better CG practices 
(Konijn et al., 2011; La Porta et al., 1999). Nevertheless, prior study results on the relationship 
between ownership structure and voluntary disclosure are inconclusive (Bebchuk & Weisbach, 
2010). The sections below discuss ownership structures: block ownership; institutional 
ownership and promoters’ ownership and their relationship with QFLID. 
Blockholder Ownership (BloOwn) 
The statistical results shown in Table 5.4 indicate that BloOwn is not associated with the 
QFLID in the annual reports of Indian companies (coef. = -. 0066745, t = -1.50, p < 0.125). 
The result highlights no significant association between BloOwn and the QFLID, hence rejects 
hypothesis H1.6, which expects to find a negative association between them. Theoretically, the 
result related to BloOwn conflicts with the agency theory perspective, which suggests that 
BloOwn is estimated to reduce the probability of introducing more voluntary disclosure in 
annual reports (Eng & Mak, 2003). This finding is in line with previous studies (Abdelbadie & 
Elshandidy, 2013; Alqatamin et al., 2017; Eng & Mak, 2003; Hidalgo et al., 2011; Nekhili et 
al., 2012; Nekhili et al., 2016) who found no significant association between disclosure and 
BloOwn. However, the finding is inconsistent with some previous studies which found a 
negative association between BloOwn and voluntary disclosure (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; 
Garcia-Meca & Sanchez-Ballesta, 2010; McKinnon & Dalimunthe, 1993; Mitchell et al., 1995; 
Schadewitz & Blevins, 1998). 
Institutional Ownership (InsOwn) 
With respect to the InsOwn, Table 5.4 shows the influence of InsOwn on the QFLID (coef. = 
-.0126049, t = -0.25, p < 0.212). The result shows that the InsOwn has no impact on the 
QFLID. Accordingly, the statistical result does not empirically support the hypothesis H1.7: 
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which proposes a positive and significant relationship between InsOwn and the QFLID. 
Theoretically, this finding is not in line with the agency theory, which assumes that managers 
disclose more information to reduce mangers’ and institutional shareholders’ conflicts 
(Alnabsha et al., 2017; Yoshikawa & Rasheed, 2009). It is also against the view that companies 
with large InsOwn suffer less from agency problems (Shleifer & Vishny, 1986). In the same 
vein, the insignificant association is not in line with the view that institutional investors benefit 
by monitoring the disclosure process because of their huge stake (Barako et al., 2006).  
This result is consistent with prior studies such as Charumathi & Ramesh (2015a); Jouini 
(2013) and Wang & Hussainey (2013) who reported no association between InsOwn and the 
FLID. However, it conflicts with Barako et al. (2006); Guan et al. (2007); Mathuva (2012b) 
and Al-Bassam et al. (2015) who found a positive relationship between InsOwn and voluntary 
disclosure. Alqatamin et al. (2017) found a negative and significant association between 
InsOwn and the extent of FLID.   
Promoters’ Ownership (ProOwn) 
Regarding the coefficient of ProOwn, the result found no association between ProOwn and the 
QFLID among Indian companies (coef. = . 0153797, t = 1.49, p < 0.136). This finding does 
not confirm that companies with higher promoters’ holdings have less incentive to disclose 
more information (Charumathi & Ramesh, 2015a). Hence, hypothesis H1.8 is rejected, which 
assumes negative relationship between level of ProOwn and QFLID. The insignificant finding 
is compatible with Charumathi & Ramesh (2015a) who found no significant association 
between ProOwn and FLID levels in Indian companies.  
5.4.1.3. Audit Committee 
The audit committee is the most important subcommittee of the board of directors. It monitors 
the reporting processes of financial and non-financial information; therefore, it could affect the 
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corporate disclosure by reducing the information asymmetry (Li et al., 2012). From the 
perspective of agency theory, the audit committee can be considered as an instrument to reduce 
agency costs (Ho & Wong, 2001b; Klein, 1998). In line with Zaman et al. (2011), this study 
used five dimensions to assess the audit committee effectiveness, namely audit committee size, 
audit committee independence, frequency of audit committee meetings, audit committee 
financial expertise, and ratio of females on the audit committee. 
Audit Committee Size (ACSIZE) 
With respect to ACSIZE, Table 5.4 indicates that the coefficient estimate on ACSIZE is 
insignificant with the QFLID (coef. = -.0093003, t = -1.33, p < 0.183). Accordingly, the result 
of the current study does not support hypothesis H1.9, which postulates a significant positive 
relationship between ACSIZE and the QFLID among Indian listed companies. Theoretically, 
it is against the predictions of agency theory, which suggests that companies with an efficient 
audit committee disclose more information to reduce agency costs (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 
2016a; Barako et al., 2006). Empirically, this result is in line with the findings reported by 
Aljifri & Hussainey (2007) and Magena & Pike (2005), who found no association between 
ACSIZE and FLID. However, the result is not in line with previous research (Abeysekera, 
2010; Al-Bassam et al., 2015; Albitar, 2015; Allegrini & Greco, 2013; Beasley, 1996; Hidalgo 
et al., 2011; Laksmana, 2008; Li et al., 2008; Ntim et al., 2013; O’Sullivan et al., 2008; Samaha 
et al., 2015) which found a significant and positive relationship between ACSIZE and the 
extent of disclosure.  
Audit Committee Independence (IAC) 
Table 5.4 illustrates that the IAC is positively and significantly associated with the QFLID at 
a 10% significance level (coef. = . 0013521, t = 1.66, p < 0.097). This result is in line with the 
argument that the IAC can improve the quality of disclosure to ensure the accurate evaluation 
of management performance (Cerbioni & Parbonetti, 2007; Forker, 1992; Ho & Shun Wong, 
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2001). Hence, this result accepts hypothesis H1.10, which proposes a significant and positive 
relationship between IAC and the QFLID. This result supports the agency theory perspective, 
that audit committee independence reduces agency costs, hence improving the extent of FLID. 
This result matches with earlier studies, such as Aljifri et al. (2014) and Ho & Wong (2001), 
who reported a positive and significant relationship between IAC and the extent of FLID.  
Frequency of Audit Committee Meetings (ACM) 
The regression results of the study found a strong positive and significant association between 
ACM and QFLID at 1% level of significance (coef. = . 0017793, t = 2.89, p < 0.004). As 
expected, this finding supports hypothesis H1.11, which expects to find a positive relationship 
between the variables. This result highlights that ACM is a source to provide managers with 
useful information continuously. Moreover, ACM improves monitoring of financial 
statements, assures their accuracy, and improves audit quality (Beasley et al., 2009). In other 
words, as ACM increases monitoring, so it generates a higher quality of financial reporting (G. 
Chen et al., 2006). Theoretically, this finding can be explained by the agency theory; a rising 
audit committee activity, represented by frequency of meetings, enables an audit committee to 
improve its monitoring which reduces agency costs (Xie et al., 2003). Increased monitoring 
reduces information asymmetry and lowers agency costs, hence leading to increased disclosure 
(Nelson et al., 2010). Empirically, the positive and significant finding supports the results of 
previous studies such as Barros et al. (2013); Beasley et al. (2009); Bronson et al. (2006); 
Karamanou & Vafeas (2005) and Kelton & Yang (2008). However, this finding is inconsistent 
with Alhazaimeh et al. (2014); Madi et al. (2014) ; Othman et al. (2014) who  reported no 
association between these two variables. 
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Audit Committee Financial Expertise (ACEXP)  
Regarding ACEXP, Table 5.4 shows no significant relationship between ACEXP and the 
QFLID (coef. = .0039175, t = 0.37, p < 0.710), meaning that the financial expertise of audit 
committees does not reflect the QFLID in the annual reports of Indian companies. Accordingly, 
the study rejects hypothesis H1.12, which expects to find a positive association between 
ACEXP and the QFLID. This outcome is not in line with agency theory, which assumes that 
the experienced audit committee is viewed as one of the monitoring agents within a company 
which improves the quality of financial reporting (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Vafeas, 
2000) and is useful  in  reducing  agency  costs (Archambeault, DeZoort, & Hermanson, 2008). 
In the same vein, this result is not in line with the argument that the audit committee’s financial 
expertise acts as a valuable tool in reducing financial misstatements (Abbott et al., 2004; 
Beasley et al., 2009; Cohen et al., 2004) and evaluating the quality of financial reporting (Chen 
et al., 2006; Cohen et al., 2004).  
Empirically, this result is incompatible with past studies (Abbott et al., 2004; Kelton & Yang, 
2008; Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2006; Liu, 2015; Smith, 2003) who found a positive and 
significant association between ACEXP and disclosure.  
Female Presence on the Audit committee (FPAC) 
Table 5.4 reports a positive and significant relationship between FPAC and the QFLID at a 
10% significance level (coef. = . 0186448, t = 1.70, p < 0.090). Therefore, the study accepts 
hypothesis H1.13, which expects significant positive relationship between FPAC and the 
QFLID among Indian listed companies. Additionally, the result supports agency theory, which 
suggests gender diversity improves monitoring of management operations and reduces the 
issue of information asymmetry (Carter et al., 2003a; Walt & Ingley, 2003). It also plays a vital 
role in attaining crucial resources from dominant stakeholders (Ntim & Soobaroyen, 2013) and 
raising the board’s reliability and the legitimacy of the company (Bear et al., 2010).  
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5.4.1.2. Control Variables (Firm-Specific Characteristics) 
This study uses six corporate characteristics, namely Firm size (CSIZE), Leverage (LEVE), 
Profitability (PRO), Liquidity (LIQUID), Growth (GROW) and Industry type (IndType) as 
control variables. Table 5.4 presents statistical results of company characteristics derived by 
using the panel data model. The multivariate findings reported that three firm-specific 
characteristics (size, profitability, growth and liquidity) are significantly associated with the 
QFLID, while leverage and industry type are not significant with the QFLID in Indian listed 
companies.  
The result of CSIZE coefficient shows that CSIZE is positively and significantly associated 
with the QFLID (coef. = . 070423, t = 32.80, p < 0.000). This result is compatible with earlier 
research (Albitar, 2015; Aljifri et al., 2014; Alkhatib, 2014; Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Barako, 
2007; Celik et al., 2006; Dembo & Rasaratnam, 2014; Eng & Mak, 2003; Ferguson et al., 2002; 
Haniffa & Cooke, 2002; Hossain et al., 2005; Kent & Ung, 2003; Khlif & Hussainey, 2016; 
Liu, 2015; Soliman, 2013; Uyar & Kilic, 2012; Wang & Hussainey, 2013) who provide 
evidence of a positive influence of CSIZE on corporate disclosure.  
 The regression result of PRO coefficient, in Table 5.4, illustrates that PRO has a positive and 
significant impact on the QFLID among Indian companies at the level of 1% (coef. = .0243281, 
t = 3.14, p < 0.002). The result of the current study is in line with prior research which found 
a positive relationship between PRO and corporate disclosure (Albitar, 2015; Cerbioni & 
Parbonetti, 2007; Charumathi & Ramesh, 2015a; Ghazali & Weetman, 2006; M. Haniffa & 
Cooke, 2002; Khlif & Hussainey, 2016; Mathuva, 2012b; Soliman, 2013; Wang & Hussainey, 
2013). Regarding LEVE, the results in Table 5.4 present no significant relationship between 
LEVE and the QFLID in the annual reports of Indian companies (coef. = -.0032019, t = -0.64, 
p < 0.524). The finding of the study is consistent with earlier research (Abraham & Cox, 2007; 
Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Celik et al., 2006; Chow & Wong-Boren, 1987; Ho & Wong, 2001a; 
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Huafang & Jianguo, 2007; Menicucci, 2013a; Nekhili et al., 2012; Nekhili et al., 2016; Nor et 
al., 2010; Uyar & Kilic, 2012; Wallace et al., 1994) which found no significant relationship 
between LEVE and the extent of disclosure in annual reports.  
In respect to LIQU, the regression result in Table 5.4 shows that LIQU and the QFLID is 
negatively and significantly associated at a 1% significance level in annual reports of Indian 
companies (coef. = -.0015061, t = -3.43, p < 0.001). The outcome of the present research is 
compatible with Wallace et al. (1994); Naser et al. (2002) and Menicucci (2013c) who provide 
evidence of negative association between LIQU and disclosure level. With regard to growth 
the regression result in Table 5.4 shows that GROW and the QFLID is negatively and 
significantly associated at a 1% significance level in annual reports of Indian companies (coef. 
= -.005453, t = -3.08, p < 0.001). Regarding IndType, Table 5.4 shows that IndType is 
insignificantly associated with QFLID in annual reports of Indian companies (coef. = . 
0000221, t = 0.06, p < 0.949). The finding supports the results of Aljifri & Hussainey (2007); 
Alqatamin et al. (2017); Eng & Mak (2003);  and Mathuva (2012b).  
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Table 5. 4 Regression analysis of the association between CG mechanisms and QFLID 
QFLID Coefficient Std. Err t- Statistics P ItI [95% Conf. Interval  
. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
BSIZE .0013898   .0004104 3.39 0.001***  .0005848   .0021947 
DP .0001386 .0026724   0.05   0.959 -.0051026 .0053797 
FBM .0016248 .0004115 3.95 0.000*** .0008178 .0024318 
BI .0158821 .0079019 2.01 0.030** .0003847 .0313795 
FPB .0467019 .0134034 3.48 0.001*** .0204148 .072989 
BloOwn -.0066745 .0089365 -1.50 0.125 -.0031852 .0232016 
InsOwn .0126049 .0101036   1.25 0.212 .0324203 .0072105 
ProOwn -.0153797 .0103019 -1.49   0.136 -.0048245 .0355839 
ACSIZE -.0093003 .0069778 -1.33 0.183 -.0229854 .0043848 
ACM .0017793 .0006161 2.89   0.004*** .000571 .0029876 
IAC  .0013521 .0008138 1.66 0.097* -.000244 .0029483 
ACFEXP .0039175 .0105508 0.37 0.710 -.0246101 .016775 
FPAC .0186448 .0109832 1.70 0.090* -.0028956 .0401852 
LEVE -.0032019 .0050227 -0.64 0.524 -.0130525 .0066487 
PROF .0243281 .007742 3.14 0.002*** .0091443  .0395119 
LIQU -.0015061 .0004394 -3.43   0.001*** -.0023678 -.0006443 
GROW -.005453 .0017699 -3.08 0.002*** -.0089242 -.0019819 
CSIZE .070423 .0021511   32.74 0.000*** .0662043 .0746418 
IndType .0000221 .0003454 0.06 0.949 -.0006552 .00006994 
R². Adjusted   0.4839    
P. Value   0.0001    
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. BSIZE denotes board size, measured by the number 
of board members. DP denotes the CEO duality, a dummy variable: 1 if company’s CEO serves as a board 
chairman, 0 otherwise. FBM denotes the frequency of board meetings during the year. BI denotes the 
independence of board, measured by the ratio of the number of independent non-executive directors to the total 
number of board members. FPB denotes the ratio of females’ presence on the board of directors. BloOwn denotes 
blockholder ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by blockholder (5% or more). InsOwn denotes 
institutional ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by institutional. ProOwn denotes promoter 
ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by promoters. ACSIZE denotes audit committee size, measured 
by the number of audit committee members. ACM denotes the frequency of audit committee meetings during the 
year. IAC denotes the independence of the audit committee, measured by the ratio of independent non-executive 
directors on the audit committee. ACFEXP denotes audit committee financial experts, measured by the ratio of 
audit committee members with financial experience to audit committee size. FPAC is the ratio of females’ 
presence in the audit committee.  LEVE denotes the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a firm’s total debt 
at the end of the year to total assets at the end of year. PROF denotes profitability. LIQU denotes liquidity, 
measured as the ratio of the company’s current assets to its current liabilities. GROW is firm growth. CSIZE 
denotes Firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. IndType denotes industry type; the sample 
in this study is divided into eleven types of industry and is coded from 1 to 11.  
*** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level 
or better. 
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Table 5. 5 Summary of the Hypothesis Results Related to CG and QFLID 
No Hypothesis Expected Relation 
H1.1 There is a significant positive association between board size 
and QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
Accepted 
H1.2 CEO duality and the QFLID are negatively and significantly 
associated among Indian listed companies. 
Rejected 
H1.3 There is a significant positive association between the 
percentage of board independence and the QFLID among 
Indian listed companies. 
Accepted 
H1.4 There is a significant positive association between the number 
of meetings and the QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
Accepted 
H1.5 There is a significant positive association between the 
percentage of the presence of females on the board and the 
QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
Accepted 
H1.6 There is a negative association between the level of block 
holder ownership and the QFLID among Indian listed 
companies. 
Rejected 
H1.7 There is a positive association between institutional ownership 
and the QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
Rejected 
H1.8 There is a negative association between promoter ownership 
and the QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
Rejected 
H1.9 There is a significant positive association between the audit 
committee size and the QFLID among Indian listed 
companies. 
Rejected 
H1.10 There is a positive association between audit committee 
independence and the QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
Accepted 
H1.11 There is a positive association between the frequency of audit 
committee meetings and the QFLID among Indian listed 
companies. 
Accepted 
H1.12 There is a positive association between audit committee 
financial expertise and the QFLID among Indian listed 
companies. 
Rejected 
H1.13 There is a significant positive association between the 
percentage of females’ presence on the audit committee and 
the QFLID among Indian listed companies. 
Accepted 
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5.5. Aditional Analysis: 
To examine the robustness of the obtained outcomes, additional sensitivity tests are performed 
to check the robustness of the prime analysis and, therefore, to confirm the reliability of the 
findings. Sensitivity analysis is meant to examine how sensitive the findings are towards using 
alternative model specifications or changing the statistical tests in the determination of the 
QFLID. In order to avoid the correlation between block holder ownership (BloOwn) and 
promoters’ ownership (ProOwn), as well as to examine whether the main findings are changed 
or not, Model 1 of Table 5.4 is re-estimated by excluding block holder ownership (BloOwn) as 
reported in Table 5.6. 
Table 5.6 shows that the results of the impact of CG mechanisms and some of the control 
variables on the QFLID after excluding BloOwn are consistent with the primary findings 
presented in Table 5.4, showing that the main findings are reliable and robust under the 
exclusion of BloOwn. This confirms that excluding BloOwn does not have an emotional impact 
on the primary findings of CG mechanisims and other control variables on the QFLID, which 
is similar to the primary finding. Overall, the results reported in Table 5.7 remain essentially 
the same as those contained in the main model of Table 5.4. 
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Table 5. 6 Regression analysis of the association between CG mechanisms and QFLID 
QFLID Coefficient Std. Err t- Statistics P ItI [95% Conf. Interval  
. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
BSIZE .0014276   .0004105 3.48 0.001***  .0006226   .0022326 
DP .0001358 .0026544   0.12   0.961 -.0055215 .00489 
FBM .0016248 .0004115 3.95 0.000*** .0008178 .0024318 
BI .0158821 .0079019 2.01 0.028** .0003847 .0313795 
FPB .0467019 .0134034 3.69 0.000*** .0204148 .072989 
InsOwn .0100361 .097431  1.03 0.303 .0291444 .0090722 
ProOwn -.014596 .0096762 -1.51  0.132 -.0043812 .0335731 
ACSIZE -.0093003 .0069778 -1.33 0.125 -.0229854 .0043848 
ACM .0017793 .0006161 2.89   0.004*** .000571 .0029876 
IAC  .0013521 .0008138 1.66 0.097* -.000244 .0029483 
ACFEXP .0039175 .0105508 0.37 0.828 -.0246101 .016775 
FPAC .0186448 .0109832 1.70 0.090* -.0028956 .0401852 
LEVE -.0032019 .0050227 -0.54 0.592 -.0130525 .0066487 
PROF .0243281 .007742 3.08 0.005*** .0091443  .0395119 
LIQU -.0015061 .0004394 -3.43   0.002*** -.0023678 -.0006443 
GROW -.005453 .0017699 -3.08 0.002*** -.0089242 -.0019819 
CSIZE .070423 .0021511   32.74 0.000*** .0662043 .0746418 
IndType .0000973 .0003456 0.29 0.774 -.0006552 .00006994 
R². Adjusted   0.4832    
P. Value   0.0001    
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. BSIZE denotes board size, measured by the number 
of board members. DP denotes the CEO duality, a dummy variable: 1 if company’s CEO serves as a board 
chairman, 0 otherwise. FBM denotes the frequency of board meetings during the year.  BI denotes the 
independence of board, measured by the ratio of the number of independent non-executive directors to the total 
number of board members. FPB denotes the ratio of females’ presence on the board of directors. InsOwn denotes 
institutional ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by institutional. ProOwn denotes promoter 
ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by promoters. ACSIZE denotes audit committee size, measured 
by the number of audit committee members. ACM denotes the frequency of audit committee meetings during the 
year. IAC denotes the independence of the audit committee, measured by the ratio of independent non-executive 
directors on the audit committee. ACFEXP denotes audit committee financial experts, measured by the ratio of 
audit committee members with financial experience to audit committee size. FPAC is the ratio of females’ 
persence in the audit committee.  LEVE denotes the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a firm’s total debt 
at the end of the year to total assets at the end of year. PROF denotes profitability. LIQU denotes liquidity, 
measured as the ratio of the company’s current assets to its current liabilities. GROW is firm growth. CSIZE 
denotes Firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. IndType denotes industry type; the sample 
in this study is divided into eleven types of industry and is coded from 1 to 11.  
*** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level 
or better. 
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5.6. Endogeneity Problems 
If one or more variables are linked with error terms, that leads to endogeneity problems (Gippel, 
Smith, & Zhu, 2015; Reeb, Sakakibara, & Mahmood, 2012; Schultz, Tan, & Walsh, 2010). 
The validity of findings from regression results becomes contradictory in the presence of 
endogeneity (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2012).  
As stated by Wang & Hussainey (2013), a positive relationship between CG and extent of FLID 
may occur due to imperfectly measured factors, hence impacting both governance and 
disclosure. Ammann et al. (2011a) highlight that an endogeneity problem makes it difficult to 
examine the impact of CG on corporate voluntary disclosure and financial performance.  
There are three main errors that occur due to endogeneity, termed as: simultaneity, omitted 
variables and measurement errors (Brown & Hillegeist, 2007; Choi, Lee, & Park, 2013; 
Moumen, Othman, & Hussainey, 2015; Ntim et al., 2013; Reeb et al., 2012; Schultz et al., 
2010). Firstly, the error of simultaneity occurs when a dependent variable affects one or more 
explanatory variables (Choi, Kwak, & Choe, 2010; Gippel et al., 2015; McKnight & Weir, 
2009; Ntim et al., 2012; Schultz et al., 2010). Secondly, the omission of variables arises when 
some unobserved omitted variables that are involved in regression that are have an impact on 
the association of two or more variables; such omitted variables are difficult to quantify (Ntim 
et al., 2012; Schultz et al., 2010; Wooldridge, 2015). Finally, if the key variables are not 
measured accurately, the study will lead to measurement error (Gippel et al., 2015; Larcker & 
Rusticus, 2010; Omar & Simon, 2011). The endogeneity problem must be taken into 
consideration as it leads to inefficient, inconsistent and biased inferences while examining the 
relationship between CG mechanisms and the QFLID. 
In order to address endogeneity problems, earlier research has used two econometric methods 
(Ammann, Oesch, & Schmid, 2011b; Beiner et al., 2006; Carter et al., 2003b; Moumen et al., 
2015; Ntim et al., 2012; Ntim, 2015; Sheu et al., 2010; Shi et al., 2014). Firstly, employing a 
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lagged structure to tackle the simultaneity error and omitted variables (Ammann et al., 2011b; 
Elmagrhi et al., 2016; Ntim et al., 2012). Then, an Instrumental Variable (IV) is used to deal 
with issues occurring due to measurement errors and omitted variables (Black et al., 2006; 
Renders, Gaeremynck, & Sercu, 2010). Based on this, the present study uses the lagged values 
of the endogenous independent variable (CG) as an IV to investigate whether or not the 
endogeneity issue affects the relationship between CG and the QFLID.  
The study conducts Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests to examine whether there is an existence of 
biasedness for independent and endogenous variables (Beiner et al., 2006; Elmagrhi et al., 
2016; Gujarati, 2008; Moumen et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015). The test presents that the null 
hypothesis which expects no endogeneity between CG (independent variable) and FLID 
(dependent variable) is rejected (see appendix 5.3). Therefore, the existence of such a problem 
may affect the findings thus leading to ineffective, biased and inconsistent results. The result 
of the two-stage (2SLS) regression of CG on QFLID is reported in Table 5.7. 
Table 5.7 presents that coefficients of explanatory variables in the lagged model have similar 
significance and magnitude as the un-lagged structure estimation model in Table 5.4. The 
findings of the instrumental variable two-stage model are compatible with the main outcomes 
presented in Table 5.4, indicating that an endogeneity problem between CG mechanisims and 
QFLID does not impact the primary findings of CG mechanisims and other control variables 
on the QFLID. Overall, the robustness analyses denote that the findings of the present research 
are fairly robust. 
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Table 5. 7 Instrumental variables Two-Stage (2SLS) regression model based on QFLID 
QFLID Coefficient Std. Err t- Statistics P ItI [95% Conf. Interval 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
BSIZE .0002798 .0007359 2.38 0.051** -.0011625 .0017221 
DP .0023848 .004175 0.57 0.568 -.0105676 .005798 
FBM .0017658 .00013543 1.98 0.090* .0008887 .0044202 
BI .0557027 .0200437 2.78 0.005*** .0949877 .0164178 
FPB .0807793 .0311046 2.60 0.009*** .0198155 .1417431 
BloOwn .0093216 .0089365 1.30 0.218 -.041852 .033201 
InsOwn .0260493 .0161367 1.45 0.115 .0324987 .0172675 
ProOwn -.0153797 .0115437 -2.34 0.097* -.1401675 -.0660728 
ACSIZE -.0038572 .0028155 -1.37 0.171 -.0093754 .001661 
ACM .0012761 .0018369 1.69 0.087* .0048763 .0023242 
IAC  .0012407 .0016019 1.50 0.099* -.008976 .0538174 
ACFEXP .0044971 .0206511 0.22 0.828 -.0359782 .0449725 
FPAC .073406 .0275177 2.67 0.008*** .0194722 .1273397 
LEVE .0298324 .0077671 0.84 0.000*** .146091 .0450556 
PROF .0680175 .0173358 3.92 0.000*** .03404 .101995 
LIQU -.0056774    .001024 -5.54 0.000*** -.0076844 -.0036704 
GROW -.005453   .0017699      -3.01 0.009*** -.0089242 -.0019819 
CSIZE .0021485 .0027809 0.77 0.440 .0075989 .0033019 
IndType .0000568 .0034348 0.14 0.880 -.0006678 .00006765 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
R². Adjusted 0.3645 
P. Value 0.0001 
QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. BSIZE denotes board size, measured by the number 
of board members. DP denotes the CEO duality, a dummy variable: 1 if company’s CEO serves as a board 
chairman, 0 otherwise. FBM denotes the frequency of board meetings during the year.  BI denotes the 
independence of board, measured by the ratio of the number of independent non-executive directors to the total 
number of board members. FPB denotes the ratio of females’ presence on the board of directors. BloOwn denotes 
blockholder ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by blockholder (5% or more). InsOwn denotes 
institutional ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by institutional. ProOwn denotes promoter 
ownership, measured by the ratio of shares held by promoters. ACSIZE denotes audit committee size, measured 
by the number of audit committee members. ACM denotes the frequency of audit committee meetings during the 
year. IAC denotes the independence of the audit committee, measured by the ratio of independent non-executive 
directors on the audit committee. ACFEXP denotes audit committee financial experts, measured by the ratio of 
audit committee members with financial experience to audit committee size. FPAC is the ratio of females’ 
presence in the audit committee.  LEVE denotes the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a firm’s total debt 
at the end of the year to total assets at the end of year. PROF denotes profitability. LIQU denotes liquidity, 
measured as the ratio of the company’s current assets to its current liabilities. GROW is firm growth. CSIZE 
denotes Firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total assets. IndType denotes industry type; the sample 
in this study is divided into eleven types of industry and is coded from 1 to 11. 
*** Significant at the 1% level or better; ** Significant at the 5% level or better; * Significant at the 10% level 
or better. 
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5.7. Summary 
To achieve the first objective of the current research, this chapter examines the association 
between CG mechansims and QFLID in non-financial Indian listed companies for the period 
2006-2015. In doing so, this study used three CG mechanisms, namely board of directors’ 
characteristics (board size, CEO duality, board meeting, board independence and presence of 
female members on the board), ownership structure (blockholder ownership, institution 
ownership and promoters’ ownership) and audit committee (audit committee size, audit 
committee independence, audit committee financial expertise, audit committee meetings and 
females’ presence on the audit committee). Furthermore, this study uses the firm’s 
characteristics (firm size, profitability, leverage, liqudity, growth and industry type) as control 
variables to include in the regression model. In general, the results show that CG variables are 
associated with QFLID. Moreover, the study uses previous literature and theoretical framework 
related to CG mechanisms and QFLID to explain the result of the regression model.  
Additionally, the findings related to endogeneity problems showed no impact on the main 
statistical analysis. Sensitivity analysis confirms the consistency and generalisation of this 
study’s findings.   
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Chapter Six: The consequences of QFLID  
6.1. Introduction 
The present chapter focuses on the consequences of QFLID and addresses the second and third 
objectives. In doing so, the chapter is classified into two sections. The first section, 6.4, deals 
with the second objective, examining the impact of QFLID on FV. The second section, 6.5, 
deals with the third objective, examining the impact of QFLID on ACUAF. To achieve this 
purpose, this chapter begins with descriptive statistics in section 6.2, followed by 
multicollinearity in section 6.3. Section 6.4 discusses the results and dissection of examining 
the impact of QFLID on FV.  Section 6.5 covers the results and dissection of examining the 
impact of QFLID on ACUAF. Moreover, section 6.6 provides additional analyses. Section 6.7 
provides the robustness test. Section 6.8 deals with the endogeneity problem and, finally, the 
chapter ends with the summary in section 6.9. 
6.2. Descriptive Statistics  
The total number of observations; mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
values for all variables utilised in this study, are presented in Table 6.1.  
Regarding the dependent variable TQ ratio (as proxy for FV), Table 6.1 illustrates that the TQ 
ratio ranges from 0.011 to 9.787 with an average of 1.940 for the overall sample, and with a 
median of 1.415. This finding is closer to the result of Ganguli & Agrawal (2009), who reported 
a value of 2.083 and 1.778 value for the mean and median of the TQ ratio respectively, among 
Indian listed companies. Likewise, this outcome is consistent with the findings of Clacher et 
al. (2008), who documented that the overall mean of the TQ ratio is 1.38 among UK listed 
companies. Similarly, Darko et al. (2016) reported that the average of the TQ ratio is 1.45 
among Ghanaian listed firms. In addition, the result is relatively similar to the finding of Chung 
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et al. (2015), who report that the mean value is 1.40 among Taiwanese companies and ranges 
from 0.29 to 12.87.  
Concerning the dependent variable ACUAF, Table 6.1 illustrates that the ACUAF ratio ranges 
from -.767 to .000 with an average of -.036 for the overall sample, and with a median of -.002. 
The result is relatively similar to the findings of Lang & Lundholm (1996) who report that the 
mean value is -.042.  
In terms of the independent variable (QFLID), the maximum FLID score is 68% while the 
minimum score is 0%, which is similar to the results of Aljifri and Hussainey (2007). They 
reported that value of FLID ranges from 0% to 70% among UAE firms. The mean value of the 
QFLID is 50.70%, which is higher than the averages reported by Bozanic et al (2013); 
Charumathi & Ramesh (2015a) and Menicucci (2013c), who documented that the overall mean 
of FLID is 31.4%, 42.12% and 32.5% in US, Indian and Italian companies respectively. 
Notably, the average is closer to Sartawi et al.  (2014),  who reported that the overall mean of 
voluntary disclosure in Jordanian companies was 49%. Furthermore, the median value of 
QFLID is 51.49%, which is closer to Nalikka’s (2009) score of 50.46% among Finnish listed 
companies. 
Regarding control variables (firm characteristics); the average company size is 7.595252 
ranging widely from 5.115201 to 9.744242. In addition, leverage ranges from .00036% to 99%, 
with a mean leverage value of 51.96%.  The table also shows that the overall mean of liquidity 
(current ratio) is 2%, with a minimum value of 0.13 and a maximum value of 22. Furthermore, 
profitability ranges from -84% (loss) to 99% (profit) with a mean of 10%. GROW ranges from 
-.49 to 2.57 with a mean of .25. Concerning the industry type, the minimum and maximum 
values are 1 and 11, respectively. 
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Table 6.  1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean Median SD. Max Min 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
TQ ratio  2120 1.940082 1.415526 1.572902 9.78762 .011101 
ACUAF  2120 -.03692 -.0021926 0.157592 0 -.767487 
QFLID 2120 .5070467 .5149583 .0764422 .6852885 0 
LEVE 2120 .5196675 .5610039 .2319884 .9933107 .0003641 
LIQU 2120 2.050434 1.6 1.676653 22 .13 
PROF 2012 .1016844 .0859759 .1019813 .991509 -.84 
GROW 2012 .2578197 .1900197 .330587 2.571437 -.4916848 
FSIZE 2120 7.595252 7.557725 .6993978 9.744242 5.115201 
IndType 2120 4.662736 4 2.795015 11 2  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
TQ ratio denotes the Tobin’s Q, used as proxy to measure FV. ACUAF denotes the accuracy of analyst forecast. QFLID 
denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. LEVE denotes the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a firm’s total 
debt divided by its total assets. LIQU denotes liquidity, measured through the current assets of the firm divided by its current 
liabilities. PROF denotes profitability, measured by ROA. GROW denotes firm growth, measured by the ratio change of sales. 
FSIZE denotes Firm size, measured through the natural log of the firm’s total assets. IndType denotes industry type; the 
sample in this study is divided into eleven types of industry and is coded from 1 to 11. 
6.3. Multicollinerity  
Before conducting the regression analysis, this research tested whether there is any 
multicollinearity issue between independent variables. As mentioned earlier in Chapter Five, 
the present study used the correlation matrix and VIF with Tolerance. The correlation matrix 
is considered to be a powerful instrument for investigating the association among the 
explanatory variables. Researchers have different views regarding the cut-off correlation 
percentage (Alsaeed, 2006). Some of them, such as Tabachnick et al. (2001), consider 70% as 
serious correlation, while others consider 80% as the cut-off point for correlation; among these 
are Alsaeed (2006) and Gujarati (2003; 2008). In addition, Gujarati (2009), Field (2009), and 
 147 
 
Gujarati (2003), highlight that if the VIF value is greater than 10 and the coefficient of 
Tolerance is above 10%, multicollinearity is expected to be a problem.  
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 below illustrate the correlation matrix between independent variables 
(QFLID and control variables). The results presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 illustrate that the 
highest correlations are between the LEVE and LIQU, with a coefficient of 22.1%, and between 
LEVE and PROF, with a coefficient of 25.9%, respectively. These are less than the cut-off 
correlation percentage, indicating that there is no multicollinearity between independent 
variables (Gujarati, 2008; Tabachnick et al., 2001). Therefore, the problem of multicollinearity 
does not exist among the data set used in these models. Furthermore, the outcomes of the VIF 
test, reported in Tables 6.4 and 6.5, show that the maximum values of VIF are very low (1.11) 
and (1.05), with means of 1.15 and 1.07, respectively. Thus, the findings of the VIF test confirm 
that the multicollinearity problem does not exist in these models.   
Table 6.  2 Correlation Matrix (QFLID and TQ ratio). 
 TQ ratio QFLID LEVE LIQU GROW FSIZE IndType 
TQ ratio 1.000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
QFLID 0.024 1.000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
LEVE -0.005 0.113*** 1.000     
LIQU 0.052** -0.140*** -0.221*** 1.000    
GROW -0.028 0.058** 0.008 0.109*** 1.000   
FSIZE -0.191*** 0.032 -0.044* -0.164*** -0.019 1.000  
IndType 0.013*** -0.092** -0.098** 0.008 0.005 -0.001 1.000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
TQ ratio denotes the Tobin’s Q, uses as proxy to measure FV. QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. 
LEVE denotes the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a firm’s total debt divided by its total assets. LIQU denotes 
liquidity, measured through the current assets of the firm divided by its current liabilities. PROF denotes profitability, 
measured by ROA. GROW denotes firm growth, measured by the ratio change of sales. FSIZE denotes Firm size, measured 
through the natural log of firm’s total assets. IndType denotes industry type, the sample in this study is divided into eleven 
types of industry and is coded from 1 to 11. *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at 
the 0.10 level.  
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Table 6.  3 Correlation Matrix (QFLID and ACUAF). 
 ACUAF QFLID LEVE LIQU PROF GROW FSIZE IndType 
ACUAF 1.000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
QFLID 0.076** 1.000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
LEVE -0.020 0.113*** 1.000 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..  
LIQU 0.017 -0.140*** -0.221*** 1.000     
PROF -0.002 0.049** -0.259*** 0.093*** 1.000    
GROW 0.004 0.058** 0.008 0.109*** 0.023 1.000   
FSIZE -0.006 0.032 -0.044* -0.164*** -0.051* -0.019 1.000  
IndType 0.010*** -0.092** -0.098** 0.000** 0.023 0.005 -0.001 1.000 
ACUAF denotes the accuracy of analyst forecast. QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. LEVE denotes 
the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a firm’s total debt divided by its total assets. LIQU denotes liquidity, measured 
through the current assets of the firm divided by its current liabilities. PROF denotes profitability, measured by ROA. GROW 
denotes firm growth, measured by the ratio change of sales. FSIZE denotes Firm size, measured through the natural log of 
the firm’s total assets. IndType denotes industry type, the sample in this study is divided into eleven types of industry and is 
coded from 1 to 11. *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at the 0.10 level.  
Table 6.  4 VIF Test Results (QFLID and TQ ratio). 
Variable VIF Tolerance 1/VIF 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
QFLID 1.04 0.963706 
LEVE 1.08 0.927782 
LIQU 1.11 0.897190 
GROW 1.02 0.984619 
CSIZE 1.04 0.965688 
IndType 1.02 0.984619 
Mean VIF 1.05  
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Table 6.  5 VIF Test Results (QFLID and ACUAF). 
Variable VIF Tolerance 1/VIF 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
QFLID 1.05 0.958149 
LEVE 1.15 0.866770 
LIQU 1.12 0.906311 
PROF 1.09 0.920645 
GROW 1.02 0.983937 
CSIZE 1.04 0.962155 
IndType 1.02 0.982587 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Mean VIF 1.07  
 
6.4. The Impact of QFLID on FV 
This section discusses the results based on the association between the independent variable 
(QFLID) and the dependent variable (FV), which is measured by the TQ ratio. In addition, the 
present study used corporate characteristics, namely Firm size (CSIZE), Leverage (LEVE), 
Liquidity (LIQU), Growth (GROW), Profitability (PROF) and Industry type (IndType) as 
control variables because of their effect on QFLID and FV as in prior studies (Alotaibi & 
Hussainey, 2016b; Belgacem & Omri, 2014; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Uyar & Kilic, 
2012). 
This study conducted various tests to select the most efficient model to investigate the impact 
of QFLID on the TQ ratio. The Chow test was conducted in this study to decide between the 
panel data model and the pooled model. The result of F-Value is significant at a 1% level (see 
Appendix 6.1). Therefore, the panel data model is the appropriate model in this study. The 
Hausman’s test is also used to decide between the random and fixed effects models (Greene, 
2008). The result of the Hausman’s test in this study indicates that the P-Value is significant at 
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a 1% level (P-Value = 0.000) and, hence, the null hypotheses (fixed effects) is accepted. 
Accordingly, the fixed effect model is preferred (see Appendix 6.3). 
Table 6.6 illustrates that the value of R2 is 18.12%. The R2 value shows that the combination 
of the independent variables (QFLID), with the company characteristics as control variables, 
demonstrate 18.12% of variation in the dependent variable (FV). This result is considered 
favourable compared with similar studies, such as Hassanein & Hussainey (2015) at R2 
14.51%. Table 6.6 also indicates that the P-Value is significantly higher (0.001), indicating that 
this model has a good explanatory power for the model utilised in the primary analysis. 
To examine the second objective of this study, Table 6.6 shows that the coefficient of QFLID 
is significantly and positively associated with the TQ ratio (coef. = 5.156462, t = 5.63, p < 
0.000). As expected, this finding provides evidence that FV should be increased as a result of 
quality of FLID through either decreasing the cost of capital, or increasing the cash flow to its 
shareholders, or both (Elzahar et al., 2015). Consequently, firms with a high QFLID are more 
likely to increase FV than those with a low QFLID. The study finding is also consistent with 
suggestions that a positive influence in terms of enhanced disclosure upon firm valuation, 
through the mitigation of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders (Healy 
et al., 1999). Furthermore, this finding is in line with the argument that the quality of disclosure 
is value-relevant information to market participants (Baek et al., 2004; Healy et al., 1999). This 
finding supports the hypothesis H2, that there is a positive and significant association between 
QFLID and FV in Indian listed companies. Accordingly, the current study accepts hypothesis 
H2.  
In relation to theoretical underpinning, the result of QFLID on FV is consistent with the agency 
theory, suggesting that the information released by FLID mitigates the information asymmetry, 
which leads to reduction in the agency costs (Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Kuzey, 2018). 
This decreases the uncertainty related to a firm’s future performance and thereby minimises 
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the private benefits that controlling shareholders and management could possibly use to 
increase the anticipated cash flow to shareholders, which leads to higher FV (Hassanein & 
Hussainey, 2015; Kuzey, 2018; Sheu et al., 2010). In addition, the study result is in line with 
the signalling theory, which assumes that managers disclose more FLID to mitigate information 
asymmetry between managers and investors, also among the stock market participants, hence 
improve FV (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Kuzey, 2018; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). 
Empirically, the result of QFLID on the TQ ratio is in line with several previous studies 
(Cheung et al., 2010; Elzahar et al., 2015; Mendes-Da-Silva & de Lira Alves, Luiz Alberto, 
2004; Nekhili et al., 2016; Plumlee et al., 2015; Uyar & Kiliç, 2012; Wang & Hussainey, 2013) 
who found a positive association between voluntary disclosure and FV. 
 Concerning control variables, as can be seen in Table 6.6 the regression result shows that the 
coefficients of CSIZE and LIQU are positively and significantly associated with the TQ ratio 
(coef. = 1.452718, t = 13.85, p < 0.000), (coef. = .0300039, t = 1.70, p < 0.088), respectively. 
On the other hand, the coefficients of LEVE, GROW and IndType have no relationship with 
the TQ ratio (coef. = . 0283899, t = 0.14, p < 0.886), (coef. = -.0630588, t = -0.89, p < 0.376), 
(coef. = . 0183764, t = 1.33, p < 0.182), respectively. 
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Table 6.  6 Regression analysis of the association between QFLID and the TQ ratio. 
TQ ratio Coefficient Std. Err t- Statistics P ItI [95% Conf. Interval  
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
QFLID 5.156462   .9159874 5.63 0.000***  3.360008   6.952915 
LEVE .0283899 .1987695 0.14 0.886 -.3614409 .4182207 
LIQU .0300039   .0175977 1.70 0.088* .0645169 .0045091 
GROW -.0630588 .0711498 -.89 0.376 -.2025986 .076481 
CSIZE 1.452718 .1048622 13.85 0.000*** 1.658376 1.24706 
IndType .0183764 .0137708 1.33 0.182 -.0086311 .0453839 
 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
R². Adjusted 0.1812      
P. Value 0.001      
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
TQ ratio denotes the Tobin’s Q, used as proxy to measure FV. QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. 
LEVE denotes the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a firm’s total debt divided by its total assets. LIQU denotes 
liquidity, measured through the current assets of the firm divided by its current liabilities. GROW denotes firm growth, 
measured by the ratio change of sales. FSIZE denotes Firm size, measured through the natural log of the firm’s total assets. 
IndType denotes industry type; the sample in this study is divided into eleven types of industry and is coded from 1 to 11. 
6.5. The impact of QFLID on ACUAF 
This section discusses the findings of the statistical analysis to examine the association between 
the independent variable of QFLID and the dependent variable ACUAF in the main analysis. 
Following prior studies (Barron et al., 1999; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Bozzolan et al., 2009; 
Lang & Lundholm, 1996), the present study uses corporate characteristics, namely Firm size 
(CSIZE), Leverage (LEVE), Liquidity (LIQU), Growth (GROW), Profitability (PROF) and 
Industry type (IndType) as control variables to examine the relationship between the QFLID 
and ACUAF. 
Before examining the impact of QFLID on ACUAF, some tests are considered to select the 
best model for the current study. These are the same tests described in the above section. The 
Chow test is conducted in this study to decide between the panel data model and the pooled 
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model. The result shows the F-Value is significant at 1% (see Appendix 6.2). Therefore, the 
panel data model is the appropriate model in this study. The fixed effects model and the random 
effects model are two of the main types of panel data regression models. These two models are 
based on various assumptions about the error term. The Hausman’s test is used to decide 
between the random and fixed effects models (Greene, 2008). The result of the Hausman’s test 
indicates that it is significant (P-Value = 0.000) and hence the null hypotheses (fixed-effects) 
is accepted. Accordingly, the fixed effect model is preferred (see Appendix 6.4). 
The results of the fixed-effects panel regression presented in Table 6.7 illustrate that the value 
of R2 is 45.95%. The R2 value shows that the combination of the independent variables 
(QFLID), with company characteristics as control variables, demonstrate 45.95% of variation 
in the dependent variable (ACUAF). This result is considered favourable compared with 
similar studies, such as Beretta & Bozzolan (2008), Lang & Lundholm (1996) and Vanstraelen 
et al. (2003). Table 6.7 also indicates that the P-Value is highly significant (0.001), implying 
that this model has a good explanatory power for the model utilised in the primary analysis. 
To examine the third objective of this research, Table 6.7 shows that the coefficient of QFLID 
is positively and significantly associated with ACUAF (coef. = .0018376, t = 2.06, p < 0.039). 
As expected, this finding is consistent with the argument that the quality of information 
disclosed is high if it is statistically significant and positively correlated with ACUAF (Beretta 
& Bozzolan, 2008), which suggest that disclosure quality is value-relevant information to 
market participants (Baek et al., 2004; Healy et al., 1999). This suggests that when companies 
disclose higher QFLID, it improves ACUAF. Accordingly, this outcome can help users to 
evaluate the QFLID when making their decisions, which is a positive event for stock markets. 
Therefore, companies with higher QFLID are more likely to increase ACUAF than those 
having lower QFLID. This finding supports the hypothesis H3, which proposed that the QFLID 
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is positively associated with ACUAF in Indian listed companies. Accordingly, the current 
study accepts hypothesis H3.   
Theoretically, the result of the impact of QFLID on ACUAF is consistent with the signalling 
theory, suggesting that managers increase FLID disclosure as it reduces information 
asymmetry and improves the accuracy of analysts’ forecasts (Bozzolan et al., 2009; Lang & 
Lundholm, 1996; Lundholm & Myers, 2002). By the same token, Lang & Lundholm (1996) 
indicate that there is negative relationship between disclosure of information and information 
asymmetry, which helps financial analysts to increase the accuracy of earnings forecasts.  
Empirically, the positive result of QFLID on ACUAF is in line with several previous studies 
(Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Bozzolan et al., 2009; Vanstraelen et al., 2003) who found that 
corporate disclosure has a positive impact on ACUAF. 
In terms of control variables, in Table 6.7 the regression result shows that the coefficients of 
CSIZE, PROF and GROW are positively and significantly associated with ACUAF (coef. = 
.0748772, t = 36.68, p < 0.000), (coef. = .0266883, t = 3.39, p < 0.001), (coef. = .0055945, t 
= 3.11, p < 0.002), respectively. However, the coefficient of LIQU is negatively and 
significantly associated with the ACUAF (coef. = -.0018308, t = -4.14, p < 0.000). On the 
other hand, the regression outcomes show that the coefficient of IndType is found to be 
insignificant related to the ACUAF (coef. = . 0000377, t = .11, p < 0.914). 
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Table 6.  7 Regression analysis of the association between QFLID and ACUAF 
ACUAF  Coefficient Std. Err t- Statistics P ItI [95% Conf. Interval  
QFLID  .0018376   .0008901 2.06 0.039**  .0000919   .0035833 
LEVE -.0042729 .0050558 -0.85 0.398 -.0141884 .0056427 
LIQU -.0018308   .0004423 -4.14 0.000*** -.0026982 -.0009633 
PROF .0266883 .0078788 3.39 0.001*** .0112364 .0421402 
GROW .0055945 .0017984 3.11 0.002*** .0091216 .0020675 
CSIZE .0748772 .0020413 36.68 0.000*** .0708737 .0788807 
IndType .0000377 .00035 .11 0.914 -.0006488 .0007242 
R². Adjusted 0.4595 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
P. Value 0.001 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ACUAF denotes the accuracy of analysts’ forecast. QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. LEVE denotes 
the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a firm’s total debt divided by its total assets. LIQU denotes liquidity, measured 
through the current assets of the firm divided by its current liabilities. PROF denotes profitability, measured by ROA. GROW 
denotes firm growth, measured by the ratio change of sales. FSIZE denotes Firm size, measured through the natural log of 
the firm’s total assets. IndType denotes industry type; the sample in this study is divided into eleven types of industry and is 
coded from 1 to 11. *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at the 0.10 level.  
6.6. Additional Analyses 
In order to provide reasonable assurance that the primary findings in Tables 6.6 and 6.7 are 
robust, further analyses are required to investigate the robustness of the main findings. The 
current study tests whether the dependent variables (TQ ratio and ACUAF) can differ 
influenced by high QFLID and low QFLID or not. Following the study by Chung et al. (2015), 
the present research identifies high QFLID firms as firm-years which have a QFLID score 
higher than the median of all samples, while low QFLID firms are identified as firm-years 
which have a QFLID score less than the median of all samples.   
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Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.8 present the results of the regressions of both high and low QFLID 
on FV (TQ ratio), while outcomes of the regression of both high and low QFLID on ACUAF 
are presented separately in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.9, respectively. 
Tables 6.8 and 6.9 shows the results of the effect of the QFLID, by dividing the sample into 
high and low QFLID, and some of the control variables on both TQ ratio and ACUAF (as 
dependent variables) are consistent with the main results reported in Tables 6.6 and 6.7, 
respectively. These findings suggest that firms with high QFLID enhance both FV and ACUAF 
compared to firms with low QFLID and vice versa. This means that the main findings are 
reliable and robust under the category of high and low QFLID.  
 
Table 6.  8 Regression analysis of the association between (High and Low) QFLID and 
TQ ratio 
 High Quality Low Quality 
TQ ratio Coefficients t- Statistics P-Value Coefficients t- Statistics P-Value 
QFLID 8.108124 5.63 0.000*** 2.995285 2.34     0.020** 
LEVE -.019632 -0.03    0.979 .294655 1.01     0.310 
LIQU .0010448 0.32    0.748 -.041743 -1.86     0.063* 
GROW -.7493740 -0.93    0.235 -.6238504 -0.85     0.421 
CSIZE -1.156785 -7.63 0.000*** -1.739223 -11.16 0.000*** 
IndType .0264393 1.44    0.150 .0279877 1.38     0.169 
R². Adjusted 0.1986 0.2211 
P. Value 0.001 0.001 
 
TQ ratio denotes the Tobin’s Q, used as proxy to measure FV. QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. 
LEVE denotes the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a firm’s total debt divided by its total assets. LIQU denotes 
liquidity, measured through the current assets of the firm divided by its current liabilities. PROF denotes profitability, 
measured by ROA. GROW denotes firm growth, measured by the ratio change of sales. FSIZE denotes Firm size, measured 
through the natural log of the firm’s total assets. IndType denotes industry type; the sample in this study is divided into eleven 
types of industry and is coded from 1 to 11. 
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Table 6.  9 Regression analysis of the association between (High and Low) QFLID and 
ACUAF 
 High Quality Low Quality 
ACUAF Coefficients t- Statistics P-Value Coefficients t- Statistics P-Value 
QFLID .0044222 1.99    0.047** .0016107 1.66    0.097* 
LEVE -.032816 -5.14    0.000*** .0379515 4.94    0.000*** 
LIQU -.0019364 -3.33 0.001*** -.0013225 -2.11    0.035** 
PROF .0316254 3.38 0.001*** .0269033 1.97    0.049** 
GROW .0083537 3.77 0.000*** .0059325 2.15    0.032** 
CSIZE .0659645 24.46 0.000*** .0766436 22.55    0.000*** 
IndType .0001612 .38    0.707 -.0006117 -1.04    0.300 
R². Adjusted 0.4562 0.4378 
P. Value 0.001 0.001 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
ACUAF denotes the accuracy of analyst forecast. QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. LEVE denotes 
the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a firm’s total debt divided by its total assets. LIQU denotes liquidity, measured 
through the current assets of the firm divided by its current liabilities. PROF denotes profitability, measured by ROA. GROW 
denotes firm growth, measured by the ratio change of sales. FSIZE denotes Firm size, measured through the natural log of 
firm’s total assets. IndType denotes industry type, the sample in this study is divided into eleven types of industry and is coded 
from 1 to 11.  *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at the 0.10 level.  
6.7. Robustness Test  
This section used alternative measurement for the dependent variables that used in the main 
analysis in order to robust essential results. Firstly, previous studies have used market 
capitalization (MC) as proxy to measure FV (Alotaibi & Hussainey, 2016b; Anam, Fatima, & 
Majdi, 2011; Uyar & Kiliç, 2012). Based on this. This study used MC as alternative 
measurement of dependent variable (FV) in order to test whether main results are robustness 
by applying different measurement or not. The findings of fixed-effects panel regression 
analysis of QFLID and the control variables on the MC are presented in Table 6.10. Regression 
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analysis indicates that the value of R² is 31.52%, which is less than the results of Alotaibi & 
Hussainey (2016b). Furthermore, Table 6.10 reported that the P-Value is significantly higher 
(0.001). The finding shows that the QFLID and MC is positively and significantly associated 
(coef. = 2.205913, t = 4.06, p < 0.000), suggesting that firms with high QFLID is more likely 
to increase MC compared to those firms with low QFLID. This finding is confirms the main 
analysis reported in Table 6.6.  
Secondly, the current study used dispersion (DISAF) as alternative measurement of dependent 
variable (ACUAF) in order to test whether main results are robustness by applying different 
measurement or not. Beretta & Bozzolan (2008) argue that the quality of information disclosed 
by the firm will be high if it is negatively and significantly related to DISAF. A number of prior 
researchers (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Bozzolan et al., 2009; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Lee, 
2017; Vanstraelen et al., 2003) indicating that DISAF is likely to decrease when firms publish 
high quality of information disclosure. Based on this, an alternative measure of the dependent 
variable (DISAF) is used to test whether the main results are robust to different measures or 
not. Table 6.11 presents the results generated by fixed-effects panel regression analysis of 
QFLID and control variables on the DISAF. The result reported that the value of R² is 45.88%, 
which is similar to the results of (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; 
Vanstraelen et al., 2003). Table 6.8 also indicates that the P-Value is highly significant (0.001). 
The results show that the QFLID is negatively and significantly associated with DISAF (coef. 
= -.0016227, t = -1.81, p < 0.07), suggesting that high QFLID enable companies to help 
financial analysts to reduce DISAF compared to those firms with low QFLID. The findings are 
in line with the primary analysis and confirms the argument that the quality of FLID is high 
when it is negatively and significantly related to DISAF (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008). This 
confirm that the results are consistent with the primary results presented in Table 6.7.  
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The above discussion highlighted that the outcomes regarding the impact of QFLID and some 
control variables on both MC and DISAF (as an alternative measure for dependent variables) 
are in line with the essential results presented in Tables 6.6 and 6.7, respectively. This suggests 
that the main findings are reliable and robust under using MC and DISAF as alternative 
measures.  
Table 6.  10 Regression analysis of the association between QFLID and MC 
MC Coefficient Std. Err t- Statistics P ItI [95% Conf. Interval  
QFLID 2.205913   .2736708 4.06 0.000***  1.669186   2.74264 
LEVE .3785414 .0599187 2.32 0.014** -.4960546 .2610282 
LIQU .0098817   .0053383 1.85 0.064* -.0005878 .0203512 
GROW -.0087217 .021592 -.40 0.686 -.0510682 .0336248 
CSIZE .3478507 .0311423 11.17 0.000*** .2867741 .4089274 
IndType .0035237 .0041789 .84 0.399 -.0046721 .0117195 
R². Adjusted 0.3152 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
P. Value 0.001 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
MC denotes the market capitalization, measured as the market value of common equity of a firm’s operations at the end of the 
year. QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. LEVE denotes the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a 
firm’s total debt divided by its total assets. LIQU denotes liquidity, measured through the current assets of the firm divided 
by its current liabilities. PROF denotes profitability, measured by ROA. GROW denotes firm growth, measured by the ratio 
change of sales. FSIZE denotes Firm size, measured through the natural log of firm’s total assets. IndType denotes industry 
type, the sample in this study is divided into eleven types of industry and is coded from 1 to 11. *** Significant at the 0.01 
level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at the 0.10 level.  
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Table 6.  11 Regression analysis of the association between QFLID and DISAF 
DISAF  Coefficient Std. Err t- Statistics P ItI [95% Conf. Interval  
QFLID -.0016227   .0008951 -1.81 0.070*  -.0033781   .0001328 
LEVE -.0031498 .0055797 -0.95 0.494 -.013423 .0058795 
LIQU -.0027348   .0008936 -3.13 0.002*** -.0026962 -.0009608 
PROF .0266494 .0078809 3.11 0.002*** .0011933 .0421055 
GROW .0056044 0017989 3.77 0.002*** .0091324 .0020764 
CSIZE .0249022 .0056589 20.69 0.000*** .0087378 .0789065 
IndType .0005867 .0003501 .23 0.784 -.0007586 .0005768 
R². Adjusted 0.4588      
P. Value 0.001      
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
DISAF denotes the dispersion of analyst forecast. QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. LEVE denotes 
the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a firm’s total debt divided by its total assets. LIQU denotes liquidity, measured 
through the current assets of the firm divided by its current liabilities. PROF denotes profitability, measured by ROA. GROW 
denotes firm growth, measured by the ratio change of sales. FSIZE denotes Firm size, measured through the natural log of 
firm’s total assets. IndType denotes industry type, the sample in this study is divided into eleven types of industry and is coded 
from 1 to 11. *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at the 0.10 level.  
6.8. Endogeneity Problems 
When one or more variables are linked with the errors terms, it leads to endogeneity problem 
(Gippel et al., 2015; Reeb et al., 2012; Schultz et al., 2010). This problem raises concerns 
regarding validity of the results generated from regression model (Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; 
Wintoki et al., 2012).  
Earlier literature suggests three main causes for endogeneity problems that are: simultaneity, 
omitted variables and measurement errors (Brown & Hillegeist, 2007; Choi et al., 2013; 
Moumen et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 2013; Reeb et al., 2012; Schultz et al., 2010).  
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Furthermore, earlier studies reported that the models utilized to examine corporate disclosure 
and FV suffer from endogeneity problem (Moumen et al., 2015; Sheu et al., 2010; Shi et al., 
2014) 
In order to address endogeneity problems, prior studies have used two econometric methods 
(Ammann et al., 2011a; Ntim et al., 2012; Renders et al., 2010). The first method uses a lagged 
structure that deals with omitted variables and simultaneity problems (Ammann et al., 2011a; 
Ntim et al., 2012). Instrumental Variable (IV) is used as a second method, which deals with 
potential issues generated by measurement errors and omitted variables (Black et al., 2006; 
Renders et al., 2010). The lagged values of endogenous independent variable (FLID) as an 
instrumental variable is used in this study to examine whether the endogeneity problem have 
an impact on the relation between the QFLID and both TQ ratio and ACUAF or not. 
Similarly, Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests were carried out to check whether bias for the 
endogenous and independent variables exists (Beiner et al., 2006; Gujarati, 2008; Moumen et 
al., 2015; Ntim, 2015). The results show that the null hypothesis of no endogeneity between 
QFLID as the independent variable and both TQ ratio and ACUAF as the dependent variables 
is rejected (see appendix 6.5 and 6.6). Accordingly, the existence of this problem might be 
affecting the findings, making them ineffective, biased and inconsistent. Therefore, IV and 
2SLS with lagged QFLID are utilized to control for the endogeneity problem.  
The outcomes of the 2SLS regression of QFLID with both TQ ratio and ACUAF are reported 
in Table 6.12 and 6.13, respectively. After controlling for the endogeneity, the coefficient of 
QFLID is significantly and positively associated with TQ ratio (coef. = 1.4851, t = 2.80, p < 
0.005), confirming that the results are in line with the main results reported in Table 6.6. 
Concerning the control variables, the results reported in Table 6.12 display similar outcomes 
to those reported in Table 6.6. In addition, the coefficient of QFLID is significantly and 
positively associated with ACUAF (coef. = .943684, t = 3.10, p < 0.002), indicating that the 
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result are consistent with the main findings presented in Table 6.7. Regarding control variables, 
the results presented in Table 6.13 are in line with the results reported in Table 6.7.  
In summary, the findings of 2SLS regression for both models are consistent with the primary 
outcomes reported in Tables 6.6 and 6.7, respectively, showing that the endogeneity problem 
between QFLID and both TQ ratio ACUAF does not affect the main findings of the QFLID 
and other control variables. Overall, the analyses showed that the main results are robust to 
potential endogeneity problems. 
Table 6.  12 Instrumental variables Two-Stage regression model based on TQ ratio. 
TQ ratio Coefficient Std. Err t- Statistics P ItI [95% Conf. Interval 
QFLID 1.4851   .5306596 2.80 0.005***  .4450262   2.525174 
LEVE .0283899 .1442455 1.01 0.311 -.3614409 .4182207 
LIQU .0399881   .0175977 1.70 0.046** .0006568 .0793194 
GROW -.0547355 .0854289 -0.74 0.450 -.3754069 .0734859 
CSIZE .710535 .051752 13.73 0.000*** .811967 .609103 
IndType .0061653 .0114599 0.54 0.591 -.0162957 .0286262 
R². Adjusted 0.1559 
P. Value 0.001 
TQ ratio denotes the Tobin’s Q, uses as proxy to measure FV. QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. 
LEVE denotes the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a firm’s total debt divided by its total assets. LIQU denotes 
liquidity, measured through the current assets of the firm divided by its current liabilities. PROF denotes profitability, 
measured by ROA. GROW denotes firm growth, measured by the ratio change of sales. FSIZE denotes Firm size, measured 
through the natural log of firm’s total assets. IndType denotes industry type, the sample in this study is divided into eleven 
types of industry and is coded from 1 to 11. *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; * Significant at 
the 0.10 level.  
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Table 6.  13 Instrumental variables Two-Stage regression model based on ACUAF. 
ACUAF Coefficient Std. Err t- Statistics P ItI [95% Conf. Interval  
QFLID  .943684   .2847436 3.10 0.002***  .5855964  1.701771 
LEVE -.1308763 .0811368 -1.61 0.107 -.2899015 .0281489 
LIQU -.0128814   .0110128 -1.17 0.242 -.0087033 -.0344661 
PROF .1806162 .1794306 1.01 0.314 .5322937 .1710613 
GROW .009561 .0534505 .18 0.858 -.0952 .1143219 
CSIZE .0009203 .0002891 3.18 0.001*** .0014869 .0003537 
IndType .0006364 .0255224 0.02 0.980 -.0493866 .0506594 
R². Adjusted 0.3586      
P. Value 0.001      
ACUAF denotes the accuracy of analyst forecast. QFLID denotes the quality of forward-looking disclosure. LEVE denotes 
the leverage ratio, measured by the ratio of a firm’s total debt divided by its total assets. LIQU denotes liquidity, measured 
through the current assets of the firm divided by its current liabilities. PROF denotes profitability, measured by ROA. GROW 
denotes firm growth, measured by the ratio change of sales. FSIZE denotes Firm size, measured through the natural log of 
the firm’s total assets. IndType denotes industry type; the sample in this study is divided into eleven types of industry and is 
coded from 1 to 11. 
6.9. Summary 
The current chapter presents the empirical findings of usefulness of QFLID in order to achieve 
the third and fourth objectives, thus this chapter is divided into two parts. The first part 
examines the association between QFLID and FV in non-financial Indian listed companies for 
the period 2006-2015. In doing so, this study used the TQ ratio as proxy to measure FV in the 
main analysis. The result showed that QFLID and the TQ ratio are positively and significantly 
associated. This outcome is consistent with the perspective of agency and signalling theories 
that managers tend to disclose more FLID to reduce the issue of information asymmetry and 
improve stakeholders’ confidence regarding a company’s future performance. This, in turn, 
improves FV (Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). Furthermore, 
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high/low QFLID is used as an additional analysis. The results of the effect of the QFLID, by 
dividing the sample into high and low quality, and some of the control variables on the TQ 
ratio are in line with the essential results. The additional analysis confirmed that the main 
results are reliable and robust under high and low QFLID. Moreover, MC is used as an 
alternative measure of dependent variable (FV) to examine whether these results are robust to 
the main outcomes or not. The findings of the impact of the QFLID on MC confirm the essential 
results. Finally, the outcome regarding the endogeneity problem confirmed the results of the 
main analysis.    
The second part examines the association between QFLID and ACUAF in non-financial 
Indian listed companies for the period 2006-2015. In doing so, this study used the ACUAF in 
the main analysis. The resutls indicated that QFLID and ACUAF are positively and signifanctly 
associated with each other. The study finding is in line with signalling theory; managers 
disclose more FLID to mitigate asymmetric information and thus increase the accuracy of 
analysts’ forecasts (Lundholm & Myers, 2002; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). In addition, high 
and low QFLID are used as additional analyses. The outcomes of the effect of the QFLID, by 
dividing the sample into high and low quality, and some of the control variables on ACUAF 
are consistent with the main results. The results confirmed that the main findings are robust 
and reliable under both high and low QFLID. Moreover, the present research used DISAF as 
an alternative measurement of dependent variable to examine whether these findings are robust 
to the main results or not. The outcomes of the impact of the QFLID on DISAF confirm the 
argument that the quality of FLID will be high when it has a negative and significant 
relationship with DISAF (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008). This suggests that the main findings are 
reliable and robust by using DISAF. Finally, dealing with endogeneity problems, the results 
confirm the outcomes of the main analysis.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
7.1. Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of this study. The current research covers the following 
objectives: firstly, to investigate the association between CG mechanisms and QFLID; 
secondly, to investigate the impact of QFLID on FV; thirdly, to examine the impact of QFLID 
on ACUAF. To achieve these objectives, this study adopts a multidimensional framework to 
measure the quality of FLID, based on a sample of 212 non-financial Indian listed companies 
over the period 2006-2015. Thus, this chapter is organised as follows: section 7.2 summarises 
the study’s findings; section 7.3 provides reserch contribution; section 7.4 highlights the 
limitations of this study; section 7.5 describes this study’s implications and section 7.6 suggests 
future research related to this study. 
7.2. Study’s Findings 
To achieve the purpose of this research, the empirical study objectives were addressed in 
chapters five and six. The next sections provide the main findings of the two empirical chapters. 
7.2.1. Findings Related to CG and QFLID 
The first objective of the study is to examine the association between CG (the board of 
director’s characteristics, ownership structure and audit committee) and QFLID. In order to 
achieve this objective, thirteen hypotheses were developed. This research adopts both 
univariate and multivariate analyses to investigate the relationship between CG and QFLID. 
The regression analyses show mixed results (significant and insignificant association) between 
CG explanatory variables and QFLID among Indian companies. 
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The statistical results show that CG mechanisms and firm characteristics affect QFLID. Four 
out of five board characteristics (Board size, board meetings frequency, board independence 
and female presence on the board) were found as significantly and positively associated with 
QFLID. This indicates that hypotheses H1.1, H1.3, H1.4, and H1.5 are accepted. However, the 
findings indicate that CEO duality is not related to QFLID, meaning that hypothesis H1.2 is 
rejected. In addition, this study examines three ownership structures, termed as block holder, 
institutional and promoter’s ownership, in relation to QFLID.  The results show that none of 
these structures are associated with QFLID. This means that hypotheses H1.6, H1.7 and H1.8 
are not supported. 
Concerning the audit committee, three variables (independence of the audit committee, 
frequency of audit committee meetings and female presence on the audit committee) have 
positive and significant associations with QFLID. This means that this study accepts 
hypotheses H1.10, H1.11 and H1.13. However, the study found that audit committee size and 
audit committee financial expertise have no relationship with the QFLID, meaning that 
hypotheses H1.9 and H1.12 are rejected. With regard to control variables, firm size and 
profitability have a positive relationship with QFLID, whereas liquidity and growth have a 
negative association with QFLID. On the other hand, leverage and industry type have no 
relationship with QFLID. 
The results that relate to hypotheses H1.1, H1.3, H1.4, H1.5 H1.10, H1.11 and H1.13 are in 
line with the theoretical framework of this study, which is based on the agency, signalling and 
resource-dependence theories. These theories recommend that CG mechanisms improve 
overall governance and help companies to minimise agency costs and reduce information 
asymmetry (Alnabsha et al., 2017; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hafsi & Turgut, 2013; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Siddiqui et al., 2013). In the same vein, good CG leads to a higher quality of 
disclosure (Elzahar et al., 2015; Hui & Matsunaga, 2014), which leads to an increase in QFLID 
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In terms of the endogeneity problems, the study tested whether the presence of an endogeneity 
problem affected the results. The study found that an endogeneity problem has no effect on 
examining the association between CG and QFLID, as the main results are consistent and 
robust.  
7.2.2. Findings Related to QFLID and FV 
The second objective of the current research is to investigate the influence of QFLID on FV. 
In order to achieve this objective, hypothesis H2 was developed. H2 expects a positive link 
between the QFLID and FV. The regression results of this study show that the coefficient of 
QFLID is positively and significantly associated with the TQ ratio (proxy for FV). Therefore, 
this study accepts hypothesis H2. This finding supports the argument that FV should be 
increased as a result of quality of FLID, either through decreasing the cost of capital, increasing 
the cash flow to its shareholders, or both (Elzahar et al., 2015).  This means that QFLID 
improves FV. Consequently, firms with a high QFLID increase FV more than those with a low 
QFLID. 
The result of the impact of QFLID on FV is consistent with the agency theory, suggesting that 
the information released by FLID mitigates information asymmetry, which leads to reduced 
agency conflicts between managers and stakeholders (Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Kuzey, 
2018). It also decreases uncertainty about a firm’s future performance and minimises the 
opportunities for management to gain private benefits, hence resulting in higher FV (Hassanein 
& Hussainey, 2015; Kuzey, 2018; Sheu et al., 2010). Moreover, this finding is in line with the 
signalling theory, which assumes that managers disclose more FLID to mitigate information 
asymmetry between managers and investors, as well as among the stock market participants, 
hence improving FV (Elzahar & Hussainey, 2012; Kuzey, 2018; Wang & Hussainey, 2013).  
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This study splits the sample into two parts: high quality FLID and low quality FLID. The 
findings confirm the primary analysis. Furthermore, this study uses market capitalisation (MC) 
as an alternative measurement of the dependent variable (FV) to test the robustness of the main 
results. The result reveals a positive and significant association between QFLID and MC, 
confirming that the main findings are reliable and robust to the alternative measurement of FV. 
In terms of an endogeneity problem, the study results indicate that the main analysis is robust 
and is not affected by the problem of endogeneity between QFLID and TQ ratio. 
7.2.3. Findings Related to QFLID and ACUAF 
The third objective of the present research is to investigate the impact of QFLID on ACUAF, 
addressed in Chapter Six. In order to achieve this objective, hypothesis H3 was formulated, 
which has expected a positive association between the QFLID and ACUAF. Both univariate 
and multivariate analyses are used to test this hypothesis. The regression findings show that 
the coefficient of QFLID is positively and significantly associated with ACUAF. Therefore, 
this study accepts hypothesis H3. This finding confirms the argument that the quality of 
information disclosed is high if it is statistically significant and positively correlated with 
ACUAF (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2008), which suggests that disclosure quality is value-relevant 
information to market participants (Baek et al., 2004; Healy et al., 1999). Therefore, firms with 
high QFLID increase ACUAF as compared to those with low QFLID. This result is consistent 
with the signalling theory, suggesting that managers increase FLID disclosure as it reduces 
information asymmetry and improves the accuracy of analysts’ forecast (Bozzolan et al., 2009; 
Lang & Lundholm, 1996; Lundholm & Myers, 2002). 
The study divides the sample into two parts, high QFLID and low QFLID, and examines its 
impact on ACUAF to test the robustness of the main findings. The results confirm the main 
findings. In addition, this study uses dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecast (DISAF) as an 
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alternative measurement of ACUAF to test whether the main results are robust or not by 
applying different measurements. The result indicates that the QFLID is positively and 
significantly associated with DISAF, which confirms the robustness of the main results. The 
study confirms that the main results are not affected by the problem of endogeneity between 
QFLID and ACUAF. 
7.3. Research Contribution 
This study contributes to the body of knowledge in several ways. Firstly, the present study 
adds a contribution to the literature in terms of determinants of FLID. It is noted that previous 
researchers have addressed the relationship between CG and the level of FLID. Most of them 
used the level or quantity of FLID as a proxy for its quality (Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Al-
Najjar & Abed, 2014; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Mathuva, 2012b; Qu et al., 2015; Wang 
& Hussainey, 2013). It is noted that there is no previous study which focuses on the association 
between CG and quality of FLID in developing countries, specifically in India. Thus, this study 
attempts to investigate the impact of CG on QFLID in Indian non-financial listed companies.  
Secondly, limited research has attempted to examine the association between FLID and FV 
(Bravo, 2015; Hassanein & Hussainey, 2015; Kent & Ung, 2003; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). 
However, these studies focused mainly on the quantity or the level of FLID. As per the 
researcher’s knowledge, this is the only study which examines the impact of the QFLID on FV 
in developing countries, particularly in India. This study attempts to bridge this gap by 
examining the impact of the QFLID on FV in Indian non-financial listed companies.  
Thirdly, a few studies have investigated the relationship between FLID and ACUAF 
(Bozzolan et al., 2009). However, no study has taken QFLID into consideration in relation to 
ACUAF. Therefore, this is the first study to examine the impact of QFLID on ACUAF in a 
developing country (India). 
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Finally, the majority of the prior studies which have examined the above relationships (the 
relationship between CG and FLID; the relationship between FLID and FV; and the 
relationship between FLID and ACUAF) were conducted in developed countries. However, 
not much is known about these relationships in developing countries. Thus, this study has 
bridged this gap by examining the determinants and consequences of QFLID among Indian 
listed companies.   
7.4. Study’s Implications 
This study provides significant implications for practitioners, policy makers and academics. 
Firstly, this research offers important implications for the practitioners of annual reports in 
Indian companies. Practitioners may understand the roles and importance of CG to improve 
QFLID. Furthermore, the results of this study provide evidence that the QFLID affects FV. 
The results may be useful for different users to make effective decisions regarding a firm’s 
future performance. Regulators can consider the importance of QFLID and improve financial 
reporting quality which will enable them to increase FV. It also provides guidance for Indian 
companies’ managers that they should consider QFLID to increase FV. This provides an 
important implication for managers of Indian companies; they should pay more attention to 
QFLID as it will help them to build investors’ confidence by providing valuable information. 
It also implies that shareholders and other stakeholders should evaluate QFLID as it will 
improve the decision-making process. In addition, with regard to the effect of QFLID on 
ACUAF, the results can help financial analysts to see how QFLID increases ACUAF and 
affects capital market decisions. As higher QFLID enables generation of high quality financial 
reporting, the market considers published information more trustworthy and credible when 
making decisions. This study also provides necessary implications for annual report users of 
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Indian companies and other developing nations. Publishing QFLID may improve the 
relationship between managers and stakeholders, as it reduces information assymetry. 
Secondly, this study has many policy implications. The results of this study could have 
important implications for regulatory bodies within India. For instance, enhancing the 
understanding of the impact of CG on QFLID may help regulators and authorities, particularly 
in India, to improve their regulations on the roles and the code of CG. This means that 
regulators should pay more attention regarding the roles of CG to ensure the standard of quality 
information in financial reporting. Furthermore, this study has policy implications for standard 
setters and regulators to continue improving the guidance and frameworks to assist firms to 
provide high-quality financial reporting and FLID. There should be certain guidelines set for 
Indian companies’ managers, while preparing disclosure information, to ensure it is of high 
standard and show how QFLID can help them to gain investors’ confidence. In addition, the 
stock market authorities can use this study’s results to evalute current QFLID and take certain 
steps to improve both QFLID and financial disclosure quality. The findings can help academics 
to further investigate FLID and its role in improving FV and ACUAF. This research covers 
various issues related to QFLID, CG mechanisms, FV and ACUAF; there has been limited 
research done on these issues, especially in developing countries such as India. Therefore, it 
contains guidance for developing countries’ regulatory bodies and authorities to evalute the 
importance of these issues.  
Finally, this study also contains important implications for academics and future researchers. 
The empirical evidence on the effect of CG on QFLID may present a stepping-stone for future 
research to consider the role of CG on the quality of voluntary disclosure, in general, and 
QFLID in particular, for increasing QFLID to protect investors. Moreover, QFLID is important 
for increasing both FV and ACUAF, as different stakeholders raise an issue related to the 
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definition of disclosure quality, since different users have different perspectives of disclosure 
quality. Accordingly, the QFLID needs to be taken into consideration by further research.  
7.5. Study’s Limitation 
This research made several contributions to the previous studies and assures that all the 
objectives were achieved. However, this study recognises that it suffers from various 
limitations, discussed below 
Firstly, one of the limitations of this study is that the sample size is restricted to only non-
financial Indian firms listed on the BSE-500 index. It does not take financial companies into 
consideration due to their distinct characteristics of financial statements, as explained in the 
methodology chapter. Hence, the generalisation of this study’s results may be limited due to 
this issue. However, this exclusion is in line with the previous studies (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; 
Alqatamin et al., 2017; Athanasakou & Hussainey, 2014; Hui & Matsunaga, 2014). As Patelli 
& Prencipe (2007) highlight that the extent of disclosure differs across countries, so the 
findings of this study regarding QFLID may not be suitable for companies operating in other 
countries. However, previous studies have given strong evidence that may enable the 
generalisation of this study’s results to a large number of developing countries that have same 
the standards and regulations. 
This study used a single country, India, as its sample. As India is a developing country, this is 
an important contribution, as most of the earlier studies were conducted in developed countries. 
However, this distinct feature limits the generalisation of the results. Due to the use of a single 
country, more research in other developing nations is required. Nonetheless, this is the first 
study conducted in India, so it significantly contributes to the body of knowledge.   
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Secondly, the data collected for the analysis in this study is mainly from annual reports, which 
are available on firms’ websites, and from other databases. Therefore, any issues or problems 
of significance which affect the QFLID might have a negative impact on the validity of the 
research results. However, Botosan (1997 p. 331) recognises that annual reports are the most 
reliable and trustworthy information source. The use of annual reports is in line with the 
previous studies (Adjaoud et al., 2007; Alnabsha et al., 2017; Alqatamin et al., 2017; Eng & 
Mak, 2003; Kuzey, 2018; La Rosa & Liberatore, 2014). 
Thirdly, further limitations might be linked to the scoring procedures of the FLID index. This 
research follows the procedures that were broadly used in prior research. As clarified in the 
methodology chapter, this research employs a scoring process that is considered to be 
subjective. Conversely, every effort is made by the current study to minimise subjectivity 
which might affect the findings.  
Finally, the models which are used to test the study hypotheses are likely to suffer from the 
omission of particular variables, leading to a factor bias related to CG, QFLID, FV and 
ACUAF. However, this research has taken several steps to decrease the occurrence possibility 
of this problem, including tests for the fixed or random effects models, using alternative 
measurements, robustness tests and controlling endogeneity problems. Adopting various 
methods is in line with the earlier studies (Beiner et al., 2006; Gippel et al., 2015; Ntim et al., 
2015; Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012).  
7.6. Suggestions for Future Research 
This study highlights potential areas that can be used by future researchers to conduct further 
research. Firstly, as this research examines the association between CG mechanisms and 
QFLID among non-financial Indian firms listed on the BSE-500 index, any future research can 
focus on financial companies to provide a broader understanding of the association between 
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QFLID and CG mechanisms. This would significantly contribute to the literature of both 
QFLID and CG. This research also investigates the association between QFLID and both FV 
and ACUAF, therefore it suggests that future research can examine this relationship by taking 
financial firms into consideration to provide comprehensive understanding of these areas. Since 
the current study focuses on the impact of QFLID on both FV and ACUAF, it will be more 
interesting for future research to examine the impact of QFLID on earnings management. 
Based on the researcher’s knowledge, no other study has examined this relationship. 
Secondly, the current study investigates the relationship between QFLID and CG mechanisms. 
However, future research could consider examining the influence of CG mechanisms by using 
other voluntary disclosure contexts, such as the quality of corporate social responsibility 
disclosure. In addition, this research investigates the association between CG mechanisms and 
QFLID but it does not examine the relationship between CG and both FV and ACUAF. It 
would be interesting to conduct a study to investigate the impact of CG mechanisms on FV and 
ACUAF, as it would provide new insight information for academics and regulators.   
Finally, this study focuses on only one country: India. The current study’s designs can be 
conducted in other nations. Since previous studies have argued that a number of factors such 
as culture, religion and other societal norms may influence FLID (Gautam & Singh, 2010; 
Hastings, 2000), the present study might be an interesting topic for future research. This may 
also encourage academic researchers to examine the influence of countries’ characteristics. 
India has different environmental contexts, religions, and cultures as one of the developing 
nations. Therefore, future research might expand the present research’s designs by using 
samples from different nations in the analysis. Cross-country analysis might offer wider 
evidence in terms of managers’ incentives to disclose more QFLID which would increase both 
FV and ACUAF. This would provide a better understanding and contribute significantly to the 
body of knowledge.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 4.1: List of 35 forward-looking Key words 
Number Forward Key words 
1 Accelerate 
2 Anticipate 
3 Await 
4 Coming financial year(s) 
5 Coming months 
6 Confidence (or confident) 
7 Convince 
8 Current financial year 
9 Envisage 
10 Estimate 
11 Eventual 
12 Expect 
13 Forecast 
14 Forthcoming 
15 Hope 
16 Intend (or intention) 
17 Likely (or unlikely) 
18 Look forward (or look ahead) 
19 Next 
20 Novel 
21 Optimistic 
22 Outlook 
23 Planned (or planning) 
24 Predict 
25 Prospect 
26 Remain 
27 Renew 
28 Scope for (or scope to) 
29 Shall 
30 Shortly 
31 Should 
32 Soon 
33 Will 
34 Well placed (or well positioned) 
35   Year(s) ahead 
Source: (Hussainey et al. 2003, P. 277). 
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Appendix 4.2: FLID categories and items 
No Item Studies which used the items 
A Environmental around the 
company: 
 
1 General economic factors 
affecting future business. 
 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Beretta and Bozzolan (2007), 
Bozzolan and Mazzola (2007), Lim et al. (2007), Hossain 
et al. (2005), Hutton et al. (2003), Vanstraelen et al. (2003), 
Robb et al. (2001)  
 
2 General industry factors 
affecting future business. 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Beretta and Bozzolan (2007), 
Bozzolan and Mazzola (2007), Hossain et al. (2005), 
Hutton et al. (2003), Vanstraelen et al. (2003), Robb et al. 
(2001)  
 
3 Social factors affecting 
future business 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Lim et al., (2007), Hutton et al. 
(2003), Vanstraelen et al. (2003), Robb et al. (2001), Cahan 
and Hossain (1996)  
4 Firm-specific factors 
affecting future business  
 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Vanstraelen et al. (2003), Robb et 
al. (2001)  
5 Forecast of potential future 
risk. 
 
 
Alqatamin et al. (2017), Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Bozzolan 
and Ipino (2007)  
6 Technological factors 
affecting future business 
 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Lim et al., (2007), Hossain et al. 
(2005), Vanstraelen et al. (2003), Robb et al. (2001), Cahan 
and Hossain (1996)  
7 Legislation with future 
positive or negative 
consequences (political 
factors affecting future 
business). 
Alqatamin et al. (2017), Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Beretta 
and Bozzolan (2007), Lim et al. (2007), Hossain et al. (2005), 
Vanstraelen et al. (2003), Robb et al. (2001), Cahan and 
Hossain (1996)  
9  Competitive position. 
 
Alqatamin et al. (2017), Vanstraelen et al. (2003), Robb et al. 
(2001)  
9 Discussion about firm’s next 
year’s operating plans.  
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014) 
B Company trend:  
1 Value of firm increase or 
decrease 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Kent and Ung (2003)  
2 Discussion of future industry 
trend 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Walker and Tsalta (2001)  
3 Growth or shrinkage in 
market share 
 
 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Hossain et al. (2005), Vanstraelen 
et al. (2003), Robb et al. (2001), Walker and Tsalta (2001), 
Cahan and Hossain (1996)  
4 Future growth rate  Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Hossain et al. (2005)  
5 Forecast of production and 
innovation 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Kent and Ung (2003), Cahan and 
Hossain (1996)  
C Strategic information:  
1 Discussion about corporate 
strategy. 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), 
2 Mission, broad objectives 
and strategy to achieve broad 
objective 
Alqatamin et al. (2017), Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), 
Vanstraelen et al. (2003), Robb et al. (2001)  
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3 Description of capital 
projects 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Hossain et al. (2005), Clarkson et 
al (1999), Cahan and Hossain (1996)  
4 Discussion of future business 
opportunity of disposal and 
acquisition 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Lim et al., (2007)  
5 Expansion of line of 
business 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Hossain et al. (2005), Clarkson et 
al. (1999)  
D Financial information:  
1 Forecast of profit  Alqatamin et al. (2017) 
2 Forecast of income  Alqatamin et al. (2017) 
3 Forecast of sales and 
revenue 
Alqatamin et al. (2017), Hassanein and Hussainey (2015), 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Hussainey and Wang (2013), 
Bozzolan and Mazzola (2007), Lim et al. (2007), Hossain et 
al. (2005), Mek and Eng (2003), Meek et al. (1995), Kent and 
Ung (2003), Walker and Tsalta (2001), Cahan and Hossain 
(1996), Clarkson et al. (1994)  
4 Forecast of earning. 
 
 
Hassanein and Hussainey (2015), Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), 
Hussainey and Wang (2013), Bozzolan and Mazzola (2007), 
Lim et al. (2007), Hossain et al. (2005), Hutton et al. (2003), 
Kent and Ung (2003), Mek and Eng (2003), Walker and 
Tsalta (2001), Cahan and Hossain (1996), Meek et al. (1995), 
Clarkson et al. (1994)  
5 Forecast of cash flows 
 
 
Alqatamin et al. (2017), Hassanein and Hussainey (2015), 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Hussainey and Wang (2013), 
Bozzolan and Mazzola (2007), Lim et al., (2007), Hossain et 
al. (2005), Hutton et al. (2003), Cahan and Hossain (1996), 
Meek et al. (1995), Chow and Wong-Boren (1987)  
6 Forecast of investment 
activities. 
 
 
Hassanein and Hussainey (2015), Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), 
Hussainey and Wang (2013), Bozzolan and Mazzola (2007), 
Walker and Tsalta (2001)  
7 Forecast of capital structure 
 
Alqatamin et al. (2017), Hassanein and Hussainey (2015), 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Hussainey and Wang (2013), 
Bozzolan and Mazzola (2007), Bozzolan and Ipino (2007) 
8 Forecast of dividend per 
share 
Hassanein and Hussainey (2015), Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), 
Hussainey and Wang (2013), Hossain et al. (2005), Kent and 
Ung (2003), Walker and Tsalta (2001), Cahan and Hossain 
(1996)  
9 Forecast of Capital 
expenditure 
Alqatamin et al. (2017), Hassanein and Hussainey (2015), 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Hussainey and Wang (2013), 
Hutton et al. (2003), Walker and Tsalta (2001)  
10 Factors affecting future tax Hassanein and Hussainey (2015), Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), 
Hussainey and Wang (2013), Clarkson et al. (1999)  
11 Forecast of cost reduction Hassanein and Hussainey (2015), Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), 
Hussainey and Wang (2013), Bozzolan and Mazzola (2007)  
12 Forecast of losses Alqatamin et al. (2017), Hassanein and Hussainey (2015), 
Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), Hussainey and Wang (2013)  
13 Forecast of margin Hassanein and Hussainey (2015), Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), 
Hussainey and Wang (2013) 
14 Forecast of interest rate Hassanein and Hussainey (2015), Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), 
Hussainey and Wang (2013) 
15 Future contribution  Hassanein and Hussainey (2015), Abed and Al-Najjar (2014), 
Hussainey and Wang (2013) 
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Appendix 5.1: The Result of Chow Test (CG and FLID) 
 
 
 
Appendex 5.2: The Result of Hausman’s Test (CG and FLID) 
 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0: F(211, 1888) = 81.79                  Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .92865855   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .02420119
     sigma_u      .087316
                                                                              
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      375.37
                 chi2(19) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
 companytype      .0000364    -.0000765        .0001129               .
        size      .0698989     .0635114        .0063875        .0002162
      Growth      -.005453    -.0059869        .0005338               .
   Liquidaty     -.0013653    -.0016724        .0003071               .
         ROA       .024128     .0208814        .0032466               .
     Leverge     -.0025405     .0003295         -.00287               .
         GAC      .0178765     .0168938        .0009827               .
       ACEXP     -.0015596     .0008976       -.0024572               .
         IAC     -.0099656    -.0114432        .0014776               .
         ACM      .0018843     .0017697        .0001146               .
       ACSIZ      .0012351     .0011111         .000124               .
      ProOwn      .0155141     .0085039        .0070102               .
      InsOwn     -.0121895    -.0099293       -.0022602               .
      BloOwn      .0040454     8.17e-06        .0040372               .
          GB       .047909     .0561815       -.0082725               .
          BI      .0157804      .015536        .0002444               .
         FBM      .0015604     .0016965        -.000136               .
          DP     -1.31e-06     .0004853       -.0004866        .0000877
        BSIZ      .0013649     .0013424        .0000224               .
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
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Appendix 5.3: Endogeneity (Wu-Hausman test) (CG and FLID) 
 
 
 
Appendix 5.4: The result of normality test (CG and QFLID) 
 
 
 
 
 
  Wu-Hausman F(13,2085)           =  3.85494  (p = 0.0000)
  Durbin (score) chi2(13)         =   49.689  (p = 0.0000)
  Ho: variables are exogenous
  Tests of endogeneity
. estat endog
0
2
4
6
8
D
e
n
s
it
y
-.6 -.4 -.2 0 .2 .4
Residuals
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Appendix 5.5: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity (CG and 
QFLID) 
 
 
 
  
1 . estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of Accuracy 
chi2(1) = 44.11 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1436 
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Appendix 6.1: The Result of Chow Test (FLID and FV) 
 
 
Appendix 6.2: The Result of Chow Test (QFLID and ACUAF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F test that all u_i=0: F(211, 1902) = 16.12                  Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .69412043   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .97450607
     sigma_u    1.4680023
                                                                              
F test that all u_i=0: F(211, 1901) = 82.39                  Prob > F = 0.0000
                                                                              
         rho    .92703586   (fraction of variance due to u_i)
     sigma_e    .02468786
     sigma_u    .08799883
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Appendex 6.3: The Result of Hausman’s test (FLID and FV) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =       49.82
                  chi2(6) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
 companytype      .0216629     .0204903        .0011726        .0044951
        size     -1.447385    -.9700118       -.4773735        .0681598
      Growth     -.0630588    -.0504991       -.0125597               .
   Liquidaty     -.0357241    -.0251333       -.0105908        .0029606
     Leverge     -.0751075     -.134772        .0596645        .0796825
     Quality      5.437819     2.197201        3.240618        .5902906
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
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Appendex 6.4: The Result of Hausman’s Test (FLID and ACUAF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                (V_b-V_B is not positive definite)
                Prob>chi2 =      0.0000
                          =      604.08
                  chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)
    Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic
            B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
                           b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
                                                                              
 companytype      .0000498    -.0000606        .0001104               .
        size      .0744221     .0682846        .0061375        .0002402
      Growth     -.0055945    -.0060975         .000503               .
   Liquidaty     -.0016766    -.0020016         .000325               .
         ROA      .0264383     .0232913         .003147               .
     Leverge     -.0033289    -.0006264       -.0027025               .
     Quality      .0017646     .0020229       -.0002583               .
                                                                              
                   fixed        random       Difference          S.E.
                    (b)          (B)            (b-B)     sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))
                      Coefficients     
. hausman fixed random
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Appendix 6.5: Endogeneity (Wu-Hausman test) (FLID and FV) 
 
 
 
Appendix 6.6: Endogeneity (Wu-Hausman test) (QFLID and ACUAF) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  Wu-Hausman F(1,2097)            =  7.21633  (p = 0.0073)
  Durbin (score) chi2(1)          =   7.2636  (p = 0.0070)
  Ho: variables are exogenous
  Tests of endogeneity
. estat endog
  Wu-Hausman F(1,2110)            =   11.591  (p = 0.0007)
  Durbin (score) chi2(1)          =  11.5768  (p = 0.0007)
  Ho: variables are exogenous
  Tests of endogeneity
. estat endog
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Appendix 6.7: The result of normality test (QFLID and FV) 
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Appendix 6.8: The result of normality test (QFLID and ACUAF) 
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Appendix 6.9: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity (QFLID and 
FV) 
 
 
Appendix 6.10: Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity (QFLID and 
ACUAF) 
 
 
 
1 . estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of Accuracy 
 
chi2(1) = 2.04 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1529 
 
1 . estat hettest 
 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of Accuracy 
chi2(1) = 29.30 
Prob > chi2 = 0.1678 
